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WHY WORKING-MEN DISLIKE PIECE-WORK.

THE method of piece-work, under which the amount of the remuneration received varies directly with the quantitative efficiency of the labour performed, possesses obvious economic advantages. But, although the large majority of the working-men and working-women of this country, especially of those employed in our manufacturing industries, are engaged under this method, yet there exists in many trades a deep and wide aversion to piece-work, rendering the more general adoption of this system a matter of difficulty. Upon the grounds of this dislike it has been the endeavour of the writer, by means of numerous visits paid to factories and workshops, and by inquiries personally addressed to both employers and employed in many branches of industry, to gain some detailed information.

In submitting the results of my investigations I draw attention to the fact that "piece-work" is a term applied under two distinct sets of industrial conditions, referring in some cases to labour performed by a group of operatives, and in others to labour performed by an individual. The leading characteristic of group piece-work is that the amount of the remuneration received by the "piece-master" (the principal member of the group) is mainly, and in some cases entirely, dependent upon the degree of exertion which he can induce his subordinates to display. When a working-man denounces "the abominable system of piece-work," it will often be found that it is to group work under "the sweating system" that he refers. But the oppressive tendency of a method, of which the very essence consists in putting a premium on "nigger-driving," is so obvious that on this point no explanation is necessary, and I shall confine myself to the exposition of the grounds upon which is based the popular dislike of the method of piece-work, when

applied to the labour of an individual operative, working "single-handed."

One sweeping objection to the method of piece-work rests on grounds moral, no less than material, being founded upon the facilities which piece-work in many instances affords for the growth of irregular habits. Operatives in piece-work trades, and these by no means the least skilful or intelligent, often spend one or more days in total or comparative idleness, making up for the time thus given up to relaxation, not always of the most elevating character, by working at a furious pace during the rest of the week. The validity of this objection to piece-work will be admitted by all who are familiar with the facts.

With regard to the effect of piece-work upon the financial position of the operatives, and the tendency inherent in this system to promote friction between them and their employer, the actual circumstances of the case can only be correctly judged by an examination of the details of workshop life. The most frequent of the disputes, to which piece-work gives rise, are those in which it is suspected that the employer is "getting sixpennyworth of work done for fourpence." The difficulty of fixing to the satisfaction of both parties what constitutes "sixpennyworth of work," varies, of course, in different trades. In many of our great textile industries this difficulty exists only to a small extent. The nature of the work to be done, although varying from time to time, does not vary with very considerable frequency. Yet, even in these industries, the number of the permanent types of work, in relation to which a settlement has to be effected, is very large. Thus, in his "Industrial Conciliation" (p. 39), Crompton says that in the Nottingham hosiery list "there are statements of prices of no less than 6,000 articles." The lists in the cotton trade are compiled with great minuteness, and are based upon most elaborate calculations; the spinners' list taking into account the amount of yarn actually spun, the number of spindles on the mule, and the fineness of the yarn; while the weavers' list allows for the fineness of the yarn or materials, the closeness of the threads, the width of the

cloth, and its length. In these textile trades we have a staple article with numerous, but fairly well defined and comparatively stereotyped, varieties. In the boot trade the demands of fashion necessitate the constant creation of novelties, so that the difficulty of satisfactorily fixing a piece-wage is very great. Yet, even in this case, arrangements have recently been adopted in many centres of the boot trade which promise to overcome this difficulty. When any question arises as to the proper piece-wage to be paid on a new kind of boot, the sample, from which the men are to work, is placed before the Board of Conciliation. This tribunal, upon which both masters and men are represented, compares the sample with certain standard examples —old kinds of boots, in relation to which the piece-wage has already been settled—and, according as the sample more nearly resembles the "seconds," or the "bests" in the standard show-case, so decides whether the novel boot shall be made up on the lower or the higher rate of piece-wage.

In all the cases just cited the principal objection taken to the method of piece-work is in great part removed by special arrangements between the combinations of employees and those of their employers. But there are very many instances in which, on account of the infinite and ever-changing variety of the articles produced, such arrangements as these are deemed impracticable, or in which, although practicable, they do not exist, by reason of the absence of any effective combination among the employees. In such instances the amount of friction caused by the incessant squabbles, which must of necessity take place between the buyer and the seller of labour, can easily be imagined. In some cases the employer appears to pay as high a wage as he can afford, consistently with his making his accustomed rate of profit; in others he will keep an eye on the men's earnings, and, if he thinks that they are making too much money, will lower their piece-wage by "nibbling," *i.e.* by an insidious process of continual petty reductions; in others, again, he will profess his willingness to allow the operatives to earn at the rate of, say, ninepence an hour; but, taking as his standard the rapidity of output exhibited by one or two

exceptionally fast workers—of the class called by working-men "chasers"—the employer fixes the piece-wage so low that, with these exceptions, the operatives are quite unable to earn more than sixpence or sevenpence an hour without over-tasking their energies to a grievous extent.

I may here point out that it is this tendency of employers to take exceptionally quick workers as the standard, and so reduce the pay of the average operative, which is in part (though, as will appear later, not entirely) responsible for the rules, expressed or tacit, which exist among the work-people in many industries with the object of preventing the work being done with more than a certain *maximum* degree of expedition.

So far we have dealt with cases in which the employee knows beforehand what money he is to get for a given amount of work. If in cases like these the method of piece-work frequently makes for discontent, what can we expect when, as is often the case, the relation between the work to be done and the pay to be received is unknown to the workman? Take, for instance, a repairing job; in such a job are included a number of items, which it is usually impossible to price separately, and the number and character of which can frequently not be ascertained at all until the work is all but finished, fresh defects appearing as the stuff is opened up. Is it wonderful that, when employers pay for repairs of this nature by piece-wage, constant and bitter disputes arise? Take, again, the analogous instance of the "lump" system so deeply detested in the cabinet-making trade, of which a description was given in his evidence before the Sweating System Committee by Mr. Jolliffe, secretary of No. 1 Branch of the Alliance Cabinet-makers' Association:

"Lump-work is an abominable system, whereby the employers sometimes will give you a drawing which does not always denote the amount of work that is in it; and when you are started on the job, they will fix a price for it themselves; they do not give you the option of saying whether you can make it for the price or not, and then they introduce more work; but through the severe competition which we are put to, we invariably have to put up with it" (vol. i. p. 316).

Read, too, the evidence given in regard to piece-work in the

upholstery trade. In the workshops of a very well-known firm, the operatives are paid a piece-wage based upon a declared time-basis, each man being rated at a time-wage fixed in accordance with his ascertained speed in working. Now, if a man employed here had a chair given him to do, the piece-wage fixed by the foreman being 2*s.* 3*d.* (say three hours at 9*d.*), then, according to the evidence of Mr. Baum, a working upholsterer, secretary of the London Society of Upholsterers—

> "If by any mischance the wrong covering is given to it, or something is done that he is not able to do it in the three hours (it is not necessary that there should be fault of his own), he does not receive the pay for the additional hour that that chair would take him to do" (vol. i., p. 300).

Even apart from accidental hardships of this kind, the whole system of piece-wage adopted in this factory—a system which there is no reason to believe to be in any very marked degree more oppressive than that prevalent in many others—will be seen by reference to the evidence, not alone of the working-men witnesses, but also of the foreman, under whose exclusive control this labour was organized, to be such as might reasonably excite the suspicion and dislike of an employee possessing a moderate degree of self-respect and independence. When a job is given to a man, so many hours are allowed for its completion; if the man takes, say, two hours longer, then he "drops time," *i.e.* he "works two hours for nothing." Perhaps he may make up his loss by completing his next job in two hours less than the allotted time; perhaps he may not. Now, since the foreman (as he himself said) is partly guided in fixing this time-limit by the necessity of getting the work done at a price which shall leave for his employers (to cover rent, taxes, salary of foreman, etc., and profit) a fixed percentage, since working-men are not prone to believe the estimate of the time required for the execution of a job made by a foreman to be infallibly correct, and since this time-limit is fixed by the absolute arbitrament of this foreman, it is not altogether surprising that this method of piece-work is viewed with strong disapprobation by the operatives engaged in the upholstery trade.

The tendency inherent in the method of piece-wage to excite discontent, especially in cases in which new kinds of work are constantly introduced, is so manifest, as to require no further illustration. In regard to a certain class of cases the piece-wage payable in respect of a novel article may, it is to be hoped, come to be more and more frequently settled by a Board of Conciliation, such as that in the boot trade above described, or by conferences between representatives of the masters and those of the men. In other cases the dispute may be such as is best settled without interference on the part of outside employers or employees, by negotiations between the owner of the particular factory in which this difference arises and his own workpeople. As a means making for peace in such cases as those, I venture to propose the institution, in relation to the work of a manufactory, of one or more committees of explanation formed for the express purpose of avoiding misunderstandings between master and men. As I am fully aware of the profound contempt with which employers of labour are certain to receive any suggestion emanating from one who, not being himself an employer of labour, cannot, of course, be treated as "a practical man," I give as the justification for my proposal a full description of the working of a Chamber of Explanations actually in existence in the mines (which are forty-five in number, and give employment to more than six thousand persons) of the Belgian Coal Companies, Mariemont and Bascoup, taken from the Report on the Social Economy Section of the Paris Exhibition of 1889, by M. Jules Helbronner, Member of the Royal Labour Commission of Canada (pp. 29, 30). This chamber is split up into committees, of which there is one for each separate kind of work. The constitution and operation of these committees is as follows:—

"The committees are delegates chosen by the workmen, and a chief elected by the delegates themselves.

"They meet once every quarter the agents under whose orders they work. The meeting is presided over by the chief engineer of the divisions for the material. The meetings are held during work hours.

"The committee inquire into all matters, differences, disputes, etc., that may have arisen between the workmen and the master (here

represented by the company); they interpose also in settling the rate of wages, and in all difficulties concerning the regulation of the work.

"The following is given as an instance of the importance of those Chambers of Explanations, and of their working; the case was brought before the chambers for the blacksmiths of the shops:—

"A working blacksmith had to do, from plans given him, and at a rate settled by the chief of the shop, certain difficult pieces of work, which had never heretofore been attempted in the shops. When the work was received, it was noticed that the pieces were not made in accordance with the plans, and the workman who had made them having fallen ill, the correction of the work was entrusted to another blacksmith, who undertook the work under reserve, the hammer, according to his opinion, not being strong enough; the result proved him to have been right. An adjuster was then charged with the correction, and succeeded in arranging it. When it was proposed to deduct the price of the work done by the adjuster from the amount agreed upon by the first blacksmith, the latter protested against such a course, pleading—

"1st. That the iron used for the work was not large enough.

"2nd. That the hammer was not strong enough.

"3rd. That the correction of the work was given to another person, and of a different trade.

"In reply it was argued—

"1st. That he was in no way obliged to make use of the iron in question, and the proper iron was to be had in the store.

"2nd. That he had made no protest as to the insufficiency of the hammer.

"3rd. That the correction of the work could not be confided to him, he being sick at the time.

"All the members present and the complainant himself accepted the correctness of these explanations, on condition that, for the future, in similar cases, it should be clearly understood that, reservations being made in time, the workman should not be held responsible."

I submit to the judgment of employers, whether the above is not a fair sample of the kind of disputes that arise every week, and that are, perhaps, the most difficult of all disputes to settle without friction; and, with the apologies due from a mere student of labour questions for venturing to make a suggestion to practical men, I very respectfully ask, whether it is out of the question that such arrangements as these should be generally adopted? My chief ground for hoping that this plan would succeed, if given a fair trial, is the belief that the adoption of

my suggestion would fulfil two main requirements necessary, in my opinion, to the efficient organization of industry. The first rule for a wise employer is to treat his men as honourable and reasonable beings. The second is to appeal, as often as possible, to the collective honour and reason of the whole body of his workmen, or of those belonging to the section concerned. An appeal made to the honour, arguments addressed to the intelligence, of an individual may often fail; for workmen have tempers, like the rest of us. But the aberrations of individual warmth and personal resentment will, in many cases, be corrected by the cool, calm common-sense of the general body, anxious to secure "peace with honour" within the factory.

While I am not without some confidence that questions in regard to piece-work, so far as they affect the purely financial position of the operative, may frequently be satisfactorily disposed of in the manner proposed, there are other and grave objections commonly entertained to the method of piece-wage, which I can hardly hope that my suggestion will remove. I allude, especially, to the objection made to piece-work on the ground of its alleged tendency to promote a degree of exertion considered to be prejudicial to the welfare of the individual workman and of the working-classes generally.

With respect to the dread of over-exertion manifested by working-men, it is of interest to inquire how far such a feeling is reasonable. Probably, although few of us do not know what it is to be "driven," or are unaware that very many persons suffer grave injury, if obliged to work at more than a fair average speed, yet no one, save a man who had himself laboured as a wage-earner, could give a really satisfactory answer to this question. Adam Smith expressly declares that "workmen, when they are liberally paid by the piece, are very apt to overwork themselves, and to ruin their health and constitution in a few years;" and cites a case mentioned by an Italian physician, an authority of repute in relation to the diseases incidental to industrial occupations.

"We do not reckon our soldiers the most industrious set of people

among us. Yet when soldiers have been employed in some particular sorts of work, and liberally paid by the piece, their officers have frequently been obliged to stipulate with the undertaker, that they should not be allowed to earn above a certain sum every day according to the rate at which they were paid. Till this stipulation was made, mutual emulation and the desire of greater gain frequently prompted them to overwork themselves, and to hurt their health by excessive labour" ("Wealth of Nations," bk. i. chap. 8).

With this may be compared the facts narrated to me by the head of a large firm in the tea trade. This employer took some of his labourers, men carrying heavy weights, from simple time-wage, and put them on time-wage piece-work (*i.e.* a time-wage supplemented by a premium on the amount of work done); but, at the end of the first week or so, finding that the hope of earning a large premium had caused the men to gravely over-task their strength, and that they were visibly deteriorating in physique, he took steps to secure their working in future at a more reasonable rate. I think, however, that the degree of over-exertion exhibited in cases like the two just cited may, in a great measure, be accounted for by the considerations urged by McCulloch, who remarks, "that this ultra zeal is not manifested, except in case of parties engaged for a short period only, or when they first begin to work under the system" ("Treatise on Wages," p. 70). Thornton says that piece-work "tends to make men overtask themselves" ("On Labour," p. 315). Lord Brassey "has seen much to confirm" the opinion of Adam Smith stated above, and illustrates its correctness by the case

"of the slaves employed as coffee-carriers in the Brazils. These men are employed in removing bags of coffee, weighing from two to three hundredweight, on their heads, in and out of large warehouses and from the warehouses to the shipping. They often carry these immense weights a distance of three or four hundred yards. The men are the most powerful slaves in the Brazils, and they are paid at a fixed rate, in proportion to the amount of work performed. They work with the most intense vigour, in order to earn as soon as possible a sufficient sum, wherewith to purchase their freedom, and generally succeed in accumulating the amount required in three or four years. But they are a short-lived race, and in their devouring anxiety to accomplish their object, too often sacrifice their health by over-exertion, although they

are well fed on dried meat, or salt meat from the River Plate, eaten with a large quantity of farinaceous food" ("Work and Wages," pp. 267, 268).

This instance, no doubt, shows that men can, if performing exceptionally heavy work, under certainly an exceptionally strong incentive to exertion—stronger than exists in the case of ordinary workmen employed on piece-wage—be tempted into working at a rate seriously injurious to their health. What we would wish to determine, would be the question to what extent the allegation that the method of piece-wage tends to promote over-exertion is borne out by the facts in the case of ordinary workmen.

This is a question to which my own observation does not enable me to give any precise answer. Some men, employed on piece-wage, will strain every nerve to produce a large output; others will produce just so much output as will yield them certain accustomed weekly earnings, and no more; many will purposely turn out less work than they could comfortably produce, because they feel sure that, if the employer sees that they can work at a higher speed, he will alter the standard of remuneration, and nibble their piece-wages down; others, again, will restrict their output in deference to those ideas to which I shall shortly refer under the name of "the theory of the Lump of Labour."

To one point, in particular, I should like to draw attention. In estimating the extent of the injurious pressure exercised by the method of piece-wage it is necessary to take into account, not alone purely physical over-exertion, but also mental strain and worry. Take the case of a man whom I saw making screws; he was working two machines simultaneously, with the assistance of a boy; while, if he had been on time-wage, nothing would have induced him to work more than one machine. It is unquestionable that the nervous tension involved, in many cases, in looking after two machines at the same time is considerable. What is more, workmen in engineering workshops state, as a universal fact, that the work turned out by a man on piece-wage is not, and cannot be, as good as that done by a man on day-wage, and is repeatedly returned, as not

"passing gauge," to be amended "in the man's own time," which circumstance necessarily creates an irritation seriously increasing the strain incidental to this labour. On the other hand, the foreman, under whose supervision the mechanic making the screws just referred to was working, explicitly asserted that the rejection of work done on time-wage was almost as common as that of work done on piece-wage; and I believe this assertion to be not far from the truth.

With a view to ascertaining the actual facts in relation to the pressure incidental to piece-work, I have taken numerous opportunities of watching engineers in different workshops while they worked machines driven by power, such as turning-machines, boring-machines, planing-machines, etc. In some instances the workman would require very frequently to attend to the machine, guiding and regulating its action. But in other cases all the work seemed to be done by the steam, while the mechanic was generally occupied in contemplating the machine, occasionally adjusting it very slightly, but for the most part standing apparently idle, with his hands in his pockets. I could not for a long time see how a man working a machine under circumstances such as these could be led, by being put on piece-wage, into over-exerting his faculties in a manner detrimental to his health, or even to his comfort; until one day I came across a mechanic, working a turning-machine, with whom I was able to chat freely in the temporary absence of the foreman. This operative pointed out that, although, when one of these machines is once set going, there is, for the time being, next to nothing in the way of hard work for the workman in charge of the machine, yet, before it is started, the machine must be "set," *i.e.* the material to be operated upon must be placed in exactly the right position—right to a hair's breadth—in relation to the operating part of the machine; and it is here that, in a case like this, the strain and stress of piece-work come in.

Certainly, we are far too prone to forget that working-men have nerves as well as muscles, and that brain-fatigue is by no means a monopoly of those to whom we ignorantly and arrogantly confine the designation of "brain-workers." Nothing, as

a matter of fact, can be more wearing to a man than to have to perform an operation demanding delicate and accurate adjustment "against time." If we were to compare the case of a workman performing as piece-work a job such as, for example, the boring of a pair of "eccentrics," to that of a surgeon engaged for nine hours in the day in performing a series of operations, such as lithotomy or trepanning, and obliged to do this at high pressure, "against time," we should, after making due allowance for the difference between the two cases, obtain a mental picture which would go far in helping us to realize how great a measure of validity is present in the objection made to piece-work as promoting, under circumstances of frequent occurrence, a kind and degree of exertion injurious to the well-being of working-men.

It might, perhaps, be said that there is no necessary connection between remuneration by piece-wage and special intensity of exertion; because the mechanic, who is on "time-and-a-quarter piece-wage" is under no compulsion, except greed of gain, to work faster than at the normal rate. But, even if a man be quite content to make "time" only, by working only at normal speed, yet he generally has not the option of maintaining this moderate rapidity of output; for an employer, who puts his men on piece-wage, does so with the express object of forcing the pace; and thus a manufacturing engineer told me that he should certainly discharge any man in his employment who failed to make, at any rate, time-and-a-quarter. That a faster pace is maintained where piece-work is the rule, than in workshops and on jobs where the men are employed on time-wage, is certain; and, wherever piece-work obtains, there workmen, who have passed the prime of their vigour, find it difficult, or even impossible, to secure employment—a circumstance which should not be forgotten in considering the causes of the dislike entertained by the working-classes to this method of remuneration.

Whether, in deference to the objections entertained by the working-classes to the method of piece-wage it would be practicable and proper to do away with piece-work, is a question

which it would be difficult to answer in the affirmative, unless one were prepared to assert that, if all our operatives were put on time-wage to-morrow, they would, as a rule, although the stimulus of piece-wage had been removed, display the fullest degree of exertion which they were capable of exhibiting with a due regard to their health and reasonable comfort. Now, to make this assertion would be to insult the working-classes by flattery, not only false, but futile, because its falseness could not escape instant detection and contemptuous contradiction. It is better to tell the truth, which is (1) that men on time-wage do not invariably "do their level best," and (2) that there is an idea prevalent among many, and these by no means the least intelligent of our working-men, that it is wrong for men, whether on time-wage or on piece-wage, to do their level best.

I have already admitted that no one not himself a wage-earning worker can judge with perfect accuracy what constitutes, in relation to the labour of working-men, a due degree of exertion; but that operatives, the amount of whose remuneration does not depend on the amount of their output, frequently saunter over their work in an unjustifiable manner is a fact patent to all who have any familiarity with industry. This fact comes out with special distinctness in cases in which operatives, who have been working on time-wage, are put on to piece-wage. Certain sole-sewing operators, in a boot manufactory with which I am acquainted, when put on piece-wage, were found to have about doubled their output, with the result that four machines, worked by men on piece-wage, were shown to be yielding approximately the same amount of output as seven machines had previously yielded when the operatives were on time-wage. In a bicycle factory the superior activity of men on piece-wage was impressed upon me by my seeing three brazing-hearths out of five standing cold and vacant—a puzzling sight, because the whole place was bustling with work, orders being plentiful. The explanation was that, the men having recently been put on piece-wage, two men were now doing the same amount of work as was formerly done by five men on time-wage. I have, in instances too numerous to mention, found

that the excess of work obtained by putting men on piece-wage has been from 30 to 50 per cent. One instance of this nature deserves special notice. A man employed in a dockyard in making "washers" by the aid of a boring-machine, was asked by a visitor (whom this workman apparently took to be a trade union "investigator") how many washers he was making per day. The answer was—"Now that I am on piece-work, I am making just about double what I used to make when on day-work. *I know I am doing wrong. I am taking away the work of another man.* But I have permission from the Society." The words in italics are referable to the belief so firmly entertained by a large section of our working-classes—whether employed on time-work or on piece-work—the conviction that for a man to exert his energies up to the point which just stops short of undue exertion—to do his level best—is inconsistent with his own interests, and with loyalty to the cause of labour. The basis of this belief, which is in a large measure responsible for the unpopularity of piece-work, is that noteworthy fallacy to which I desire to direct attention under the name of "the theory of the Lump of Labour."

In accordance with this theory it is held that there is a certain fixed amount of work to be done, and that it is best in the interests of the workmen that each shall take care not to do too much work, in order that thus the Lump of Labour may be spread out thin over the whole body of work-people. As the result of this policy, it is believed that, the supply of available labour being in this manner restricted, while the demand for this labour remains (as it is supposed) unchanged, the absorption into the ranks of the employed of those who are now out of work will follow as a necessary consequence. At the same time, since (as it is assumed) two masters will now be running after one man, the operatives, having succeeded in this "corner," will, it is hoped, be able to obtain for their labour a very much better price than at present.

In many of the rules prohibiting a man from doing his level best we can recognize the influence of the ideas now under consideration. Thus the Bradford lodge of the Labourers'

Union was, during the Trade Union Commission of 1867–1869, shown to have the following rule :—

"You are strictly cautioned not to overstep good rules, by doing double the work you are required by the society, and causing others to do the same, in order to get a smile from the master. Such foolhardy and deceitful actions leave a great portion of good members out of employment all the year round."

The theory of the Lump of Labour will be seen to rest upon the utterly untenable supposition that a fixed amount of work exists, which has to be done, and will be done, irrespective of the conditions under which work is done, and, in particular, irrespective of the efficiency of the labour employed; and that, the more work is done by any one workman, the less work remains to be done by all other workmen. A full treatment of this subject would take us too far afield. But the character of this fallacy will best be understood, if the objection entertained to a man's doing his level best is compared with the precisely similar objection to a man's using the best available tools; in other words, with the popular objection to the use of motor power and machinery. No clear thinker believes that, in order to provide labour for the unemployed, it is advisable that we should give up steam-ploughs for ordinary iron ploughs, these again for wooden ploughs, and, in the ultimate resort, should abandon these instruments and scratch the ground with the fingers. Just so, in regard to this doctrine of the Lump of Labour, it should be perceived that it is against the best interests of the community at large, and, first and foremost, of the working-classes, for working-men to handicap the industry of the nation in deference to a theory which proclaims it to be the duty of every man to work, as it were, with one hand tied behind his back.

With the question of the length of the working-day we have here nothing to do. Still, I shall not conceal my opinion that the claim of the working-classes to possess an amount of leisure adequate for the purposes of rest, of education, and of recreation is one in an eminent degree deserving of recognition. But, while a reduction of the hours of labour—say,

to eight in the day—may readily be admitted to be, on grounds both economic and social, highly desirable, yet it is no less desirable that during those eight hours every working-man in the country shall, using the best available tools and machinery, and performing as much labour as he can perform without exerting himself to an extent prejudicial to his health or inconsistent with his reasonable comfort, produce as large an output as possible. In the interests of the people as a whole, it is—as I think—expedient that the remuneration of the labour of the industrial classes shall be increased; and, since this remuneration is paid out of the national income, it is a matter of great importance, not only that the working-classes shall succeed in obtaining for themselves a far ampler share in the national income than they at present receive, but also that the productive powers of the working-classes shall be exercised in a manner calculated to secure that this income shall be of the largest possible dimensions.

DAVID F. SCHLOSS.