Reforming to Survive:
The Bolshevik Origins of Social Policies

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The Bolshevik Revolution brought profound social changes to the modern world. This worker-led revolution, with aspirations far beyond the country of origin, became a threat and symbol of revolution to ruling elites around the world. We develop a theory of how elites provide policy concessions when they face credible threats of revolution, highlighting how motivation and capacity of opposition groups influence threats, but also how elites' absorption and interpretation of information signals matters. The Bolshevik Revolution and the formation of Comintern effectively enhanced elites' perceptions of a credible revolutionary threat, as it affected both the capacity and motivation of labor movements, but also the nature and interpretation of information signals, thus incentivizing policy concessions such as reduced working hours and expanded social transfer programs. We assess our argument by using original qualitative and quantitative data. First, using extensive archival resources, we document a change in perceptions of revolution, but also explicitly strategic policy concessions. Second, we use party- and union representatives at the 1919 Comintern meeting as an indicator of the credibility of the domestic revolutionary threat in cross-national analysis. We find that states facing higher revolutionary threats expanded various social policies to a much greater extent. Some of this difference persist up until today.

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Introduction

> The ice has been broken. The Soviets have won all round the world. (…). The new movement advances towards the dictatorship of the proletariat (...). The foundation of the third international, of the Communist International, is the prelude to an International Soviet Republic.
>
> Lenin, 5 March 1919 (quoted in Pons 2014, 7)

The Bolshevik revolution of 1917 constituted one of the most profound social changes in the modern world. A worker-led revolution with aspirations far beyond the country of origin, it was a threat to elites all around the world. While worker organizations had come into existence long before in many countries, the Bolshevik revolution offered a template to action for workers; it was a symbolic event for revolutionaries around the world (Pons 2014). It also promised ideological, logistic, and other forms of support to revolutionaries outside Russia, and effectively split the labor movement, between reformist and revolutionary groups in many countries, leading to the formation of communist parties (Rokkan 1987; Ebbinghaus 1993, 99; Pons 2014). The Russian revolution thus marks the beginning of what Hobsbawm (1994) labels the "short 20th century», characterized by the demarcation of the world into a capitalist- and communist sphere.

In this paper, we address how developments following right after the Bolshevik Revolution – and especially after the formation Comintern – shaped the social policies of various countries, including those that remained firmly within the capitalist camp. We argue that the Bolshevik revolution and workings of the Comintern spurred perceptions of credible revolutionary threats among the elites, who responded with expanding social policies with the intent to appease and defuse the labor threat. Comintern participation, we surmise, enhanced working class revolutionary threats through multiple channels: First, the international network and Russian support that followed Comintern participation increased the capacity of domestic revolutionary actors. Second, participation in Comintern may have altered the ideological outlook in these organizations and groups, if nothing else by strengthening their more radical and revolutionary fractions. Third, a working class party being invited by the Russians to attend Comintern could, in itself, function as an easy-to-identify informational cue that enhanced the perception among elites of a credible revolutionary threat. Elites become convinced that domestic groups are credible revolutionary actors, when the latter have both the requisite resources for effective collective action *and* adhere to a social transformative ideology. Yet, perceptions matter; elites need to receive and interpret information signals suggesting that these groups are both organizationally strong and ideologically radical. Such processing of information by elites may be largely "rational" and unbiased, but it may also be facilitated by the use of cognitive shortcuts that could lead elites to over-evaluate the revolutionary threat. Nonetheless, an increase in perceived revolutionary threat, in turn, induced these elites to pursue large-scale expansions of social transfer programs, reduce working hours, etc., in order to appease the working classes. By expanding social rights and economic benefits, elites hoped to starve of the grievances that could fuel a revolution. Hence, by laying out this argument, we elaborate on one key channel through which early-modern welfare states arose.

Our empirical analysis is two-fold, comprising an in-depth historical case study of Norway 1915–1924 and an extensive cross-country analysis using new measures of revolutionary threats and novel social policy

measures. Together, these analyses provide complementary pieces of evidence that support the argument that fear of revolution drove elites to extend various social policy measures, as concessions, in the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution and formation of Comintern.

For our in-depth case study, we draw on numerous Norwegian-language sources, hitherto unexplored by political scientists. We, for instance, document perceptions on the likelihood of revolution from employer organizations, police, military high command, and politicians, and their strategies for countering this threat. Norway, currently a social democratic welfare state, is of particular theoretical interest, since other major welfare expansions have been interpreted as resulting from social democratic reformism (e.g., Esping-Andersen and Korpi 1985; Korpi 2006; Esping-Andersen 1990) or cross-party welfare state consensus (see, Kuhnle 1981, 1986; and Katzenstein 1984). It would therefore appear that Norway is a hard test case for the proposition that revolutionary fear pushed elites to adopt social policy as counter-measures. What is more important, if revolutionary fear is presented we know it is not directly tied to the Great War, as Norway was neutral during the war. Yet, we describe how Norwegian elites believed the socialist capable of revolution following November 1917. The institutional linkages between the Labor party and the Comintern helped shape this belief. Economic and political elites coordinated their response to this credible revolutionary threat. Both stick- and carrot-tactics were pursued in tandem. Regarding the carrots, elites consciously and very strategically pursued appeasement and inclusion, implementing several extensive reforms that they initially had opposed, including the eight-hour work-day. In line with our expectations, gains that were granted before the revolutionary fear dwindled (in 1923/24), proved persistent, whereas promised policies that were not yet passed before the fear of revolution declined were never implemented. For our cross-country tests, we use novel country-level measures on social policies and labor regulation. The new measures of revolutionary fear that we code are tightly linked to our theoretical argument, and draw on the fact that Trotsky in January 1919 invited revolutionary groups to set-up the Third International in Moscow (Carr 1979). Invitations did not include all labor organizations and were not random, but only sent to truly radical worker groups (to avoid the "ideological contamination" perceived to having spurred the breakdown of the Second International). This allows us to distinguish contexts where labor had adopted a radical ideology from other contexts. Not only should we consider these Russian invitations a true "expert opinion" on which countries in 1918-19 faced revolutionary pressures, we should also consider it a clear signal to elites that domestic labor groups were indeed revolutionary and likely had significant resources at their disposal. Our results show that countries facing a credible communist threat were more likely to limit working hours and pass more extensive (in terms of groups covered) and generous social policy reforms. Various panel and synthetic control matching analyses corroborate these relationships. We also find that this revolutionary shock lingers on; states that experienced greater revolutionary threat in 1917-1919 had lower working hours *today*, everything else equal. Further analysis shows that this persistent relationship exists due to the formation of Communist parties, linked to the Comintern congress and funding from Moscow.

Argument

In this section, we first present the particular empirical context that we study, namely the aftermath of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia and the formation of Comintern. Thereafter, we present our more general theoretical argument on which features make an organization or group pose a credible threat of revolution, at least as perceived by incumbent elites. In extension, we discuss how perceived revolutionary threats may spur social legislation.

A brief overview of the Bolshevik Revolution and formation of Comintern

1917 was the starting year of the Russian Revolution, which would eventually bring power to the Bolsheviks, thus leading to a Communist great power that would shake up the international system, both in the short- (e.g., Russian withdrawal from WWI) and long term. The Bolsheviks saw their own revolution as a prelude to a greater World Revolution (Pons 2014, 15), and even considered the spread of the revolution outside of Russia as key to the long-term survival of their own regime (Pons 2014, 8-9; Car 1979, 12-13).

Comintern was thus established to guide revolutionary groups outside of Russia Agnew & McDermott 1998). Comintern was de facto controlled by the Politburo of the Russian Communist Party, and worked alongside the Russian ministry of foreign affairs (Pons 2013, 12). Its mission, in Trotsky's (1919) words, was to bring together the true revolutionaries of the world, eschewing the "reformist class traitors". It would establish local branches around the world to spread propaganda, and later require that all member parties adhere to the 21 points set down by Lenin at the second conference, including that current capitalist societies had progressed to a state of "civil war" (Sundvall 2018). Comintern would also provide extensive funding for communist parties in the making around the world (Agnew & McDermott 1998).

In the words of E.H. Carr (1979, 13), for a while, "the hope of a world revolution seemed too materialize". Worker- and soldier councils, strike waves, uprisings and unionization numbers surged around the world (Cronin 1980). Still, any hope of worldwide revolution was short-lived, as no communist regime outside of Russia materialized. In 1921, Lenin admitted as much, noting that the revolutionary trajectory had "not been as linear as we had expected" (Lenin 1921). Hopes of a world revolution were further mitigated with the defeat of the Russian armies outside of Warszawa in 1922 and the failed uprisings in Germany 1923 (Hobsbawm 1994).

Why was the Bolshevik revolution not followed by similar (successful) revolutions around the world? Moreover, even if it did not result in major revolutions, did it lead to major political and policy changes outside of Russia? The resolution to these questions lies in recognizing that while the revolution acted as a symbol for labor and revolutionaries across the world, so too did it inspire counter-strategies by economic and political elites. Fearing revolution, elites responded by a series of political and economic reforms, which aim was to appease and create vested interests among (moderate parts of) the labor movements in capitalist democratic regimes. Below, we outline a more general theoretical argument on why and how elites may respond to credible revolutionary threats by strategically providing policy concessions.

Elites, preferences and coalitions

Why would economic and political elites accept and pursue extensive social policy arrangements that redistribute resources to relatively poor segments of society?[1] The welfare state literature and theories of democratization provide different responses; with the danger of oversimplifying, we may distinguish between cross-class theories and class-based theories. The former argues that some parts of the anti-elite groups and elites can form pro-redistribution coalitions, against other elites. The latter assumes that redistribution is a zero-sum game between elites and non-elites, and suggests that the main explanatory factor behind redistributive policies is the institutional environment and how it affects the power balance between elites and other citizens.

One strand of so-called cross-class theories of welfare expansion focus on businesses interests, arguing that employers and their political representatives can gain from welfare state development and labor regulation (Iversen and Soskice 2009, 2010; Martin and Swank 2012; Hall and Thelen 2009; Hall and Gingrich 2009; Schneider 2009). For instance, sectoral features related to exposure to international competition (Mares 2003) or corporatist organizational structures (Martin and Swank 2012) could drive some employers to support some welfare state policies.[2]

Despite these incentives for certain elite groups, power resource theorists and class theories of democratization (e.g., Ruschmeyer et. al. 1992; Korpi 2006; Boix 2003; Acemoglu & Robinson 2006) suggest that elites are often inherently resistant to most forms of labor regulations or redistributive policies. However, even if elites are inherently resistant, our theoretical argument below highlights how elites may change from being antagonists to concenters when it comes to expanding social policy.

Power resources, ideology and signals

If elites initially resist the legislation of redistributive social policies, how can they come to consent or even promote such policies? We argue that elites become concenters or even protagonists when they face a credible revolutionary threat to their political and economic power. Elites would rather consent to such policies and lose out monetarily from redistribution in its milder form (e.g., increased taxation and spending on social programs) than risk revolution, which entails a change in the societal and political power structure *and* redistribution in more extreme forms (nationalization, collectivization).

This argument follows key rationalist contributions to the democratization literature (e.g., Aidt & Toke 2014; Acemoglu & Robinson 2000, 2006; Boix 2003) in highlighting that elites may provide concessions to the lower classes in order to avoid revolution. In these works, the concessions come in the form of political

[1] By elites we mean a set of groups and individuals that they have an intrinsic interest in maintaining both of the current economic system and organization (e.g., capitalism with private property), and the existing political regime. In our context, elites encompass important conservative and liberal forces such as parties mobilizing these groups, but also employers, capitalists, and landowners and their organizations.

[2] A prevalent such argument is the skill-supply argument (Iversen and Soskice 2001, 2009). Employers require employees to make (inherently risky) investments in skills that are specific to sectors, industries, or even firms. By promoting social insurance, employees know that their risky investments will be compensated even if they lose their employment in the future. This, in turn, increases employees willingness to invest in profitable, specific skills that particular employers require, inducing these groups to form pro-redistribution alliances and expand the welfare state.

liberalization and suffrage expansions, which in turn shifts political power to the lower classes and thereby ensuring future redistribution. Counter to the argument in Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), however, we highlight that regime change and franchise expansion are not *necessary requisites* for credible guarantees of future redistribution (though they certainly help). Instead, we follow Knutsen and Rasmussen (2018), who highlight that the legislation of new social programs, and other major policy initiatives, create lock-in effects and serve to tie elites to these programs once initiated. Not only do sunk costs with starting up programs create lock-in effects, but discontinuing a popular program also creates a clear focal point on which opponents of the regime/policy change may organize effective, large-scale opposition (Knutsen and Rasmussen 2018).[3] In contrast, mere promises of future policy initiatives should not be considered credible, as also our case study below on Norway suggests.

If credible revolutionary threats drive elites to provide social policy concessions, a decisive question for understanding welfare state expansion therefore becomes what factors shape how elites view the likelihood of revolution?

First, opposition groups must possess power resources. For labor movements, key resources have historically resided in hierarchical and effective organizations that enable them to solve collective action problems and mobilize large numbers, including youth organizations, trade unions, and party organizations (Korpi 2006; Esping-Andersen 1990; Paster 2013). While domestic, organizational capacities have been at the center of attention in studies on unions and labor parties, international linkages is another key factor. Such linkages may provide monetary resources and organizational know-how, even for smaller groups. Notably, our empirical study will highlight the role of Comintern in advancing domestic organizational structures, even the creation of new Communist parties. As an example, the Comintern smuggled diamonds in chocolate bars and spent £55 000 to set up the British communist party in 1920-21 (Thorpe 1998, 648).

Second, for a revolutionary threat to be credible, opposition groups should espouse an ideology of radical societal transformation, for instance aiming to transform in the ownership structure of the economy by socializing property. Pursuing legislative change through parliament may also be explicitly rejected, with the movement instead focusing on extra-parliamentary action such as strikes or mass-revolutionary action to spur social change (Duverger 1954), perhaps even considering violent means as legitimate.[4] For labor movements, historically, this description fits to parties and unions adhering to Communism or the Zimmerwald movement as opposed to the reformism of social democrats and the second international (Carr 1961; Lipset 1982).

Third, elites must receive some sort of signal, some indication of the intention and resources of the opposition groups, which they must subsequently interpret (Fearon 1994; Weyland 2019). The nature and

[3] For other arguments on the importance of social policies in diffusing pressure against the regime or increasing legitimacy, see e.g, Kim (2007).

[4] We do not require that such groups take actual steps to pursue a violent revolution in order for them to be relevant for our argument. Instead, it may suffice that they espouse a revolutionary *rhetoric* that appear to herald a coming revolution, insofar as elites interpret as a credible signal of willingness to revolt.

interpretation of such signals will shape elites' perceptions of the credibility of revolutionary threats. In some contexts, revolutionary movements may send strong and clear signals on their motivations and resources. In other contexts, it is harder to send accurate and/or credible signals. Indeed, reformist labor unions or parties who would be unwilling to engage in revolutionary activities might have incentives to "bluff", and pose as revolutionary in order to obtain concessions.[5] Thus, elites may have a hard time distinguishing revolutionaries from reformists.

Yet, the elites' capacity to absorb signals and how they go about in interpreting these signals are also key to perceptions of revolutionary threats. While some elites may be able to fairly rationally decipher information about the motivation and capacity of opposition groups, and update beliefs in a relatively unbiased manner, many elites presumably make decision under uncertainty and time-pressure, and are therefore likely to use various cognitive short cuts (e.g., Nisbett and Ross 1980; Fiske and Taylor 1991; Tetlock 2005; for applications to democratization see Aidt and Toke 2014; Weyland 2014, 2019). Revolutions are complex and relatively rare events, making it even harder for elite actors to analyze prospects of revolutions without relying on cognitive short-cuts. Under the common assumption that the past is likely to reflect the future, elites may thus be comparing current events in search of patterns found in past revolutionary settings (Aidt & Toke 2014), for which the Bolshevik Revolution long remained the primary reference point. Therefore, while Lenin had used the history of the French revolution, revolutionaries and elites used the Russian-revolution as the primary reference (Hobsbawm 1994). In addition, given the so-called "availability heuristic" (see, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman 1973), elites, as other people, may inadvertently focus on large and salient events, thus over-estimating the true baseline probability of revolution. Since big historical events create symbols that work as cognitive maps to understand current events, the Bolshevik revolution is likely to have formed many elites' perceptions of conditions in their own country.

When considering our particular research context, ties with the Russian revolutionary regime in the aftermath of 1917, and especially membership in the Comintern in 1919, may have served to enhance all the three above-mentioned aspects that make for a credible revolutionary threat. First, Comintern often provided material resources directly to relevant movements and helped the founding of new Communist parties, thus enhancing organizational capacity. Second, the related international network and exchanges presumably diffused revolutionary ideology. Third, Comintern membership served as a strong signal to elites, increasing fears that a revolution may soon be coming to their country.

In the face of perceived credible revolutionary threats, we argue that elites should respond by pursuing a strategy of co-option by extending rights. Co-option comes in two forms, political and economic. Political co-optation includes granting equal rights to participation to previously excluded groups. Economic co-optation includes granting greater access to material resources for the group in question. Both strategies aim

[5] In the appendix B, we show that reformist labor MPs consequently highlighted that the parliamentary line of the reformist would only be viable if elites granted major concessions.

at defusing revolutionary threats by increasing the legitimacy of the current system and mitigating core grievances of the opposition.

The group that constituted the primary threat in the period that we study was manual and skilled urban labor, organized in labor unions and various socialist parties (Ruschmeyer et. al. 1992). Hence, in our research context, policies introduced to stem revolutionary threats should primarily be designed to benefit this group; political reforms should aim at including socialist parties in political institutions, and social policies should target risks commonly associated with urban labor, such as unemployment. One important demand made by labor was the eight hour-day/48-hour week. Such regulation had been a key demand already by the First Socialist International; in 1866, the congress declared, "the limitation of the work day is the fundamental reform, which without all other struggles for liberation are doomed to fail. We propose 8 hours as a law regulated maximum limit for the working day". Employers in various countries had resisted this policy change. While demanded by labor on all continents, the first decree would come during the Russian revolution of 1905 and it was one of the first changes made by the Bolsheviks in November 1917, setting a concrete standard for labor movements in other countries where revolution had not (yet) taken hold. If employers and governments wanted to co-opt labor to avoid revolution, the eight-hour day would arguably be a prime policy tool for doing so.

Case study: The Bolshevik Revolution and revolutionary fear in Norway

In Appendix B, we present a long and detailed case study of early-20th century Norway, drawing on numerous archival and other sources. Here, we present the condensed version showing how various Norwegian elites thought that a revolution was imminent, at least during 1918-19 and 1920-21. We further show how these elites, in response to this perceived threat, pursued a complex "sticks and carrots" strategy to avoid a revolution. Notably, the carrots included changes to working hours, as we detail here, but also several other policies. We focus on the eight-hour day given that this was a central demand by labor, but the trajectory and timing of policy-making in this area is similar for several other policies. In the appendix, we describe developments related to the question of socialization, employee's representation in management, changes in electoral rules, collective agreements and old-age pensions.[6] The elite's aim of pursuing these measures was to incorporate and strengthen the reformist part of the labor movement (Furre 1983; Knutsen 1994, 43-46). In brief, our case study documents the following developments:

A) Labor underwent a clear change following right after the Bolshevik revolution, strengthening the radical elements at the cost of the reformist ones.
B) Elites came to believe that revolution was possible and imminent. This belief was directly tied to foreign revolutionary events, Comintern membership, and the adoption of radical ideology in large parts of the worker movement.

[6] The only social policy initiatives of the 1915-1922 period we do not cover is payment of extraordinary unemployment benefits, social housing and arbitration rules. We would expect to see similar patterns for these polices.

C) Elites responded by various measures aimed at incorporating the labor movement politically (such as changes in electoral rules) and economically (various social policies).
D) These reforms had previously been resisted by both economic and political elites, and further developments and reforms were also slowed down or halted when the fear of revolution dissipated after a few years.

Norwegian labor going revolutionary

The Norwegian Labor Party (Det Norske Arbeiderparti [DNA]), founded in 1887, was inspired by Marxist thinking from its inception. The first party program stated that DnA «endeavors the handing over of the means of production to social common property and production changed from capitalistic to socialistic" (DnA landsmøteprotokol 1891). Such ideas were slowly abandoned as reformism became the leading principle before the turn of century, acknowledging the importance of achieving social change through legislation in parliament. The trade union federation (Arbeidernes Faglige Landsorganisasjon, AFL), founded on the behest of the party in 1899, was a means to achieve changes in wage- and working-conditions through bargaining with employers. DnA and AFL were bound by the hip, and dual membership was practiced. The unions and party coordinated their demands against employers and politicians. At the start of 1917, reformist leaders such as Olaf Lian held leadership positions in both the DnA and AFL.

Before 1918, radical elements were thus delegated to a minority position, largely originating from "Fagoposisjonen" of 1911 – a syndicalist movement within AFL – and the social democratic youth organization. Fagoposisjonen argued for the use of sabotage, boycott, and sympathy strikes as legitimate weapons against employers (Olstad 2009, 173). Its leader, Martin Tranmæl, wanted to radicalize the union movement, "to make it ready for revolutionary mass-action" (Bjørgum 2017, 45).

The 1917 revolution strengthened the radical movement, especially in DnA (Rasmussen et. al 2020). Tranmæl's first reaction to the revolution in March 1917 was to see it as the beginning of the "fall of class-society and the introduction of socialism" (Bjørgum 2017, 44). Tranmæl demanded that workers organize a general strike against the war, and arm themselves against the coming counter-revolutionary attempts by the bourgeoisie. The November revolution would decisively change the power balance in favor for the radicals within DnA (Furre 1983; Bjørnson 1990; Sundvall 2017). The news from Russia led to major organizational and ideological transformations almost immediately. The labor paper, *Klassekampen* published the Zimmerwald declaration to *"*establish everywhere soldier and worker councils as your body in the struggle for peace*!"* (Bjørnson 1990, 509). The radicals, led by Tranmæl, would establish and coordinate worker- and soldier councils all around the country, usually outside of the established trade unions (Nordvik 1974). These organizations offered Tranmæl a base of support outside the established frameworks of DnA and AFL. Moreover, among the resolutions adopted at the worker councils national conference on March 24 1918 was the immediate introduction of the 8 hour day, and in case the government ignored their demands, the use of "political mass-strikes" (Bjørnson 1990, 516-517).

By 1918, the radicals had gone from being a minority to gaining enough support to challenge the reformists. Their recommendation to the national party meeting of March 1918 stated that DNA "must … reserve the right to use revolutionary mass-action in the fight for the working-class economic liberation" (DnA landsmøteprotokol 1918). The reformists lost at the 1918 meeting, and the radicals gained majority. Most importantly, Tranmæl would become party-secretary, with all of the reformists relinquishing their place in the party-leadership.

In November 1918, the new party leadership believed a revolution possible. Several members of the leadership even started working on (subsequently abandoned) plans on "arrangements for a quick takeover of power" (Furre 1983, 473). Notes from the planning group show that a coup would be facilitated by the massive organization of worker councils, and the immediate reforms to be carried out once in power was socialization of the means of production and the eight-hour day. Tranmæl was designated the role as "leader of the revolution" (Ibd. 473-476).

The radical line was further strengthened in 1919, when the Labor party national convention declared that the "party considers mass action in its various forms to be the crucial means in the struggle for socialism" and even encouraged MPs to strike and soldier councils to be formed and to work against mobilization (DnA landsmøteprotokol 1919, 12). Norway was perceived to be in a "state of maturation for the revolution and socialism".[7] Importantly, DnA decided to become member of the Comintern.

Vice-chairman Emil Stang was the single delegate representing the party at the First Congress in 1919, and the party joined the Comintern in late 1919. On the second conference, however, DnA had one of the biggest delegations: 10 delegates arrived in Moscow, including the youth organization leader, (and later PM) Einar Gerhardsen. At this conference, Zinonev, the leader of Comintern, presented "Lenin's 21 thesis", outlining the rules for admission to Comintern. The explicit aim of Comintern would be to establish organizations that could function as divisions in the European civil war. In other words, the aim was to create communist parties that could survive the coming world revolution (Sundvall 2017). This revolutionary ideology would be too much for some reformists within DNA. In 1921, they broke out and established the Norwegian Social Democratic Party, achieving about 10 percent of the vote. These reformists would not re-join DnA until 1927.

DnA took an active role in both legal and illegal work in Comintern. A secret committee carried through illegal transportation of Soviet propaganda materials (Furre 1983; 468-9). Party offices were used to hide illegals traveling to and from Russia, and prominent DnA members participated in smuggling coordinated with Moscow. A report to the Office for Intelligence by the Army Gerneral Staff reveal that there existed a secret agreement between DnA and Comintern, under which DnA accepted to undertake all orders from Moscow, in exchange for political, financial and military resources (Olstad 1998, 39).

[7] DnA landsmøteprotokoll 1919, 12. Social-demokraten. 8 may. 1919.

In 1922, the high court barrister and communist Ludvig Meyer was tasked to investigate the opportunities for revolutionary action, and concluded that "Norway is on the verge of breakdown, which can be exploited by a tax-strike and by pushing for demands that could rally the workers against the government." (Olstad 1998, 49).. Despite the perceived feasibility of a revolution, the Comintern adherents in the Labor party now pushed for a moderate line, following signals from the third international conference. Over time, this created a rift in the revolutionary wing, which pushed Tranmæl and his ilk to embrace the remaining social democrats that had not left the party in 1921. Tranmæl also wanted to use the dual membership of union and party to build a revolutionary movement "from below". Comintern, with its concept of party cells, wanted dual membership revoked. Subsequently, DnA voted to leave Comintern in 1923. The pro-Comintern group would leave DnA and establish the Norwegian Communist Party (Norges Kommunistiske Parti [NKP]) in November 1923, with 13 MPs defecting. In 1924, only six of these MPs would be re-elected, suggestive of the more general power shift towards reformists and away from revolutionaries from this point onwards.

Elites and revolutionary threat

The above-described developments were not lost by the economic and political elites in Norway. The revolution of 1917 and the following power change in DnA fundamentally changed perceptions of the labor movement and security situation in the military, business community, and among liberal and conservative political elites. Prior to 1917, the military establishment and political elites shared the opinion that military engagement in internal affairs should be avoided (Agøy 1994, 32-34). By 1918, focus had shifted from external- to internal threats. First, steps were taken to set-up "risk-free" military divisions, i.e., excluding members of the lower classes (Pettersen 2010), which could be mobilized during general strikes or strikes targeting strategic infrastructure. . At various times, military divisions and battleships would be mobilized as pre-emptive measures against strikes getting out of hand. The political elite was perhaps even more concerned than the military. In early 1918, leading cabinet members feared an outright coup (Agøy 1994; 94). The Prime Minister Gunnar Knudsen established a secret security commission, mandated to "secure peace and order if civilian government was brought down" (Pettersen 2010, 43).The security commission was summoned to convene again on November 12, 1918 following the revolutionary events in Germany. The military secret services and the police was tasked to increase their surveillance and to further develop plans to carry out a successful defense against a coup.

After the entry of DnA into the Comintern, and with the national rail strike looming in 1920, the new Conservative PM Halvorsen discussed the prospects of a revolution in a speech to his fellow Conservative Party MPs:

"One is expecting the hardest of civil wars (..) Our present enemy, even with their minority position, would still be able to win in the moment [and] we cannot know whether they intend to secure the persons of government. Edvard [Hagerup Bull] therefore said we must secure a government for the nation. He proposed that Ivar Lykke and Gunnar Knudsen should stand by with their people if anything were to set

the current government out of play. If they and their people were to meet the same fate, the director general of the finance department should stand ready." (Quoted in Danielsen 1984, 18).

This speech strongly suggests that the revolutionary threat was perceived as credible by the elites. The Norwegian PM was, indeed, setting up lines of succession to a competitor party and the bureaucracy, because he believed the very existence of the regime was threatened.

As we detail in the appendix, several military and police measures would be organized against the worker movement. Still our focus is on the integrative measures, the silk glove and not the steel hand hidden within. As we show in the appendix, the "silk hand responses" included several (proposed or implemented) political and economic reforms, encompassing a new electoral system, subsidies for housing, worker councils, profit sharing, arbitration regulation, socialization of industries, generous unemployment subsidies to unions, and old-age pensions. Space constraints limits our focus to one policy area here, namely work-hour regulations:

Eight-hour day

In the early 20th century, hours of work were unregulated for adults in Norway. In 1914, the Liberal Party's "Great Reformator", Johan Castberg made his second attempt to regulate working hours for male adults. A proposition, outlining two proposals, was put before the Storting. The proposals included Castberg's (and the majority of the commission's) alternative, a 9-hour working day with compensation for overtime for men. The minority position suggested a 10-hour normal workday. It was dead on arrival. In 1915, an attempt was again made to pass the act, but it underwent extensive changes in parliament, and ended up a major disappointment for its original architect. Gone was overtime compensation, daily hours were capped to 10, and implementation was set to 1920 with major industries excluded. Neither the Conservatives nor the Liberals could support the eight-hour day, or even a 9-hour day.

Regarding the economic elites, the employer association N.A.F. was, at the time, fully against *any* regulation of working hours in factories.[8] N.A.F argued that the existing Factory act of 1909 – a law that did not regulate hours for adults at all – was already *too* encompassing.[9] N.A.F. was hesitant also three years later, in spring 1918 when commenting on a government proposal for a temporary eight-hour day. Regulating work hours was argued to likely work in favor of agriculture at the cost of industry, increase prices on consumer goods, hurt competitiveness and "cause so many so many difficulties, that industrial stagnation or decline must be expected" (Petersen 1950, 366-367). Yet, there had been movement within the organization, as, by 1918, N.A.F. would not necessarily work against the implementation of such an act. And, the position of N.A.F. continued to change with perceptions of the revolutionary threat throughout 1918. Following revolutionary events in Finland and Germany, N.A.F would come to accept working hour regulations both by legislation and in collective agreements. Especially the CEO of N.A.F. Lars Rasmussen argued for the necessity of meeting the new ideological orientation of the workers by other means than

[8] Casteberg 1914, bilag 4 page 18)
[9] Casteberg 1914, bilag 4 page 18)

force (Knutsen 1994, 29-31). In his new-year speech of 1919 to the board, Rasmussen outlined the dangers facing the organization, and the possible solution – accepting the 8-hour workday:

"Previously, our organization would respond to such demands with all the means at our disposal. But here I believe, that we must consider, that behind these demands stand so to speak all the unrest, that in our time reigns around us on this earth, and it infects also our situation…For if we constrain this concept to much, then the pressure might become too great. Then the development will go on without negotiations, and the result will be that workers say: let us now grip our time, let us take power. Then we would be stuck in a societal upheaval, a situation that we would, by all means, seek to avert, we must be aware our times, we have to see its signs and learn its demands. We must therefore renegade on some of our old principles (…) We must see to that we can save what we can save."[10]

By 1918-1919, also the political elite had shifted positions. Both the Liberals and Conservatives had voted down Castberg's nine-hour working day proposal in 1915. In 1919, all parties would embrace the eight-hour day.[11] Gunnar Knudsen (PM, Liberal) decided at the end of 1918 that it was necessary to pass an eight-hour bill to appease the socialists. The social minister Berg (Liberals) opened the new parliament in 1919 by stating that "the times demand social reforms, demand it with necessity (…) we have great demands for social reforms, and the greatest task in my opinion, is that labor now takes precedence in our country. (…) Capital should be a servant and helper for labor, but not its master. It is this which is the demand of our time".[12] When on 14 June and 2 July 1919 the eight-hour act was put forward to the Storting, it passed both in the lower and higher camber (Odelsting and Lagting) by *acclamation*. Social minister Berg was clear on the reason for the reform: "With the 8 hour day implemented by law our country's workers will find new faith in the belief that through a development of society as it now exist, we can therefore reach a societal-order, where also they may find their place".[13]

The Conservatives in opposition were equally supportive. MP Klingenberg stated that, "we will now approve with law a demand that workers in the whole world for a lifetime has declared to be one of the most important to (..) achieve the social conditions under which they want to live and have a demand to live under"[14]. MP Olsen stated that, "I find that one must salute, with both happiness and satisfaction, than one has come to agreement on such a great issue as this"[15]. The extent to which both Liberals and Conservatives supported the eight-hour day is remarkable when seen in light of the staunch opposition just four years prior.

[10] NAF page 4 Sentralstyre 12.01.1919. (Rasmussen)
[11] The eight-hour act for industrial workers followed in the foot heels of similar legislative enactments for workers in in military owned factories (27 April 1918), workers in railways workshops (3 August 1918), and for workers on state railways and defense structures(1 July 1918). Conducive to these reforms was considerations of limiting grievances of workers in strategic state industries as to limit the impact of potential mass-strikes (Agøy 1997).
[12] 1919 stortingstidene efterm 26 march page 646 (Statsråd Berg)
[13] Ot.prop. nr 21 1919. pages 8-9 (Berg).
[14] 1919 stortingstidene 19 june page 141 (Klingenberg)
[15] 1919 stortingstidene efterm 2 July page 66 (Olsen)

This sudden change of heart did not go unnoticed by the socialists. Nygaardsvold (DnA) would lament that suddenly all parties across the ideological spectrum had come to embrace what they had so vehemently fought against just 4 years ago:

"The road to legislative reform has been hard to travel. Each time the demand of the workers for an 8-hour normal-working day was brought forward to the Storting was the demand voted down, or the reform was so distorted that it would have no impact of consequence for the workers. (..) Workers therefore had to take on the issue themselves (...). I want to add, that there is *no single issue that has to such an extent, made workers lose their faith in the parliamentary line, that parliamentary action work*. (..) As long as workers did not put any major force behind their demand for to so important demand, the Storting down voted all demands to reduce working hours to 8 hours [our cursive]".[16]

Summary

Our case study leaves little doubt that the Bolshevik Revolution was a key driver of the different repressive and appeasing policy changes that took place in Norway between 1918 and 1923. Following our expectations, Labor's international organizational linkages were important to Norwegian elites in ascertaining the level of revolutionary threat. In reports and discussions, membership in international organizations were used as indicators of revolutionary sentiment among labor. The defense intelligence office, for example, writes already on 29 February 1918 that "[a] named source could report that Norwegian participants in the Zimmerwald-conference now was arming themselves in congruence with the conference decision to carry out armed rebellion" (Agøy 1994, 76-77).

A quite varied set of sources pertaining to Norwegian politics and social life in the early 20th century, and which we have investigated, support the hypothesis that social policies were often born out of elite fears of a credible revolutionary threat. Take, for example, the (changes in the) party programs of the Conservative Party. When comparing the 1909 program to that of 1918 and 1921, the conservatives had gone from being silent on the issues to promising to secure measures against unemployment and lack of housing, and even evaluate the question of employees' dividends. Yet, in the 1924 program, *none* of these issues is mentioned. The necessity of social policy innovation had dissipated in tandem with the credibility of the revolutionary threat.

In sum, the Russian revolution and the subsequent invention of the Comintern sparked a decisive change in the radicalism of the Norwegian labor movement, and in the perception of labor as a radical and potential revolutionary force amongst the elites. A combination of repressive and inclusionary tactics – especially pursuing social policy concessions that benefitted urban workers -- was developed by Norwegian elites to weaken radical groups and strengthen reformists in the trade unions and DnA.

[16] 1919 stortingstidene efterm 2 July page 64 (Nygaardsvold)

Cross-country analysis

Measures of revolutionary fear and social policies, and benchmark model specification

In this section we will present our new cross-country measures to capture revolutionary threat, and measures used to capture different social policies. Tables and figures with descriptive statistics for all variables are in Appendix A1. Next, we present the design for the benchmark specification, and discuss the core controls that we employ in order to mitigate confounding. Additional designs and specifications used to deal with particular threats to inference, including instrumental variable regressions and synthetic control matching, will be discussed in the empirical section when they are first introduced.

Concerning our core independent variables capturing communist threat, we have drawn on several sources to code two indicators pertaining to invitations and attendance at the first Comintern meeting. As discussed in the introduction and theory section, being invited to the Comintern presented a clear and observable signal about radical ideology and revolutionary motivations and capacity, given how the Russian Bolsheviks distributed invitations. Further, we discussed, also in the case study on Norway, how participating in the Comintern may even have had independent effects on the actual motivation and capacity for revolution among the movements that partook. Thus, Comintern invitations and participation should capture various features that correlate with high perceived levels of revolutionary threat by the elites.

Regarding our specific measures, these are, first, an indicator for whether a union or party from the country was invited to the first Comintern meeting, and, second, an indicator for whether a party or union from the country attended this meeting with voting rights. We use the first one, which is more exogenous in the sense that it does not hinge on the active choice of domestic unions or parties to partake in the meeting as our main measure, and the second one for robustness tests (results are very robust to using either measure). We have also created a similar measure for acceptance for the second Comintern conference (1920); invitations are not available from identified, extant sources.[17] For details on measurement construction and sources, see Appendix A2.

Our argument highlights that elites are likely to target policy benefits that mitigate grievances among the urban working classes. For our dependent variable, need thus measures that capture policies that are important for the welfare of this group. One such policy, as also indicated by our case study of Norway, is the regulation of work-hours. Indicatively, the 48-hour week (eight-hour day) was a core demand of organized labor in many countries long before WWI. For our first dependent variable, we therefore use working time data collected by Rasmussen (2019). We use a measure for "normal weekly working hours" for factory (industrial/manufacturing) workers, defined as the number of hours an employee can work

[17] For later meetings, we only have data on the executive council (elected representatives from the various member parties) and speakers.

before overtime restrictions come into play. For details on this measure, for instance on how it deals with sectoral differences within manufacturing, see Appendix A3.

Our alternative measures pertain to either the coverage or generosity of social transfer programs that were key to mitigating particular work-life risks for urban workers. Specifically, we use an aggregated measure on the coverage of national-level, redistributive social transfer programs in six areas – old-age pensions, accident, sickness, maternity, unemployment and family allowance benefits. We code coverage in these programs for four groups; urban industrial workers, urban commercial or salaried workers, rural wageworkers, and self-employed rural workers or medium sized farm owners. Coverage for a specific risk can be issued through various programs[18], and some groups might be covered for the same risk in different programs at the same time. Our measure takes this into account. Let us take an implied example for industrial workers. In our example, industrial workers are covered against both sickness and unemployment, but for sickness, coverage is extended through both a non-contributory sickness system as well as a compulsory social insurance scheme. The score is therefore 1 (unemployment coverage) + 2 (sickness coverage) = 3. The final score for each country year is calculated for all groups for all the risks and programs. Given the differences between programs in likelihood of providing efficient coverage and insurance for low-income groups (see Mares 2005), the main version of this measure only considers redistributive programs (compulsory contributory, and non-contributory with a means or no-means tested) and excludes non-redistributive programs (private, voluntary insurance). This measure extends from 0 (no groups covered in no program) to 96 (All groups covered for all risks in all redistributive programs).

While revolutionary threats may stem from different social groups, including peasants and urban middle classes, we have highlighted the particular threat stemming from the urban workers in the manufacturing sector, the core-support group of labor parties in this period (Ebbinghaus 1993). Thus, the third measure that we use resembles the second measure, but we now only construct a count across transfer programs that take into account whether urban industrial wageworkers are covered in the program or not. Given that there are six program types, this measure thus extends from 0 (no redistributive program covering industrial workers) to 24 (industrial workers covered by a national, redistributive program in all areas).

Yet, social transfer programs may formally cover social groups without channeling substantial resources. Ultimately, those covered by such programs are interested in how generous they are. Thus, our fourth type of measure captures the generosity of core welfare programs, measuring the duration of benefits for sickness and unemployment, respectively. Unfortunately, these measures are only coded for 1925.

Concerning design and model specifications, we highlight at the outset that our results are very robust to using different estimation techniques, sets of control variables, error correction methods, etc. Yet, for our benchmark, we opt for a simple OLS model, and cluster errors by country in panel specifications. When

[18] The following classification system is used: compulsory social insurance system, Means-tested/social assistance non-contributory system, Universal/non-contributory system, private mandatory system, Private mandatory & Lump sum single payment system, and voluntary insurance with state subsidies. We ignore rights to various benefits issued through general labor law.

running panel specifications, we also prefer a dual fixed effects specification, including dummies for both countries and years. This specification eliminates several hard-to-measure confounders that may simultaneously affect both revolutionary risk and social policy provision and design. For example, some countries may, for historical or geographical reasons, have its industrial production focused in certain sectors that both facilitate the coordination of strong unions and provide an impetus for broad social policy coverage. In the benchmark, we also include logged GDP per capita to account for level of development. GDP per capita should also correlate with productivity, and even extent of industrialization. We further control for log population to account for differences in revolutionary threats and social policies among large and small countries.[19]

In alternative specifications, we include country-specific trends or a lagged dependent variable. We also use the recent synthetic control method developed by Galiani and Quistorff (2016), with several treated cases instead of the usual single treated case. We detail this and other specifications below when they are first introduced.

Descriptive relationships

To preview our main findings, Figure 1 shows the simple cross-sectional relationship between our measure of revolutionary fear in 1919, as proxied by Comintern invitations, and our different dependent variables. Our indicator of revolutionary fear correlates strongly with more generous transfer programs (bottom plots), broader coverage in redistributive programs (upper-left), and lower working hours(upper-right). As we will now detail, these relationships turn out very robust to choices of measures, control variables, estimation technique, and other specification choices. Greater revolutionary fear in 1919 seems to have spurred various social policy responses by elites.

[19] We note that the results presented below are robust to omitting these controls.



Figure 1 association between indicator of revolutionary threat in 1919 and various social policy indicators for 60 countries. Figures in the upper field show the cross-sectional results from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is averaged for 1919-1925 with controls for GDP and Population.

Figure 2, which is a purely descriptive figure, further corroborates this conclusion by showing the development of average working hours, across time, in countries that received Comintern invitations and those that did not. Figure 2 adds another line for the Comintern-group of countries when we exclude countries that become independent after 1919. When considering these trend-lines, we clearly see that an early divergence appears between the Comintern and other countries, but that their trends are fairly similar prior to 1917. The average difference in work hours between the two groups of countries is only 3 hours in 1916. This divergence jumps to 6 hours in 1917, and 12 hours in the year of the Comintern, 1919. This divergence is still 12 hours in 1923, after which it gradually declines. A small difference persists, however, all the way to the end of the Cold War.



*Figure 2 Average working hours, across time, for different groups of countries. When no regulation on number of working hours exist, we have set 72 hours (12 hours*6 days a week) as the number of hours for the country before calculating averages.*

Main results, working hours

We turn now to our benchmark (panel) specification. We first focus on normal weekly working hours. Before we discuss our results, we want to make two remarks on sample-composition. First, we have excluded Russia from all regressions. We are principally interested in the threat of revolution, and not the effect of having a Communist regime. Second, we also run-robustness tests where we exclude the newly formed East-European and Baltic states from our sample; these countries enter our sample before they become independent countries, but have no national legislation regulating working hours.[20] We also used various starting-years, from the 1789 to 1900. Since our results remain the same independent of starting year, we use the first year for which we have information in most analysis. See appendix A6 for sample tests.

Table 1 presents results from our benchmark OLS regressions. Model 1 just includes log GDP per capita and log population as controls, but not country and year dummies. This model sets the end year of the sample to 1925, about two years after we surmise that the revolutionary threat stemming from the Bolshevik Revolution had subsided. The estimated relationship is higher than what the descriptive over-time trends in Figure 2 suggested. Specifically, the Comintern invitation dummy – which can first be scored 1 in 1919, but

[20] We also re-code the Baltic countries to have the proscribed hours of the Russian factory act of 1897, Czechoslovakia that of the Austrian factory act of 1885 (part of Austria-Hungary, but Austria and Hungary had their own separate factory regulation), and Poland the Russian act mentioned above. Results are similar when we apply these changes.

is then scored 1 until the time series end in 1925 for the relevant countries – is -14.4 (hours/week), and statistically significant at all conventional levels.

Yet, Figure 2 showed substantial differences between countries that were invited and not invited to Comintern also before 1919 – presumably delegates from countries that were considered ripe for revolution were more likely to receive an invitation by Trotsky, and these countries may also have been inherently more likely to observe strict working hour regulations. In Model 2, we thus add country- and year–fixed effects to mitigate such confounding. The Comintern coefficient is attenuated to 10,8 hours, which is more in line with the descriptive evidence, but remains highly significant (t=-4.4). The coefficient and related t-values are close to identical when we enter country-specific time trends on working hours in Model 3.

Table 1. Invitation to the Comintern 1919 and Legislated Normal Working Hours

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Dep var. measurement:	Levels	Levels	Levels	Levels	Levels	Levels	Changes
Invited Comintern	-14.4***	-10.8***	-10.7***	-8.38***	-7.45***	- 7.401***	-0.733**
	(-7.01)	(-4.43)	(-4.56)	(-3.67)	(-3.69)	(-3.10)	(-2.41)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Trends	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
LDV	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	8348	8348	8348	9592	15996	20242	20127
Countries	105	105	105	105	169	187	187
End year	1925	1925	1925	1939	1988	2014	2014
R^2	0.301	0.504	0.680	0.763	0.864	0.870	0.119
Mean hours	71.23	71.23	71.23	69.77	62.70	62.44	62.39
(min-max)	(45-72)	(45-72)	(45-72)	(40-72)	(38-72)	(38-72)	(-32-27)

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. *t* statistics in parentheses. OLS with standard errors clustered by country. Country- and year dummies and control variables (log GDP per capita, log population) are excluded.

In Models 4 and 5, we expand the time series to 1939, 1988, and 2014 thus also capturing the longer-term relationship between Comintern invitations and working hours up to, respectively, 20, 69 and 95 years later. This reduces the point estimate (and t-value) somewhat, indicating that there is some catch-up for the "non-treated" cases towards the end of the time series. The Comintern coefficient remains at -7.5 hours/week (t=-3.7), even in Model 5, which extends to 1988. We also did a second round of data-updates, bringing the dataset up to 2014 (187 countries). Models 6 to 7 shows that the Comintern coefficient is -7.4 hours/per week in the treated cases. In other words, the effect of the shock persists up until today.

Finally, in Model 7 we add a lagged dependent variable as regressor. We are thereby estimating a restricted Error Correction Model. The estimated long-term coefficient indicates a substantial reduction, -6.5 hours/week (*t*=-2.56). We find similar results when using attendance (instead of invitation) at the first Comintern. Results are also robust to various technical changes to the specification, such as using panel-corrected standard errors with AR (1) autocorrelation adjustment, instead of clustering errors by country.

One remaining worry – despite the controls for linear country-trends and the country-fixed effects (intercepts) – is that the group of countries that were invited to Comintern was already on a particular development path, towards fewer working hours, just before they received the "treatment" in 1919. To exclude this possibility we conduct a series of placebo-tests, artificially assigning Comintern invitations to the same group of countries, but in years prior to 1919. If these countries were already on a particular development paths, these "placebo-year" Comintern dummies should still be significant predictors of lower working hours. Figure 3 draws on estimates from Model 4, Table 1 with fixed effects and country-trends, but now re-estimated with Comintern participation artificially set to different years (1918-1914, 1909, 1899, 1889). The results are striking; we only find a significant (t=-3.40) coefficient at conventional levels when measuring the treatment in 1919, and point estimates are also far smaller for any other year.



Figure 2: Placebo tests assigning Comintern invitations artificially to years prior to 1919 and re-estimating Model 4, Table 1.

Still, there could be factors that affect working time, are correlated with revolutionary fear, and occur/change at the end of WWI. In Table 2, we enter controls that capture such potential confounders. These models are extensions of Model 2, Table 1, including country- and year-fixed effects. (Adding country-trends does not change any of the substantial results reported in Table 2).

First, we should take into account one primary alternative explanation of social policy change, namely mass mobilization in war (see, e.g., Obinger & Petersen 2017; Obinger & Schmitt 2011; Scheve and Stasavage 2018). A widespread notion is that states that experienced vast mobilization of the population may face

strong post-war demands for reciprocation in the form of social policies that redistribute benefits from the elites to social groups that sacrificed lives and limbs in the war effort. This is particularly salient for us, since the Bolshevik Revolution and Comintern coincided with the end of WW1. In Appendix A4, we provide summary tables of developments in various social policy areas, both for European countries that did partake in WW1 and other European countries, also categorizing their level of revolutionary threat. Comparative considerations from these tables suggest that social policy expansions was not determined solely by mass mobilization in WW1, with numerous non-warring states such as the Iberian, Scandinavian and the Netherlands expanding social policy. The Low Countries give us the closest we can come to a comparison following the "most similar system design". 95% of Belgium was occupied and it lost about 1.7-2.0 % of its population. The Netherlands was not a warring party. Thus, it was never occupied during WW1 and did not experience any major loss of life.[21] Still, while Belgium only introduced the 48-hour week in 1922, the Dutch introduced a 45-hour week already in 1919, the most generous working time law in the whole world. One likely explanation for why the non-warring Netherlands led occupied Belgium is, we surmise, revolutionary fear. The Dutch refer to "De Roode Week", which took place from 9-14 November, 1918. This was a series riots and the formation of soldier and sailor councils inspired the leader of the Dutch social democrats to calling for revolutionary action. The revolutionary attempt was a failure, however, and induced several pre-emptive measures such as major policy concessions and counter-mobilization of Catholics defense leagues.

Table 2. Controlling for the most likely alternative explanations on Working hours

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Comintern Invited	-10.0**	-9.95**	-9.74**	-9.14**	-13.2***	-10.53***
	(-3.32)	(-3.35)	(-2.97)	(-3.39)	(-3.86)	(-4.28)
Mobilization	-0.047					
	(-0.27)					
ILO member		-1.63				
		(-0.43)				
Inflation			-0.0018**			
			(-3.38)			
Social dem. Party				-0.95		
				(-1.36)		
Union density					0.11	
					(0.81)	
Regime support indust. workers						-2.17
						(-2.84)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3778	3778	3878	6074	560	7552
Countries	78	78	39	63	25	98
R^2	0.674	0.675	0.559	0.527	0.775	0.496
Mean hours	70.62	70.65	70.96	71.08	65.62	71.25
(min-max)	(45-72)	(45-72)	(45-72)	(45-72)	(45-72)	(45-72)

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. t statistics in parentheses. OLS with standard errors clustered by country. Country- and year dummies and control variables (log GDP per capita, log population) are excluded. Time series extend from 1817-1925.

[21] The Netherlands did mobilize for war as a neutral deterrent. A comparison can therefore not rule out an effect of mobilization, but it does rule out major loss of life and destruction of property.

Yet, we also account for the mass mobilization explanation of social policies in our panel regression set-up. More specifically, we account for this explanation by including a measure of the percent of the population serving in the armed forces in Model 1, Table 2.[22] This is particularly important in our context, given that the end of WWI coincides with Comintern invitations. In Model 2, we control for membership in the International Labor Organization, which (as Comintern) is established in 1919, and which had the 48-hour week as a primary goal (Rasmussen 2019). Rising prices could also drive labor militancy and increase the demand for reforms. We therefore enter a control for annual inflation in Model 3. Models 4-5 control for reformist labor movements, including a dummy for the presence of a social democratic party in Model 4 and a measure of the share of workers organized in a trade union in Model 5.[23] It might also be that our is capturing the policy-effects of workers gaining hold of political power independent of revolutionary threat. We therefore control for the degree to which urban wageworkers are part of the regimes supporting coalition, with data from V-dem. The size and significance of our measure capturing revolutionary fear (Comintern invitations) is very robust to controlling for these alternative explanations.

Until now, we have a priori considered all non-treated countries – i.e., those that did not have unions or parties invited to Comintern – as equally important and relevant cases in our comparison group, when estimating the relationship. Still, the inclusion of less relevant cases in the control group might affect results, despite the control strategy pursued above. Thus, we construct a plausible counterfactual to our treated cases by creating a set of synthetic control countries (mixing features from several actual countries), in which we try to match the pre-trend in our synthetic cases to the treated countries. These synthetic control cases should – except for Comintern invitations – be artificial composite "countries" that resemble the countries receiving Comintern invitations. The treatment effect is then the difference between the actual working hours observed in our "treated countries" and the working hours observed in our synthetic control cases.

To run this analysis, we first balance our unbalanced dataset to countries with no missing values between 1900-1925 on GDP and Population, reducing our sample to 1898 observations (73 countries). To construct our synthetic control we include our two basic controls (GDP, and population), and two pre-treatment periods (1910 and 1915). The results from the analysis is presented in Figure 4. First, we may note that the pre-treatment trends for the treatment and control groups are similar. Second, Figure 4 shows a clear and large, immediate effect of the treatment (revolutionary fear as measured by Comintern invitations) on working hours. Figure shows that these trend differences remain significant up to 4 years after treatment.[24]

[22] We experimented with various ways of measuring mobilization, similar to those of Scheve and Stasavage and found no substantial changes.
[23] Data on trade union density is from Rasmussen & Pontusson (2018). We have interpolated these data between missing observations.
[24] We also show that our results is robust to using Zimmerwald-membership as an instrument for Comintern-invitation.



Figure 3 Effect plot results synthetic control analysis with multiple treated cases. Trends in treated and non-treated group scaled to 1 in 1918 to faciliate comparision.

Welfare state coverage and generosity

In Table 3, we investigate how revolutionary threat, as reflected in Comintern invitations, influenced redistributive welfare programs – more specifically, the coverage of non-contributory and compulsory contributory programs. Models 1-3 consider a general expansion of coverage to pertain to various social groups (the empirical range of the measure in our sample is 0-14), as described above, and the dependent variable in Model 4 counts only the number of redistributive programs that cover industrial workers (min 0; max 6). Given the nature of these dependent variables, we estimate both a fixed effects negative binominal count and OLS models, and results are robust. The OLS results are presented in in Table 3.

Table 3 Invitation to the Comintern 1919 and Coverage in redistributive programs up to 1925 for 105 countries

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Groups covered:	All Groups	All Groups	All Groups	Industrial Workers
Comintern invited	4.39***	4.05***	3.18***	1.54***
	(7.99)	(6.82)	(6.02)	(7.01)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Trends	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	8350	8350	8350	8350
R^2	0.431	0.567	0.712	0.756
Mean welf. prog.	0.190	0.190	0.190	0.198
(min-max)	(0-14)	(0-14)	(0-14)	(0-6)

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. t statistics in parentheses. OLS with standard errors clustered by country. Country- and year dummies and control variables (log GDP per capita, log population) are excluded. Time series extend from 1817-1925.

The results reported in Table 3 are clearly in line with our expectations. A higher revolutionary threat, as reflected in Comintern invitations, is associated with more social groups being covered in redistributive programs, and estimates are quite consistent when we omit (Model 1) or include (Model 2) fixed effects, and when we add country-specific trends to the fixed effects (Model 3). Even in the latter, very restricted model, receiving Comintern invitations in 1919 is associated with an increase in the index of about 3.2. This is equivalent to one redistributive, social transfer program being expanded so that it covers three additional social groups (or three programs each being expanded to cover one social group extra). In Model 4, we only count coverage extended to industrial urban workers, and the results are, once again, in line with our expectations. The mean number of redistributive national programs in this period is 0.20, and the estimated coefficient of 1.5 thus indicates that revolutionary fear was substantively very important for expanding coverage to workers in different areas of risk.

Next, we turn from the coverage to the generosity of transfer programs. In Table 4, we present results for our newly collected measures for the generosity, measured by the duration of benefits periods, of sickness and unemployment insurance programs in 1925. Since these data are cross-sectional only, we measure our independent and control variables in 1919. This gives us a 6-year lag. We also tried measuring all controls contemporaneously, with no overall change to the results. Estimates suggest that, on average, countries with higher revolutionary threat, as reflected by Comintern invitations, had on average 16-30weeks longer duration of sickness benefits and 6-8 weeks longer for unemployment benefits.

Table 4. Generosity of Sickness and Unemployment Benefits measured in duration of benefit period (Weeks) in 1925

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Program:		Sickness			Unemployment	
Comintern Invited	24.4***	28.4***	15.9*	5.73*	7.83**	5.70*
	(5.81)	(4.16)	(2.60)	(2.46)	(3.16)	(2.61)
GDP (log)	0.51	-0.73	6.13	2.25	1.28	3.86
	(0.21)	(-0.16)	(1.09)	(1.24)	(0.65)	(1.20)
Population (log)	-0.89	-1.38	-0.92	0.018	0.42	0.43
	(-1.27)	(-1.01)	(-0.59)	(0.04)	(0.63)	(0.35)
Mobilization		-1.18			-0.63	
		(-0.95)			(-1.02)	
ILO member		-0.040			5.20*	
		(-0.01)			(2.66)	
Inflation			0.0054***			0.0015**
			(4.97)			(2.98)
Social De. Party			-3.84			-0.39
			(-0.89)			(-0.17)
Observations/countries	84	42	29	87	45	32
R^2	0.590	0.579	0.513	0.312	0.448	0.462
Weeks	7.36	13.19	11.87	2.50	3.68	4.35
	(0-52)	(0-52)	(0-52)	(0-26)	(0-26)	(0-26)

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. t statistics in parentheses. OLS with standard errors clustered by country. Independent variables measured in 1919.

Testing a mechanism: Comintern, the formation of Communist parties and persistent effects on social policy

Before concluding, we evaluate some questions that arise in extension of our argument. First, did Comintern lead to the formation of communist parties around the world? Second, did these parties arise though a breakaway from social democrats parties? Third, did formation of communist parties matter for the persistence of the relationship between Comintern invitations and social policies documented above?

In order to respond to these questions, we have coded the formation of communist parties around the world. First, we collected data on their year of formation. Second, we collected data on the nature of their formation, distinguishing between the formation of independent, new parties and the formation of parties by the breakaway of central elements from an extant labor or social democratic party.[25]

Model 1, Table 5 reports a logit model testing whether having attended the 1919 Comintern is associated with having a communist party, using 1940 as the end-point of the time series. Model 2 tests whether having attended Comintern is associated with establishing a communist party (going from 0 to 1). In order to include country-fixed effects, we re-estimate Model 1 using OLS as Model 3. Model 4 also adds country-specific trends, whereas Model 5 extends the time series to 1988. Having attended the Comintern meeting in 1919 is associated with an increase in the predicted probability of having a communist party of about 20 percentage points according to the OLS results.

Table 5. Did the Comintern lead to the foundation of communist parties?

	(1) Logit	(2) Logit	(3) OLS	(4) OLS	(5) OLS
Attended Comintern 1919	4.18***	0.75*	0.20**	0.20*	0.24**
	(7.54)	(2.06)	(3.02)	(2.16)	(3.21)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Trends	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	6752	6729	6752	6752	9649
Countries	60	60	60	60	63
End year	1940	1940	1940	1940	1988
(Pseudo) R^2	0.2413	0.0259	0.758	0.807	0.883

*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. t statistics in parentheses. Standard Errors clustered by country. Country- and year dummies and control variables (Log GDP per capita; log population) are omitted.

We also test whether Comintern attendance enhanced the frequency, more specifically, of communist parties being formed by a split from social democratic parties. In Appendix 10 we re-estimate Table 5, but with this more specific dependent variable. These specifications show very clear relationships between

[25] We note that our definition (see Appendix A9) includes Syndicalist parties. In the appendix we lists the year of founding for all coded parties, whether these parties arose as a break from a labor party, a short explanation for the classification, and the sources used for the coding.

Comintern attendance and Communist party formations stemming from a split for existing social democratic parties.[26]

We have established a link between the Comintern and the institutionalization of radical worker movements into Communist parties. Did such developments help shape social policy expansion. First, descriptive evidence in Figure 5 shows the development of working hours (average) over time for two groups of countries, one facing revolutionary threat in 1919 and one that does not. We have also added a long-dash line, which shows the average for those countries facing a revolutionary threat and observing organized communist parties. Interestingly, the two sub-groups of Comintern countries track each other closely up to the late 1930s. However, starting in the 1940s, counties with communist parties had, on average, about 1-2 hours lower working time than those without. This suggests that the long-term persistence in the effect of Comintern on social policies is partly mediated by the formation of Communist parties, organizations that could maintain a radical presence in the country.



Figur 5: Average working hours, across time, for different groups of countries: Non-invitees to Comintern; Invitees to Comintern that did not form a Communist party; and, invitees to Comintern that did form a Communist party.

Still, these differences could be driven by various other factors between the two groups of countries. We therefore re-run Model 2, Table 1, but now both including and excluding the communist party variable

[26] The 1920 Comintern conference formulated the formal criteria for how to achieve membership in the Comintern. Therefore, we re-estimate the result from Model 5, Table 5 with an added dummy for attending the second Comintern congress (1920). Including this dummy-renders the 1919 dummy insignificant (correlation between 1919 and 1920 dummy is 0.55), with the coefficient of 1920 attendance being 0.375 (t-value= 2.25). In other words, the 1920 Comintern meeting and the 21 theses of Lenin seem to have been decisive in the formation of Communist parties.

before we compare results. We test three sample specifications to assess shorter- vs longer-term relationships. In Model 1, Table 6, the time series ends in 1940, in Model 2, it ends in 1960, and in Model 3, it ends in 1988.

Table 6. Long-term effect of Comintern-shock when controlling or not controlling for communist parties on legislated Normal Working Hours

	(1)	(2)	(3)
End Year:	1940	1960	1988
Excluding communism			
Comintern Invited	-7.07**	-4.84*	-4.56*
	(-2.83)	(-2.16)	(-2.05)
R^2	0.754	0.828	0.864
With communism			
Comintern Invited	-5.84*	-3.56	-2.55
	(-2.28)	(-1.62)	(-1.19)
Communist party	-3.48*	-4.56**	-6.79***
	(-2.26)	(-2.95)	(-3.97)
R^2	0.759	0.833	0.872
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	6693	7941	9649
Countries	60	60	63

t statistics in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. OLS with standard errors clustered by country - similar results using Ar1 correction and panel corrected standard errors. Country, year dummies and basic control variables excluded. Basic controls are GDP per capita (log) and population (log).

The results reveal an interesting pattern; the predictive power of the Comintern variable declines in all models including the communist party dummy. Up to 1940, the Comintern shock, in itself, is still important, as indicated by the coefficient being significant at the five percent level even when controlling for the communist party dummy. In the 1960- and 1988 samples, however, the Comintern variable loses statistical significance once controlling for communist party formation. One interpretation is that the long-term effect of the revolutionary threat shock from the Bolshevik revolution and Comintern on work hours is mainly mediated by the formation of communist parties. The communist party variable has a strong and precisely estimated coefficient on working hours in different specifications. In the updated dataset

Conclusion

In this paper, we have developed a theoretical argument on how revolutionary threats that elites perceive to be credible may spur these elites to react by providing concessions in the form of social policies in order counter this threat. Specifically, we have focused on the context of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, and the subsequent formation of Comintern in 1919. We have discussed how an organization being invited to the Comintern may have enhanced the revolutionary threat for the organization in question by radicalizing the movement and providing infrastructural and monetary support. Further, we have highlighted the importance of Comintern invitations as an information signal to elites, leading the latter to update their

beliefs on how credible the revolutionary threat is. The differences originating from this shock persist up until today.

We subsequently presented an in-depth qualitative case study of Norway around the time of the Bolshevik revolution. We also presented a range of statistical tests using new measures and stringent designs to assess the extent to which revolutionary fear, in our case captured by measures related to being invited to or participating in Comintern, drive social policy development. In brief, the evidence that we find in support of our argument is very clear and robust; the fear of revolution change labor market policies and the coverage and generosity of various social transfer programs, and the effects seem persistent. Historically, we detail the extent to which the Bolshevik Revolution, and Comintern more specifically, drove the early expansion of many modern welfare states. We highlight that this pattern persists in a variety of tests, controlling for a host of other alternative explanations. To mention one prominent such explanation, we find that the revolutionary threat effect on social policy expansion persists even when accounting for mass mobilization in WWI. Both warring states such as France and Germany and non-warring states with revolutionary threats such as Norway and the Netherlands observed social policy expansion in the hectic few years after the end of the war, which coincided with the aftermath of the Bolshevik revolution and the formation of Comintern

We make several contributions pertaining to different literatures. First, ours is the first empirical study of its kind to directly test the extent to which revolutionary fear, sparked by international events, drive social policy development. More specifically, we are the first to investigate the role played by the Bolshevik revolution on the extension of social rights, by drawing on comprehensive cross-country data material.[27] Second, our theoretical contribution comes from combining a theory of how elites use social policy for co-optation purposes, with a micro-argument on how elite perception of revolutionary threats are formed. By doing so, we provide further understanding into the origins of welfare states (see also Obinger Schmitt 2008),[28] and thus the determinants of redistribution and inequality (Scheve and Stasavage 2010; Milanovic 2016; Scheidel 2017). More specifically, we contribute to the debate on how revolutionary, as opposed to reformist, labor shaped social policy development (e.g., Lipset 1983; Korpi 2006; Paster 2013).

[27] Weyland (2014) is a rare study that directly deals with the 1917 revolution and democratization. The diffusion literature on revolutionary threat, in which revolutionary events in neighboring countries is used to proxy for domestic revolutionary threat, details links to suffrage expansion and inequality (Aidt and Jensen 2014; Sant' Anna and Weller 2019). Still, these studies do not provide a clear design to capture communist threat, beyond the effect of revolution in nearby countries, and do not focus on the formation of policies.

[28] In particular, our results indicate that recent studies on war, mass mobilization, and social policy development should account for revolutionary fear. Our study thus opens up for further interesting avenues to investigate how revolutionary threat and mass warfare might interact to shape social policy development.

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Online Appendices

Text describing contents of appendices here

Appendix A1: Descriptive statistics for main models

Table 1 descriptive stat. from model 4 table 1.

	Mean	STD	Min	Max
Weekly work	71.207	4.008	45	72
Comintern invite	0.0221	0.147	0	1
GDP (log)	7.203	0.776	5.131	10.599
Population (log)	8.185	1.618	4.289	13.081

Table 2 descriptive stat. from model 5 table 1.

	Mean	STD	Min	Max
Weekly work	59.389	13.523	35	72
Comintern invite	0.117	0.321	0	1
GDP (log)	7.598	1.057	4.652	11.345
Population (log)	8.482	1.661	3.332	14.121

Table 3 descriptive stat. from model 4 table 5.

	Mean	STD	Min	Max
Communist party	0.1338	0.3405	0	1
Comintern invite	0.034	0.181	0	1
GDP (log)	7.311	0.725	5.719	10.599
Population (log)	8.257	1.483	4.289	12.861

Appendix A2: Construction the Comintern measures of revolutionary threat, Zimmerwald group measure and International Socialist Commission membership

We construct our measure of invitation to the first and second Comintern congresses using a translation of the original documents from Jane Degras (1955) "Communist International: 1919-1943 Documents part 1". Attendees information have been compiled from http://www.marxisthistory.org/subject/usa/eam/ci-congress19delegates.html and https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/2nd-congress/delegates.htm , which have compiled the information from John Riddell (1987) "Founding the Communist International: Proceedings and Documents of the First Congress, March 1919", and R.A. Archer (1977) "Second Congress of the Communist International: Minutes of the Proceedings".

Invited to 1919 meeting:
Russia, Germany, Austria, Hungary, Finland, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuanian, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia(Yugoslavia), Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Belgian, France, Switzerland, Italian, Spain, Portugal, United Kingdom, Ireland, United States, Australia, Japan.

Attendees at 1919 meeting with voting rights:
Russia, Germany, United states, Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Estonia, France, Latvia, Lithuania.

Attendees at 1920 meeting with voting rights:
Russia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia , Finland , France , Germany , great Britain, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Iran, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, Yugoslavia (Serbia).

As we argued, Comintern invitations were only extended to those countries with radical labor organizations or elements within social democratic parties. This was to avoid the fractionalization that had taken place within the Second International. This aim outlined in the invitational text (Degras 1955,):

"9. Towards the social-chauvinists, who everywhere at critical moments come out in arms against the proletarian revolution, no other attitude but unrelenting struggle is possible. As to the 'centre'—the tactics of splitting off the revolutionary elements, and unsparing criticism and exposure of the leaders. Organizational separation from the centrists is at a certain stage of development absolutely essential.

10. On the other hand, it is necessary to form a bloc with those elements in the revolutionary workers' movement who, although they did not formerly belong to socialist parties, now stand by and large for the proletarian dictatorship in the form of Soviet power. Chief among these are the syndicalist elements in the workers' movement.

11. Finally it is necessary to draw in all those proletarian groups and organizations which, although they have not openly attached themselves to the left revolutionary tendency, nevertheless appear to be moving in this direction. 12. In concrete terms, we propose that representatives of the following parties, groups, and trends shall take part in the congress (full membership of the Third International shall be open to those parties which stand completely on its platform)"

This was then followed by a list of invited parties and union federations.

For our instrumental variables, we have used similar sources. Zimmerwald manifesto signatories is adopted from https://www.marxists.org/history/international/social-democracy/zimmerwald/manifesto-1915.htm and membership in the international socialist commission from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Socialist_Commission

Signatories of the Zimmerwald Manifesto of September 1915:

Russia, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Rumania.

International Socialist Commission Members from 1915:

Italy, USA, Great Britain, Serbia, Portugal, South Africa, Greece, Russia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Finland, Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Spain, Netherlands, Bulgaria, Germany.

Appendix A3: Hours of Work Codebook

The Hours we Work

Regulated Working Hours around the World since 1848

A dataset on normal hours of work

Author information here

Regulating Normal Hours of Work

The "Hours we Work" dataset provides information on regulated Normal Hours of Work as specified by national level legislation for 203 countries from 1789 to 2014 – first law for adult males is in 1848. More specifically, the regulated normal hours of work per week of men in manufacturing or in general industrial work. Normal hours of work refer to the hours that a worker can work before extra working hours counted as overtime. Normal hours of work is therefore not necessarily the maximum hours of work. The latter given by the limits set on overtime, hours worked beyond the normal limits, which also tend to give raise to higher wages, and which also tend to be limited to periods or high production demand or crunch. Normal Hours of Work therefore gives a more complete picture of many hours per week a worker is likely to work on average in a year.

Countries with legal frameworks for working-time institutions can be divided into two subgroups: those were legislation is the primary vehicle for regulating hours and those were legislation only lays out the broad frameworks, allowing for intra or extra governmental institutions to fully specify the regulatory framework. In the latter group of countries, this is usually done through arbitration awards as in Australia, Italy, New Zealand, and in colonies by governors' being granted the power to extend regulation on hours as they see fit or national level collective agreements as Denmark and Sweden.

A significant problem is the fact that there is no conventional way of coding the regulated normal working time in the absence of a working time law. Letting these observation stand as missing would also introduce selection bias, and make us unable to test interesting hypothesis as to the origins of working time regulations. Hence, in countries that have unregulated working hours, we set their hours at 72 hours per week, which is the weekly hours prescribed in the first law regulating hours for both women and men. While far from a perfect solution, this alternative is preferable to the alternative of leaving out observations before the first law.

Equally important as it is to highlight what the data measure, it is also important to highlight what they do not. As already mentioned, normal hours of work must not be confused with total hours of work. Divergences is likely to be low in countries in which overtime his highly compensated, lower number of overtime hours accepted, and if employers have to apply to authorities to use overtime. Further restrictions have also been employed: First, these data does not capture regulation for equally important groups such as wageworkers in the rural sector or commercial workers (usually regulated by their own laws). Second, it refers *explicitly* to wageworkers, not to salaried workers. This means that legislation, which only refers to wageworkers, is included, while

legislation that regulate hours of work for salaried workers is ignored. Third, it does not code regulations that only regulate hours for women, adolescents, and children. Prior to the First World War, hours of work tended to be only regulated for women and children, and some countries continued this tradition, such as the various states belonging to the United states of America and the British empire and it's colonial dependencies. Historical researchers should consider this when using the data. Fifth, it does not capture regulations that only refers to workers in harsh or hazardous occupations, as this definition tends to be too small to encompass manufacturing or industry more generally. Sixth, countries that have no federal or national legislation wageworkers or award-systems are classified as having no legal-system for working-time regulation. In cases in which federal regulation exists that regulate hours not only for federal workers, but for all firms that buy services from the federal government, regulation are considered as national in scope and therefore coded.

Even if a country does not have national laws regulating hours, working-time institutions still exists through historical evolved norms or collective sector or firm bargaining agreements. This is generally the case for USA, Canada, and the GB in the period under study (which ends in 1990). Unfortunately, reliably data is much harder to come by for collective bargaining than on law and arbitration decisions. Since the tendency to rely on regulation through law as opposed to collective bargaining or tradition differs systematically between countries, our data suffers from a systematic bias against such countries. This will tend to in the direction of showing less generous working time regulation than what might be the picture on the ground. Researchers should therefor take care when interpreting results. With this in mind. An alternative source of regulation can be found in the CBR dataset (Adams, Z., et al 2017), which measures working time regulation as outlined in both in collective bargaining and legislation. Still, collective bargaining agreements are only rarely formulated on the national level (the Scandinavian countries being a prominent exception). Collective bargaining agreements will therefore be less fitting to describe national level regulation, as hours of work will tend to diverge between sectors and even between firms within the same sector depending on the dominant level of bargaining.

A quick note on the EU directives of 1993 and 2000 on working time. Following the introduction of the common market with the Maastricht agreement in 1992, EU-directives have started prescribing minimum requirement for working-time for EU-members. Only the UK have the ability to opt out of one part of the 2003 working-time directive, the working-time limit of maximum 48 hours on average on a seven day basis. The data collection for this dataset ends prior to this date, meaning that these data cannot be used to estimate their effects.

The period under study contains a period in which European states took mastery of most of the world, creating vast colonial emperies, which in turn needed labour regulation if they were to develop internal markets allowing for commerce, exchange and exploitation. Still, hours of work regulations were non-existent in the colonies for "native" labour (as they tended to be defined by colonial administrations or settler governments) prior to the 20th century. Only sporadic legislation existed, usually defining aspects such forced labour duty and elementary rights of contracts (similar to the master and servant acts). The extension of labour law or factory regulating hours of native workers only started taking form in the early 1910s, taking steam after the First World War and the Washington convention of 1919. With the 1930s and especially 1940s, the French extended the 48-hour week into their own colonial dependencies, and in 1952, they universalized the 40 hours week to all remaining colonies. There were also marked differences between the colonial empires in the extent to which legislation developed on a case-by-case basis or by major uniform extension of labour law. Below we provide a short (and non- exhaustive) oversight over the major colonial laws and give a short summary of the extent to which a specific country tended to regulate hours of work in its colonies by piecemeal legislation or by uniform regulations.

This codebook is structured as follows. First, I outline the sources and the coding procedure used to classify the 203 countries covered by this dataset. I also show some results that indicate that we are indeed capturing hours of normal work, by correlating the collected data with annual worked hours per capita. The results indicate that changes in regulated hours correlates with de-facto hours worked. Second, I give a short overview over the different colonial policies pursued by the imperial powers when it comes to working time. Third, an oversight of the relevant ILO conventions for working hours in industry. Fourth, a country specific overview over the changes in working time legislation for each country. Only reforms that change working hours are tracked. Finally, the last section contains a dataset to reconstruct the country-classifications using the V-dem country code scheme.

Sources, coding procedures, and validity

For Scandinavian, Pacific, Caribbean, African and Anglo-Saxon countries or commonwealth, I relied on online law databases and description of legislative changes in statistical yearbooks.[29] For the period leading up to the 20th century I used the description of the historical development of factory legislation by Magnusson (1919), the extensive and very impressive 1898 report on factory working time laws by Brooke (1898), and a major League of Nations (1919) report issued on the

[29] Links to webpages: Pacific countries: http://www.paclii.org/ , African countries ; https://africanlii.org/ commonwealth countries (previous british colonies in Africa and Asia) ; http://www.commonlii.org/.

recent developments leading up to the declaration of the eight day work day. I also use a report issued by the American Bureau of Labor Statistics (1913) on the ten-hour working-day around the world. From 1919, the ILO sources (that also cover non-members) become available; the "Legislative Series" is an annual publication that translates labor legislation into English up to the 1980s, and is therefore used track year to year changes from 1919, and the various reports such as the "Hours of Work" with historical sections on previous development are used to verify pre-1930 classifications (e.g., ILO, 1935), and the major oversight reports of 1964, 1984, 1995, 2004, and 2018 (e.g., ILO 2018).

In addition, I use the following databases: NATLEX and Travail to track changes in labor laws and hours of work laws, which are then used to identify and track down specific laws in national databases using the sources referred to above. In sum, the dataset is a combination of various sources, meaning that a hierarchy was needed in order to ascertain which information is most trustworthy in the few cases in which sources diverged. In short, national sources take precedent against ILO reports. ILO purports to measure legislation in force in a specific year, usually the time of publication. However, this raises some issues. For example, since information takes time to collect, several countries might have changed their regulation in the same year, leading to incorrect classifications.

In most cases, coding the regulated hours of work is straightforward; the legislation states the number of normal hours of work per week in the legislation. The two most common problems we encountered as follows. First, countries may not regulate hours by week, but instead by day. In these cases, we calculate the normal weekly hours by multiplying the daily hours with the number of working days (which varies over time and between countries depending on regulations mandating weekly resting days). Second, countries sometimes do not specify normal working hours, and instead only specify maximum working hours. In these cases, we have classified normal working hours as maximum hours. This is defensible since workers will have to work up to the specified limit without overtime-compensation. Meaning that workers will have to rely on some other form of regulation besides legislation to reduce hours or receive higher compensation.

How well do *regulated* normal hours track *actual* worked hours? First, the raw correlation is 0.57. Since annual worked hours are shaped by much more than just legislated normal hours of work (as highlighted above, hours can be regulated by other means and the possibility of overtime means maximum hours can be higher than normal hours) this is a quite as strong correlation. In table 1, I have correlated the legislated normal hours of work per week with annual worked hours per capita using various model specifications. Data on actual worked hours is from Hubermann and Minns

(2007) combined with data from the Total Economy Database. Model 1 is estimated without fixed year or country effects, and we find that hours per capita would decrease by 29, 5 for each decrease in regulated working hours. This estimate drops to 5 hours per capita if we control for common events in the form of year effects in model 2. It increases to 30, 6 if we only focus on within country changes by including country dummies. Including both together, we end up with 7,9 hours per capita, which drops to 7, 2 when we account for changes in the denominator (population changes). I short, *regulated* hours of work track *actual* hours worked reasonably well.

One possible source of bias should be highlighted: since information on working time regulation is largely available from ILO initiatives, member countries might be better covered than non-members might be. This is a serious concern, and could bias any study in a number of critical ways. As a test of such a bias, I checked the labor laws of all non-ILO members with no regulated normal hour of work for male workers in my sample in 1990 (end year) to verify that their classification was correct. In 1990, 20 of the 134 countries in my sample were not member of the ILO. Working hours was correctly coded for all 20 countries. This exercise to not rule out ILO-membership bias, but it makes it less likely.

Appendix A4: Major Welfare and political Countries invited to Comintern that didn't participate in the First World War as independent countries

Table I. Policy developments following Bolshevik revolution in countries invited to Comintern meeting in 1919 up to 1925

Country	48 hour law or more generous	Unemployment benefits	Sickness benefits	Old-age pensions	Electoral reform	Other major reform
Existed prior to 1914 and neutral during WW1						
Denmark	1919	1918-1924↑	1915	1891	1918 - 1920 - PR	1921 – invalidity insurance, employment exchange
Netherlands	1919	1916-1917↑	1913	1919↑	1918 - PR	1919-1920 Supreme Labor Council established, 1921 – Accident insurance (improved benefits), 1922 – accident insurance extended to rural workers
Norway	1919	1918-1922↑	1915-1925↑	(1923)	1919 - PR	1918- minimum wage for commercial workers, 1919 - Social assistance, Commission on socialization, (1919 -work council) 1920 – accident insurance (improved benefits)
Spain	1919	1919↑	(1923↑)	1919↑	-	1920 – employment exchanges
Portugal	1922	-	(1919)	(1919)	1915 - PR	1919 – accident insurance extended to all employed persons
Sweden	1919	(1920)	1891-1921	1913	1911 - PR	Commission on socialization
Switzerland	1919	1924↑	1925↑	-	1919 - PR	1918-1920 - accident insurance, 1920 – federal labor department
Existed prior to 1914 and participated in WW1						
Austria	1918/19	(1918) 1920	1920/21	1920	1919-PR	1919 – act of socialization, Work council reform, socialization commission and act of community control, 1920 – work council act, 1919-1921 accident benefits increased
Bulgaria	1917/1919	1925	1918/19	1924	?	1917 – factory inspection, 1918-24 accident insurance, 1920-1923 - land reform
Hungary	-	-	1917/19/25	1928	?	General lack of reform.
Germany	1918/19/22	(1918)1923	1919/23	1911/25	1918-PR	1919 – collective bargain law, 1920 - Work council reform, socialization commission
Greece	1920	(1922)	(1922)	(1922)	?	1918-1925 – land reform, 1922 – accident legislation,
Romania	-	1991	1912	1912	?	1921-1937 - land reform
Belgium	1922	1920-25	1910/1925	1920/24	?	1919- family allowances, labor inspection, 1919-1920- accident insurance. 1922 – employment contracts
France	1919	1905/10	(1898)1928	1910/1928	?	1917-24 – Family allowances, - law on profit-sharing schemes. 1922 – accident legislation
Italy	1923	1919-1923	(1919-1920)	1919-1925	1919-PR	1917- accident insurance 1918/1920 – profit-sharing and worker participation in management bill and commission
United kingdom	-	(1911)1920 1925	1911	(1908)1920/21/24/25	1919 – female suffrage	1918/20– industrial courts (arbitration system), 1923-25 accident insurance reforms

Ireland	-	1911/1920)	1911	1909	?	-
United States	-	-	-	-	?	1918 – immigration act (restrictions of anarchists) 1921 – Emergency quota act (restriction on migration from Europe)
Australia	-	-	(1912)1944	1908	?	Several important arbitration decisions (44 hour week in 1920, reversed in 1922)
Japan	-	-	1922	-	?	1923 – minimum age of factory workers, and working hours of women and children
Existed after 1914 and didn't mobilize as self-organized units						
Czechoslovakia	1919	1921↑	1919↑	(1919)1924↑	1919 - PR	1918- Land reform, 1920- Socialization of mines, 1921 – requisitioning land for building purposes, Works Committees. 1924 – sickness and maternity benefits (major re-organization)
Estonia	1931	-	1917↑	-	1920 - PR	1921 - Wage and Hours act for rural workers, 1922- accident insurance
Finland	1917	1917-1921↑	1897	-	1907 - PR	1917-1918 – compulsory accident insurance, 1924-1939 land reform
Latvia	1922	-	1922↑	-	1919 - PR	1927 – accident insurance for all employed persons
Lithuania	1919	-	1925↑	-	1922 - PR	-
Poland	1919	1924↑	1920↑	-	1919 - PR	1918 - land-reforms, 1921 – Employment exchanges, 1924 – compulsory accident insurance

Oversight over major laws for labor standards and transfer welfare schemes before 1925. Health and education policies excluded. Dates in parenthesis signify moderate or quasi-temporary measures. Dash signify no-major legislation prior to 1925. Classifications were done by tracking legislative changes in the SpaW 1 and 2 database (see Rasmussen SPaW codebook) the Legislative Series produced by the ILO, and the International Labor Review (various issues up to 1925). Land reform from Albertus (2015) and electoral reforms from V-dem database. Temporary-war related unemployment benefits excluded. We have not included special legislation for smaller groups of workers, such as public servants, soldiers, miners and seamen for the simple reason that the graph would be even more unreadable. The category "Other major" reforms include insurance reforms such as invalidity, social assistance reforms (away from stigmatizing poor relief laws), socialization acts or commissions including land-reforms, corporative arrangements (such as work-councils), and setting up of government organizations or departments aimed at regulating the labor market. The table is not exhaustive and is not meant to be so. It is only a rough outline of the social policy development in non-waring and waring states that all faced revolutionary threat.

Appendix A5: Replication of all main tables using attendance at the first Comintern meeting instead of invitations

Table 1A Attendance at the first Comintern meeting (1919) and Legislated Normal Working Hours

	(1) Levels	(2) Levels	(3) Levels	(4) Levels	(5) Levels	(6) Changes
Attended	-16.0***	-11.6***	-11.3***	-8.26**	-8.11***	-0.39
	(-5.39)	(-3.52)	(-3.81)	(-3.02)	(-4.15)	(-1.23)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Dummies	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Dummies	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Trends	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
LDV	No	No	No	No	No	Yes
Observations	8348	8348	8348	9592	15996	15904
Countries	105	105	105	105	169	169
End Year	1925	1925	1925	1939	1988	1988
R^2	0.190	0.470	0.650	0.752	0.863	0.105

t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. OLS with standard errors clustered by country - similar results using Ar1 correction and panel corrected standard errors. Country, year dummies and control variables excluded.

Table 2A Controlling for the most likely alternative explanations for 78 countries between 1817-1925

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Attended Comintern	-9.00*	-9.09*	-13.6***	-9.54**	-3.40
	(-2.31)	(-2.62)	(-6.51)	(-2.79)	(-0.64)
Mobilization	-0.067				
	(-0.40)				
ILO member		-2.47			
		(-0.60)			
Inflation			-0.0029***		
			(-7.40)		
Soc. Dem. Party				-1.32	
				(-1.88)	
Union density					0.032
					(0.24)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3778	3778	3878	6074	560
Countries	78	78	39	63	25
R^2	0.642	0.644	0.564	0.505	0.764

t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. OLS with standard errors clustered by country - similar results using Ar1 correction and panel corrected standard errors. Country, year dummies and control variables excluded.

Table 3A Attendance at the first Comintern meeting (1919) and Coverage in redistributive programs up to 1925

Coverage:	(1) All Groups	(2) All Groups	(3) All Groups	(4) All Groups	(5) All Groups	(6) Industrial Workers
Attended Comintern	3.99***	3.32**	2.08*	2.08*	2.08*	1.09**
	(4.21)	(2.96)	(2.06)	(2.06)	(2.06)	(2.63)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Trends	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8350	8350	8350	8350	8350	8350
Countries	105	105	105	105	105	105
R^2	0.212	0.453	0.646	0.646	0.646	0.731

t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. OLS with standard errors clustered by country - similar results using Ar1 correction and panel corrected standard errors. Country, year dummies and control variables excluded.

Table 4A. Invitation to the Comintern 1919 and Coverage in all types of welfare programs up to 1925 for 105 countries, including coverage in private and voluntary insurance systems

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Comintern Invited	6.43***	5.73***	4.29***
	(8.33)	(7.49)	(6.67)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	No	Yes	Yes
Country Trends	No	No	Yes
Observations	8350	8350	8350
R^2	0.349	0.555	0.745
Mean welf. prog.	0.422	0.422	0.422
(min-max)	(0-17)	(0-17)	(0-17)

t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. OLS with standard errors clustered by country - similar results using Ar1 correction and panel corrected standard errors. Country, year dummies and control variables excluded. Basic controls are GDP per capita (log) and population (log).

Table 5A Generosity of Sickness and Unemployment Benefits measured in duration of benefit period (Weeks) in 1925

Program:	(1) Sickness	(2) Unemployment
Attended Comintern	19.4**	-1.16
	(3.33)	(-0.43)
Controls	Yes	Yes
Observations	87	90
R^2	0.419	0.214

t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Appendix A6: Testing Sample restrictions for main Comintern analysis

Table 6A Checking Sample restrictions, all analysis ends in 1925.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Sample restriction:	1900	Independent and 1900	Excluding Asia/Africa	1900	Independent and 1900	Excluding Asia/Africa
Comintern Invited	-10.3***	-8.17**	-8.54**			
	(-4.34)	(-2.88)	(-2.84)			
Attended Comintern				-11.6***	-7.71*	-8.23*
				(-3.76)	(-2.10)	(-2.26)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year Dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2101	1388	4218	2101	1388	4218
Countries	92	66	58	92	66	58
R^2	0.649	0.677	0.604	0.623	0.657	0.588

t statistics in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. OLS with standard errors clustered by country - similar results using Ar1 correction and panel corrected standard errors. Country, year dummies and control variables excluded.

Appendix A7: Synthetic control P-values



Appendix A8: Instrumental regression results

Our main specifications control for country-fixed effects and some specifications even include country-specific trends. Yet, Comintern invitations could have been highly responsive to the perceptions of leaders in the Russian Communist Party about which countries were ripe for revolution in the aftermath of the dramatic and game-changing events of 1917. More specifically, Lenin, Trotsky, or other could form judgements (based on factors that are not captured by our control variables, fixed effects, or time trends) about which countries were experiencing short-term developments that made them particularly likely to follow the Russian example. If so, it might be rational for Russian leaders to send Comintern invitations to unions or labor parties in exactly these countries, anticipating that this could potentially tilt the balance of scales between elites and revolutionaries in this country. Such perceptions, formed right before or in 1919, may correlate also with the passage of social policies in the aftermath of 1919. In order to account for such endogenous selection into Comintern stemming from short-term developments, we use Zimmerwald membership – i.e., signing the proclamation of the Zimmerwald group, a break out of radicals from the Second International in 1915 (notably, before the Bolshevik Revolution) – as a predictor of Comintern invitations four years later. The Zimmerwald declaration, formulated by Lenin, was aimed to push worker movements in the direction of his revolutionary line. While Lenin detested the organizational arm of the Zimmerwald movement, the International Socialist Commission, it was a precursor to the Comintern Agnew & McDermott 1998).

We thus use Zimmerwald membership as an instrument and Comintern invitations as the endogenous regressor in Instrumental Variable (IV) analysis. Our identifying assumption is that historical international worker radicalism – captured by Zimmerwald membership – can only influence current social policy through predicting Comintern representation, *once* we control for *current* domestic worker radicalism (we try out different such measures as additional controls to ensure the exclusion restriction is satisfied). If true, these IV regressions will yield consistent estimates of the effect of Comintern invitations on work hours.

Results from (2SLS) IV regressions are reported in the table below. The first-stage results clearly show that Zimmerwald membership is a very strong predictor of Comintern invitations; the specification passes all conventional tests for instrument strength. Further, the coefficient of Comintern invitation on working hours is larger than in our benchmark OLS specification, and various 2SLS specifications show that the relationship remains highly significant and robust. In other words, even when we account for the possibility that (short-term) developments in revolutionary threats is causing invitations to Comintern, Comintern invitations are strongly related to subsequent changes in working hour regulations.[30]

[30] Equivalent such instrumental variable tests on other outcome variables, such as social policy coverage and generosity, show similar results.

Table Instrumental IV regression and Invitation to the Comintern 1919 and Legislated Normal Working Hours up to 1925

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
First Stage					
Zimmerwald	0.513***	0.463***	0.417***		0.221
	(13.75)	(7.21)	(5.90)		(1.93)
ISC				0.410***	0.307**
				(5.01)	(2.74)
IV					
Second Stage					
Comintern Invited	-20.8***	-17.9***	-18.1**	-14.7*	-15.9**
	(-4.74)	(-3.35)	(-2.95)	(-2.54)	(-3.14)
Mass. Mob.		-0.16	-0.16	-0.14	-0.15
		(-1.13)	(-1.06)	(-0.92)	(-0.97)
ILO Member		-0.15	0.35	0.24	0.28
		(-0.04)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.07)
Communism			1.09	0.13	0.46
			(0.37)	(0.06)	(0.21)
Reduced Form					
Zimmerwald	-10.690***	-8.318***	-7.544***		-5.271
	(-4.62)	(-3.44)	(-3.03)		(-1.74)
ISC				-6.035**	-3.571
				(-2.47)	(-1.28)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	8485	3887	3164	3164	3164
Countries	106	79	55	55	55
Kleibergen-Paap	189.005	52.008	34.756	25.077	26.893
Endogenity Test	4.222	2.351	2.378	1.205	2.4458
	(*P*= 0.039)	(*P*=0.125)	(*P*= 0.123)	(*P*=0.272)	(*P*=0.117)
R^2	0.486	0.670	0.570	0.596	0.588

t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. OLS with standard errors clustered by country - similar results using Ar1 correction and panel corrected standard errors. Country, year dummies and basic control variables excluded. Basic controls are GDP per capita (log) and population (log) included in all models. Mass mobilization, ILO membership and communism variables included but not presented in first stage and reduced form.

Appendix A9: Communist parties and sources

Table 1 Complete oversight over communist parties

Country	Communist party name	Year of founding
Sweden	Svergies Kommunistiska Parti	1924
Norway	Norges Kommunistiske Parti	1923
Denmark	Danmarks Venstresocialistiske Parti	1919
Bulgaria	Balgarska rabotnicheska sotsialdemokraticheska partia	1903
Belgium	Parti Communiste de Belgique	1921
Finland	Suomen Kommunistinen Puolue	1919
Estonia	Eestimaa Kommunistlik Partei	1920
Latvia	Latvijas Komunistiskā partija	1904
Lithuania	Lietuvos komunistų partija	1918
Greece	Kommounistikó Kómma Elládas	1918
Switzerland	Kommunistische Partei der Schweiz	1921
Russia (Soviet Union)	Bolsheviks	1903
Albania	Partia Komuniste e Shqipërisë	1928
Poland	From 1906: Polska Partia Socjalistyczna – Lewica From 1918: Komunistyczna Partia Polski	1906
Portugal	Partido Communista Portugues	1921
France	Parti Communiste Francais	1920
Germany	Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands	1918
Ireland	Socialist Party of Ireland	1904
Italy	Partido Communista Italiano	1921
Netherlands	From 1909: Social Democratic Party From 1918: Communistische Partij Nederland	1909
Spain	Partido Communista de Espana	1921
Turkey	Türkiye Komünist Partisi	1920
United Kingdom	Communist Party of Great Britain	1920
Austria	Kommunistische Partei Österreichs	1918
Romania	Partidul Comunist Român	1921
Serbia (Great Serbia - Yugoslavia)	Serbian name: Zveza komunistov Jugoslavije Official name: Savez komunista Jugoslavije (from 1952) English name: League of Communists of Yugoslavia	1919
Hungary	Magyar Kommunista Párt	1918
Mexico	Partido Socialista Obrero	1917
Colombia	Partido Comunista Colombiano	1930
Brazil	Partido Comunista Brasileiro	1922
United States	Communist Party of the United States of America	1919
El Salvador	Partido Comunista	1930
Bolivia	Partido Obrero Revolucionaro	1938
Haiti	French: Parti Communiste Haïtien Creole: Pati Kominis Ayisyen	1934
Honduras	Partido Comunista de Honduras	1927
Peru	Partido Socialista del Perú	1928
Argentine	Partido Comunista de la Argentina	1918
Venezuela	Partido Comunista de Venezuela	1931
Nicaragua	Partido Obrero Socialista	1967
Canada	Communist Party of Canada	1921
Chile	Partido Obrero Socialista	1922
Paraguay	Partido Comunista Paraguayo	1928
Cuba	Partido Comunista de Cuba	1925
Costa Rica	Partido Comunista Costarricense Primarily called: Bloque de Obreros y Campesinos	1931
Ecuador	Partido Socialista Ecuatoriano Changed name to Partido Comunista del Ecuador in 1931.	1925
Guatemala	Partido Comunista de Guatemala	1922
Panama	Partido del Pueblo de Panamá	1930
Uruguay	Partido Comunista del Uruguay	1920
Dominican Republic	Partido Comunista Dominicano	1944
Japan	Nihon Kyōsan-tō	1922
Yemen	National Liberation Front	1963
Pakistan (India)	Communist Party of Pakistan	1948
Afghanistan	People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan	1965
India	Communist Party of India	1928
Thailand (Siam)	Communist Party of Thailand	1942
Nepal	Communist Party of Nepal	1949
Australia	Communist Party of Australia	1920
Iran	Hezb-e-Komunist Iran	1920
Iraq	al-Hizb al-Shuyu'i al'Iraqi	1934
Syria	Hizb al-Sha'b al-Lubnani al-Hizb al-Shuyu'i al-Suri	1924 1944
Tunisia	al-Ḥizb ash-Shuyūʿī at-Tūnisī	1934
Saudi Arabia	Hizb al-Shuyu'i fial-Sa'udiyah	1975
South Africa	Communist Party of South Africa	1921
Mali	Parti Malien du Travail	1965
Ethiopia	Mela Ethiopia Sosialist Niqinaqē	1968
Liberia	--	--

We provide additional notes on our classification and the specific sources used in the Excel file: Communist_Social_notes.exel. Please download the dataset following this link.

Appendix A10: Additional results for communist parties



Figure 4

Table X. Did the Comintern lead to a split from social democratic parties to communist parties?

	(1) Logit	(2) Logit	(3) OLS	(4) OLS	(5) OLS
Attended Comintern	2.47***	1.38*	0.43**	0.45**	0.51***
	(3.33)	(2.39)	(3.14)	(3.07)	(3.76)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed Effects	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Country Trends	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	6954	6930	6954	6954	9943
Countries	60	60	60	60	63
End year	1940	1940	1940	1940	1988
R^2	0.3232	0.1146	0.479	0.679	0.866

t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard Errors clustered by country. Pseudo R2 in models 1-2. Country, year dummies and control variables excluded. Basic controls are GDP per capita (log) and population (log). Results are substiantialy similar if we constrain our sample to countries with social democratic parties.

Appendix B: Revolutionary Fear and the Bolshevik revolution in Norway 1915-1924 – an extended case study

In this appendix, we will provide an extended and thoroughly documented version of the briefly described case study from the main text. Part of the material collected for the section on "Proportional electoral system" and "Going revolutionary" is used in Gjerløw & Rasmussen (2019) and Rasmussen et. al. (2019).

The Norwegian elites, both military, secret police, organized business, and the political establishment, all thought revolution as imminent at least two periods of time, during 1918-19 and 1920-21, with a range of various measures being planned or pursued to avoid its columniation (Danielsen 1984; Knutsen 1994; Agøy 1994: 73, 136). The aim of these measures was to incorporate and strengthen the reformist part of the labor movement, through various political and economic institutional and policy changes (Furre 1983, Knutsen 1994, 43-46). In this case study, we will document that:

A) Labor, as represented by core actors in the Labor Party and several unions, underwent a radical change following the Bolshevik revolution, strengthening the radical elements at the cost of the reformist.
B) Elites came to believe revolution was possible and imminent. Furthermore, this change was directly tied to foreign revolutionary events, Comintern membership and the adoption of radicalism ideology in large part of the worker movement.
C) Elites responded to their changing beliefs by various measures aimed at incorporating the labor movement politically through electoral reforms and economically through various social policy elements.

Concerning the economic elites, we mainly consider the Norwegian Employer Association (Norsk Arbeidsgiver Forening N.A.F.) the leading employer organization in Norway from 1889 (Knutsen 1994). Regarding the political elites, we consider them as being constituted, at the time, by the government (Gunnar Knudsen liberal PM 1913-1920 and Otto B. Halvorsen conservative PM 1920-21), conservative and liberal MPs, and their party organizations.[31] In the state apparatus, we focus on the defense intelligence office (Generalstabens Efterretningkontor), secret police (Oppdagelsespolitiet), and discussions in the high command (Generalstaben) and the provisory security commission. The Labor movement is operationalized as the Labor Party (Det Norske Arbeiderparti, DnA), (Arbeidernes Faglige Landsorganisasjon, A.F.L.), the youth-wing of the party (Norges socialdemokratiske Ungdomsforbund, NU) and the short-lived worker and soldier council movement. We therefore cover all the principle organizations and arenas for coordination and decision making in Norway around 1910-1920s.

[31] Party archives are – unfortunately – missing for our period. The Nazi-occupation in 1940 lead to the confiscation of the archives, and they were never recovered. Historians have since then used various alternatives sources such as diaries to reconstruct the preferences and political considerations (e.g, Danielsen 1984). We have corresponded with several leading historians on this period to ensure that we have consulted most of the relevant material (e.g, Agøy, Egge, and Knudsen).

Going Revolutionary

The Labor Party (Det Norske Arbeiderparti [DNA] in Norwegian), founded in 1887, was in the beginning inspired by Marxist thinking, the first party program stated that DnA, «which have the liberation of the working classes as our goal, therefore endeavors the handing over of the means of production to social common property and production changed from capitalistic to socialistic" (DnA landsmøteprotokol 1891). This line of thinking was slowly abandoned as reformism became the leading principle of DnA. Reformism meant a clear adherence to the importance of the parliamentary line in achieving social change (DnA 1918). Parliamentarianism was finally adopted by the party program of 1901, coinciding with the introduction of universal suffrage for men (Bjørgum 1976, 66-68). In this way, ideological position of the DnA had shown that it was susceptible to manipulation from legislative amendments.

The trade union federation (Arbeidernes Faglige Landsorganisasjon, AFL) founded on the behest of the party in 1899, was understood as a means to achieve changes in wage- and working-conditions through bargaining with employers. DnA and AFL was bound by the hip, dual membership was practiced, and having a power base in the unions was a necessary step in gaining the party leadership position. The unions and party coordinated their demands against employers and politicians, deciding which aims to be pursued against the employers in bargaining and which to promote in parliament. At the start of 1917, the reformist leaders such as Olaf Lian held important position in the leadership of DnA and AFL.

Until 1918, the syndicalist had been delegated to a minority position in the DnA. Largely originating from the Fagoposisjonen of 1911 - a syndicalist movement within AFL - and the social democratic youth organization. Its platform marked a strong break with the reformist group. Fagoposisjonen argued for the use of sabotage, boycott, and sympathy strikes as legitimate weapons against employers (Olstad 2009, 173). The leader and primary motor for the Fagoposisjonen was Tranmæl. He wrote the group's ideological program of 1913, stating that "workers improvements cannot only take place within the established frame of capitalism, but one must also work to destroy [capitalism] and introduce the socialistic social order" (Tranmæl 1913, 5). The aim was, to radicalize the union movement, "to make it ready for revolutionary mass-action" (Bjørgum 2017, 45). While originating in the unions, the movement would interestingly enough not gain a foothold to threaten the leadership, aiming instead to push their line in the DnA.

The 1917 revolution strengthened the radical movement, especially in the party. It lead would ultimately lead to a massive change in party-rhetoric, a temporary membership in the Comintern, and the expulsion of the reformists social democrats in 1921. [32] Tranmæl first reaction to the revolution in March 1917 was to

[32] It is still debate in the historical community as to how radical the Norwegian social democrats were truly radical, or what was meant by "revolutionary mass-action". Brandal and Sørensen (2018) argue that while the social democrats pursued a polarizing and extremist rhetoric, they were still committed to democracy (see also Bjørnson 1990, 547). In this reading, the Norwegian social democrats only continued a long-tradition of civil society organization within the bounds of the political regime. Our argument is not dependent on whether the social democrats in this period were truly revolutionary, planned to undertake revolutionary like actions or a full-blown revolution. Instead, our argument is conditioned on the bourgeoisie generally held the convention - which was strengthened by the international situation and connection - that they were indeed revolutionary. The only historical sources that indicate that this was not the case, (e.g., Hobson & Kristiansen 2001, 169) has been criticized of not using the available source material (Agøy 2002). Moreover, even these authors argue that the general command underwent a decisive change in their

see in it the beginning of "The fall of class-society and the introduction of socialism" (Bjørgum 2017, 44). For Tranmæl, it was clear that "one can now clearly see that the fire will spread with a strength such as it cannot be stopped" (ibd, 45). With a reference to the Zimmerwald program, he demanded workers organize a general strike against the war, and workers arm themselves against the coming counter-revolutionary attempts by the bourgeoisie. Still, his attempts at bringing down the reformist management of the labor party and union congress were all outmaneuvered by the reformist leadership (Bjørgum 2017, 52).

The November revolution would decisively change things in favor for the radicals within the party (Furre 1983; Bjørnson 1990; Sundvall 2017). The news from Russia lead to major organizational and ideological transformations almost immediately. The labor paper, *Klassekampen (Class struggle)* published the Zimmerwald declaration to *"*establish everywhere soldier and worker councils as your body in the struggle for peace*!"* (Bjørnson 1990, 509). The movement would establish worker and soldier councils all around the country, usually outside of the established trade unions (Nordvik 1974). Tranmæl and others would work to set up and coordinate these councils, including soldier councils. These organizations offered Tranmæl a base of support that was outside the established frameworks of DnA and AFL, one that the reformists did not control. They also held risks, as Tranmæl would be charged by the minister of justice for conspiring to organize military men. Among the resolutions adopted at the worker councils national conference on March 24 1918 was the immediate introduction of the 8 hour day, and in case the government ignored their demands, the use of "political mass-strikes" (Bjørnson 1990, 516-517).

By 1918, the radicals had gone from being a minority to gaining enough support to challenge the reformist. The minority recommendation to the 1918 meeting stated that, "As a revolutionary class party, social democracy cannot recognize the affluent classes' right to economic exploitation and repression of the working class even if this exploitation and repression is supported by a majority in parliament. The Norwegian workers party must therefore reserve the right to use revolutionary mass-action in the fight for the working-class economic liberation" (DnA landsmøteprotokol 1918). The position of the revolutionaries, in tandem with syndicalist orientation, was to push the party in the direction of extra-parliamentary action, away from reformism through parliamentarianism. Ole O. Lian, the party vice-chairman in 1918 argued against the belief that a "revolutionary coup" was possible in Norway, the only possible option was to secure majority support in the population at large.[33] Tranmæl countered, «The majority confuses parliamentarianism with popular rule. One has a superstitious belief in parliamentarianism. Such a superstitious belief will lead to a weakening of worker power and to nothing but great disappointments" (DnA landsmøteprotokol 1918, 41). The reformists lost, and the minority became the majority. Most

understanding of the revolutionary threat in 1917 following news of the revolution, and that local agitation now came to be seen as an expression of social radicalism (Hobson & Kristiansen 2001, 135). The seminal study on the issue, Furre (1983) argues that there is clear evidence of planning for armed rebellion in November 1918, but that these plans were shelved in late November at the behest of the reformist leadership in the unions.

[33] Specifically, Lian ruled out any general strikes aimed at the sorting since all foods supplies were controlled by the municipality administration and the state. That meant any action would have to be supported by the A.F.L., which he knew did not have the necessary resources to support such an undertaking. The only possible outcome from the mass-revolutionary action the radicals wanted would be to "knock our own feet from under ourselves" (Bjørnson 1990, 531; DNA landsmøteprotokol 1918, 35-40)

importantly, Tranmæl would become party-secretary, with all of the reformists relinquishing their place in the party-leadership.

In November, in response to the German revolution, the party leadership even believed a revolution possible. Several members of the leadership started working on plans on "arrangements for a quick takeover of power" between 11 of November to 21 November when the meeting between the A.F.L. secretariat and DnA leadership ended with the plans being shelved (Furre 1983, 473). Notes from the planning group show that a coup would be facilitated by the massive organization of worker councils, and the immediate reforms to be carried out once in power was socialization of the means of production and the eight hour day and Tranmæl the role as "leader of the revolution" (Ibd. 473-476). Did these measures include the gathering of arms in preparation for revolution? If the reports found in the archives of the secret police are to be believed, yes. A member among the leadership is reported to have told an entente agent "weapons and ammunition were assembled on various places (…) When action was to be taken, workers would be well armed. The weapon stores increased each day."[34] Another member was tasked with buying weapons from a German trade boat (Furre 1983, 498). Still, any weapons the movement possessed has been estimated to be limited to non-existent by historians (Agøy 1994). Even if the main secretariat of A.F.L distanced themselves from these plans and probably was the reason they were put aside (Furre 1983, 498.), the German revolution had strengthened the positon of the syndicalist in the federation. This lead to a worsening the position of the reformists, which had seen the federation as their bastion against the radicalism of the party base (Furre 1983, 65).

The radical line would be further strengthened in 1919. At the party at the national convention it was declared, "The party considers mass action in its various forms to be the crucial means in the struggle for socialism" and even encouraged MPs to strike and soldier councils to be formed and to work against mobilization (DnA landsmøteprotokol 1919, 12). The vision was a society in which political rights was to be denied those " that live on the exploitation of others labor. (..) Social democracy will only extend voting rights to those that work, and connect such a right to work itself." Furthermore, the socialist society must organizationally be built on worker-, farmer and fishermannscouncils" (DnA Landsmøteprotokoll 1919, 15). This was direct result of their understanding of the current situation: The capitalistic world was on the brink of "breakdown (..) Moving in a direction from capitalism to socialism" (DnA Landsmøteprotokoll 1919, 12-13). Norway was in a "state of maturation for the revolution and socialism"[35]. The party decided to become member of the Comintern, and the role of the soldier councils was expanded from a defensive measure to an offensive strategy to "dismantl[e] the military" (DnA landsmøteprotokol 1919, 44). Furthermore, the party also changed its understanding of property rights in the rural sector. Since 1902, DnA had accepted private ownership in tandem with municipality and state owned lands, and land-reforms

[34] Generalstabens etteretningskontor til sjefen for justisdepartementet 28.11.1918. den revolusjonære bevegelse i Norge i 1918. the seminal historian on DnA in this period (Furre (1983, 479), advises some restraint in interpreting his statement to the agent. The fellow in question was known to exaggerate, but his statement on efforts being made to secure arms probably reflected some degree of truth.

[35] DnA landsmøteprotokoll 1919, 12. Social-demokraten. 8 may. 1919.

was envisioned to bring about these reforms. With the new land-program of 1919, all land which was worked by hired help was to be (by a combination of) portioned up to family owners, socialized and managed as co-operatives. Parliamentary means was eschewed in favor of a post-revolutionary society being the only solution to bring about these changes (Furre 1983, 92-93).

The next transformation of the party, would take place in 1920, with the entry of the party into Comintern. The vice-chairman Emil Stang had been the single delegate representing the party at the First congress in 1919, and the party would join the Comintern in late 1919. On the second conference, DnA would be one of the biggest delegations: 10 delegates would arrive in Moscow, including the youth organization leader, (and later PM) Einar Gerhardsen. It was here that Zinonev, the leader of Comintern, presented what later to be was nicknamed Lenin's 21 thesis, outlining the rules for admission to the Comintern.

It is important to recognize the revolutionary nature of the Comintern. The aim of the Comintern, as recognized by Lenin 21 theses, was to establish organizations that could function as divisions in the European civil war. The organization was to be divided into isolated cells that could operate independent of each other but following a hierarchal system. In other words, to create communist parties that could survive the coming world revolution (Sundvall 2017). It would mean accepting Lenin's understanding of the capitalist world as having entered into a state of "civil war". It also meant the expulsion of what Zinonev labeled "reformist traitors" in order to avoid the "danger of being watered down by elements characterized by vacillation and half-measures".[36] House clearing was therefore mandatory – even it came at an loss of important capacities – and even engaging in illegal activities. The purpose of these changes was clear. The organizational changes was needed because "The organization of the party must be adapted to the conditions and purpose of its activity. The Communist Party should be the vanguard, the front-line troops of the proletariat, leading in all phases of its revolutionary class struggle and the subsequent transitional period toward the realization of socialism, the first stage of communist society.» [37]

In 1921, the most ardent of the reformist would break out from DnA. They established the Norwegian social democratic party, holding on 10 percent of the vote. The reformist would not re-join the party until 1927.

How involved was DnA with the Comintern? DnA would take an active role in both legal and illegal work. Illegal transportation of soviet propaganda and couriers was carried through a secret committee in Kristiania, in quite extraordinary proportions (Furre 1983; 468-9). Party offices was used to hide illegals traveling to and from Russia and bribes paid to workers on the various coast-boats used to ferry the illegals through customs (ibd. 471). A Germany spy-report from this period also outlines that Norway was used as a station to transport funds too practically "the whole world" (ibd.).Prominent DnA members participated in

[36] https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/2nd-congress/ch07.htm
[37] https://www.marxists.org/history/international/comintern/2nd-congress/ch07.htm

smuggling. Gerhardsen (after the Comintern meeting of 1920) would smuggle Emeralds hidden in toothpaste tubes. Another member of DnA would be stopped with 51 gold bars in his luggage.

The actions of the Norwegians were also coordinated with Moscow. For example, an report to the generalstabens office for intelligence reveal that there existed a secret agreement (overkomst) between DnA and Comintern, under which DnA accepted to undertake all orders from Moscow, in exchange for political as well as financial and military resources (Olstad, 1998, 39). Other sources indicate that Norwegian radicals was told to halt any revolutionary attempts in 1922, as to wait for more favorable conditions in Sweden which could have facilitated an inter-Scandinavian revolution (Ibd.).

In 1922, the high court barrister and communist Ludvig Meyer is indicated to have been tasked to "utrede" the possibility of revolutionary action 1922 (Olstad 1998, 49). The documents show that he thought the current year fitting for the beginning of revolutionary action: "Norway is on the verge of breakdown, which can be exploited by a tax-strike and by pushing for demands that could rally the workers against the government. The Military and the [kings] guard was not as trustworthy as in 1921, and in the army perhaps, only as many as 3000 men would go as far as to do their duty" (ibd.). Few public functionaries would go so far as to risk their lives to fight against the revolution. The Norwegian middle class was "weak" and would be easy to contain by the use of terror" (ibd. 49-50). Ironically, the Comintern adherents in the party pushed for a moderate line following signals from the third international conference, which indicated the stalling of the world revolution. These Comintern members would therefore support the reformists in their acceptance of various reformist proposals in the early 1920s. Over time, this created a rift in the revolutionary wing, which pushed Tranmæl and his ilk to embrace the social democrats that had not left the party in 1921. To some degree this was a natural response for Tranmæl. His power-base was split between the unions and the party, and the ability of the party to gain foothold among the workers dependent on the unions. He also wanted to pursue a radical line from "below", using the dual membership of union and party to build a revolutionary movement. Comintern, with its concept of party cells was adamant that dual membership had to be revoked: DnA voted to leave Comintern in 1923, the social democrats which had left in 1921 would rejoin the party in 1927. The Comintern group would leave DnA and establish "Norges Kommunistiske parti" on the 4 of November 1923, with 13 MPs defecting. In 1924, only six would re-elected.

Elites and revolutionary threat

Having established the strong radical turn in both the AFL and DnA, we now turn to how state, business and political elites over time came to view the revolutionary threat and what responses they felt were fitting.

The revolution of 1917 and the following power change in DnA fundamentally changed the Elites understanding of the labor movement. This change took place in both the military, business community and among the liberals and conservatives.

Prior to 1917, Agøy (1994, 32-34) documents that both the military establishment and the political elites all shared the opinion that that military engagement into internal affairs was to be avoided. By 1918, focus

shifted from external threats to internal, with some of the efforts undertaken even weakening defense against external enemies. The general staff had undergone a shift in their fundamental understanding of labor, and what means were appropriate as response. First off, major steps was taken to set-up risk-free military divisions, which could be mobilized during general strikes or strikes targeting strategic infrastructure. Risk-free here meant divisions excluding members of the lower classes (Pettersen 2010). The secret police also decided to continue (which would become illegal after 1918) postage and telegram surveillance of the most radical elements. Especially the klick around the syndicalist and leader for the radical wing of the labor party, Martin Tranmæl was put under surveillance, which later led to him being charged for working against the state. At various times, military divisions and battleships would be mobilized to work pre-emptive measures against strikes getting out of hand. For example, the battleship "Harald Hårfagre" would be sent to Trondheimsfjorden during the work-stoppage conflicts in 1918. DnA had put forward the demand and threaten with work stoppage on the first of May unless their demands were meet. The commander was told that «one must be prepared to face disturbances if the decision goes against the wishes of the workers" (Pettersen 2010, 52). Similar preparations were in place during the railway strike of 1920.

The political elite was even more concerned than the military. As argued by the seminal historian on the conservative party in our period, the labor movement would now come to be viewed as the greatest danger to the regime since the Thrane movement over 70 years ago (Danielsen 1984, 14-15). Even if mostly a change in rhetoric, it was extremist and revolutionary rhetoric. At the start of 1918, leading members of the cabinet feared an outright coup (Agøy 1994; 94). The Prime Minister Gunnar Knudsen therefore established a security commission with a wide mandate to "secure peace and order if civilian government was brought down" and work to establish guideline for co-operation between the different defense arms against the syndicalists (Pettersen 2010, 43). The commission would operate in secret and was meant as a permanent additional as long as the syncialist threat persisted.

Given these preparations, when Knudsen was contacted by N.A.F in the mid of April 1918, fearing the threat of mass-revolutionary act in the declaration from the worker councils concerning the eight-hour day, his response was comforting. The military was prepared to intervene if the worst come to the worst (Bjørnson 1990, 549). Gunnar Knutsen would alter address the situation publically in parliament on March 3. "It is tragic to have to say this and even more tragic if one ends up having to do it; but the government is prepared to, that it might become necessary, and if it is necessary, it is better to strike fast than to show weakness and forbearance opposite possible breach of order, for then it might become so much worse later on".[38]

The security commission was summoned convene again the 12 of November following the revolutionary events in Germany. The German revolutionary action had convinced both the political establishment and especially the military that a revolutionary attempt was imminent in Norway (Agøy 1997, 75). Information

[38] Stortingstidene 1918 399 (Gunnar Knudsen)

problems were prevalent, a primary talking point was how keep tabs of the syndicalist movement (Danielsen 1984, 16). The military secret services and the police was tasked to increase their surveillance of syndicalist elements, established networks of informants, and linkages with other Nordic intelligence agencies. Security talks (and later preparations) would especially focus on the role of strikers, by strategically targeting transportation and commutations, to effectively restrict the government ability to control the country. Weapons stored in all army depose around the country was to be made useless, and the preparation of specially selected army divisions was set up. Specially selected here meant the exclusion of soldiers which potentially could have lower class sympathies (Agøy 1997, 139). These divisions were kept secret for all but a select few. The literature is uncertain as to their size, Agøy (1997, 118-9) estimate their strength at around 8 500 troops, supported by additional 4500. Equipment was machine guns (stressed by the defense department as needed to ensure crowd control) and field artillery. In a Norwegian context, these were sizable numbers, a clear indication that they were intended for civil war. PM Halvorsen (conservatives) illustrates just how likely the government came to see a revolutionary attempt in a speech to his fellow conservative MPs before the national rail strike in 1920:

"One is expecting the hardest of civil wars (..) Our present enemy, even with their minority position, would still be able to win in the moment [and] we cannot know whether they intend to secure the persons of government. Edvard [Hagerup Bull] therefore said we must secure a government for the nation. He proposed that Ivar Lykke and Gunnar Knudsen should stand by with their people if anything were to set the current government out of play. If they and their people were to meet the same fate, the director general of the finance department should stand ready." (Quoted in Danielsen 1984, 18).

What we have here is the closest we can probably come to support our contention of revolutionary fear was indeed present and credible: A PM setting up the line of succession to their competitor party (within the elite) and then to the bureaucracy because he believes the very existence of the regime was threatened.

It is important to recognize that elites coordinated around their response, the leading employer organization, N.A.F. coordinated both with the government (under the Liberal politician Gunnar Knudsen, himself a factory owner) which in turn coordinated with the security services (military and police arms). Our source material shows that revolution was seen as a possible danger 1918-1923 for all groups, even if the various actors believed revolution to be imminent in some years than others. For example, N.A.F seems to have been more convinced that a coup or mass-action would take place in 1918-1919, while the government in 1918 and 1920 (Agøy 1994).

First among the legislative changes was a proposal on law on maintenance of "Public order during war and under the danger of war"[39]. It was put before parliament 9 march 1918. It gave wide powers to the executive to act as in wartime when war was a possibility, and to define specific areas as zones of conflict, in which civil authorities could summon the military to maintain law and order. Additional surveillance measures

[39] O.t. 1918, 399

were also proposed, along the lines of what had existed under the war. To what extent were these changes viewed as radical? Among the Elite parties, the conservatives (Høire) and the liberals (Venstre) member of the parliamentary committee charged with the treatment, none had any major objections. The minority position held a *somewhat* different view. The representative of DNA (Aslaksrud) saw the whole law as such a severe intervention in citizens civil rights that it had to be withdrawn. Johan Casteberg (liberal) argued that it broke with the constitution. The parliamentary debates became quite heated (st. forh. 198 8d s1217-18), with the minister of justice claiming the law was never to be used in peace-time, and Casteberg responding that if that was the case, the law was not even necessary. It was decided to postpone the treatment. It would never be put before the parliament again.

Several additional military and police measures would be organized against the worker movement. Still our focus is on the integrative measures, the silk glove and not the steel hand hidden within. The silk hand responses were a combination of various political and economic reforms; encompassing the regulations for hours of work, a new electoral system, subsidies for housing, worker councils, profit sharing, arbitration regulation, socialization of industries, generous unemployment subsidies to unions, and old-age pensions. Space constraints limits out focus to only a few of these policies, but we still deliver the most extensive discussion of the politics surrounding these initiatives yet.

Eight-hour day and 48 hour week

Before we deal with the politics of the Eight-Hour day reform of 1919 it is important to highlight how radical a break this piece of legislation was with previous attempts. Before the War, hours of work were still unregulated for adults. The only restriction in force applied to children. In 1914 with war raging in Europe, the "Great Reformator" of the liberal party, Johan Casteberg made his second attempt (the first in 1909 and had been a failure on all points) to regulated working hours for adults.[40] At his behest, a proposition was put before the Storting in 1914, only to be postponed. The proposition outlined two proposals, Casteberg (and the majority of the commission) proposed a 9-hour working day with compensation for overtime. The minority position, instead suggested a 10-hour normal workday. In 1915, an attempt was again made to have the act treated in parliament, but the extensive changes it underwent in the Lagting meant the law ended up a major disappointment for its original architect. Gone was overtime compensation, daily hours set to 10 (not 9) and implementation was set to 1920 with major industries excluded. These changes prompted Casteberg to think aloud in parliament that one might as well drop the whole legislation.[41]

With neither the radical proposal of DnA nor Castebergs position gaining a majority, it could be that employers, which faced increased demand, were positive to the legislation. Not quite, even if their position was at least crystal clear: N.A.F argued that the original the act of 1909 was already to encompassing. A law

[40] Proposals to set hours to 48, 56, 58 and even 72 (!) for men all fell in the Lagting and the Odelsting (Casteberg 1914, 2).
[41] 1915 stortingstidene efterm 20 august page 2368 (Casteberg)

that had ended up not regulating hours at all. NAF was fully against *any* regulation of working hours in factories.[42] Increasing demand was in itself not enough to push N.A.F. to support working time regulation.

N.A.F was hesitant to resistant on hour reductions also three years later (1918). At this time, bargaining was highly decentralized except for some areas of manufacturing, and N.A.F as a whole did not participate in bargaining. In one of the first examples of federations becoming involved in localized bargaining, at the Hydro plant at Rjukan the N.A.F. foreman had accepted a 51 hours week (down from 54) and resisted 48 hours. When the director placed the proposal for the board, it was down-voted. Factory owner Campbell-Anderson formulated the opposing position by highlight that it broke with the federations core principles:

"If I have a principle, and if I mean that this principle has worth, then I must decline: No I do not go into any form of compromise (..) What we achieve in this way is that it is not us, that are changing the ruling principles".[43]

Giving in on the question of working time was still perceived by many companies as to big a pill to swallow. The statement of the organization on 27 of May on the proposed extraordinary law 8-hour law 1918 illustrates this perfectly: It was not necessary given current conditions, it would likely to worsen productivity, work in favor of agriculture at the cost of industry, increased prices on consumer goods, hurt competitiveness and "cause so many so many difficulties, that industrial stagnation or decline must be expected" (Petersen 1950, 366-367). An eight-hour law was not recommended by N.A.F., but at the same time, it would not necessarily work against the implementation of such an act. A major shift from an organization that only 24 months earlier had balked at any form of regulation working time.

That was the situation prior to July 1918. Following revolutionary events in Finland and Germany, and the shift within the unions towards syndicalism, N.A.F would come to accept working hour regulations both by legislation and in the collective agreements. It was especially the CEO of N.A.F. Lars Rasmussen that argued for the necessity of meeting the new ideological orientation of the workers by other means than force (Knutsen 1994, 29-31). In his new-year speech of 1919 to the board, Rasmussen outlined the situation, the dangers facing the organization, and the possible way to safety:

"Previously, our organization would respond to such demands with all the means at our disposal. But here I believe, that we must consider, that behind these demands stand so to speak all the unrest, that in our time reigns around us on this earth, and it infects also our situation. And the result is that demands become more sharper, that they become qualitatively different, than they were before. They are born from, if I may be allowed, by a new concept among the workers, that is, that the time has come for the workers, and now they want to use it. Such as concept must, as far as I can understand, be allowed to unfold, at least to some degree. For if we constrain this concept to much, then the pressure might become too great. Then the

[42] Casteberg 1914, bilag 4 page 18)
[43] NAF page 42 Sentralstyre 26.06.1918. (Campbell-Anderson)

development will go on without negotiations, and the result will be that workers say: let us now grip our time, let us take power. And then we would be stuck in a societal upheaval, a situation that we would, by all means, seek to avert, we must be aware our times, we have to see its signs and learn its demands. We must therefore renegade on some of our old principles, We have to embark on new paths and formulate new ideas. We must act as wise skippers do, not to turn the rudder against the wind and to pressure up against the coming storm, with the possibility that we may perish. No, we must turn the rudder. We must see to that we can save what we can save."[44]

It is important to notice how the N.A.F. leader reveals their preferred preference for the eight-hour day "before we would have resisted" and that such demands would have been meet with all available resources. This also fits with their previous statements. The quote also support our contention as to the reason for N.A.F. to now support the eight-hour day: integration of labor into the existing economic system in order to avoid revolution. Rasmussen was backed by the previous hesitant voices and even by the outright critical such as Campbell-Andersen. The latter now argued, "I agree that we must look at the signs of our time and therefore there is no use in resisting the eight hour workday anymore"[45]. One hold out was still present. Kopperud argued, "That one cannot overcome difficulties by simply giving up".[46] He renegaded on this position in May, with the words "it no longer lies in our hands [to act], it lies with the workers, and they will not be stopped".[47] It is important to highlight that all statements N.A.F. in this period originates from board notes, notes which were kept secret and meant to be destroyed later (Knutsen 1994). They are therefore unlikely to be strategic overtures to unions meant only as empty rhetoric, and more indication of preference deliberation, of a change to second order preferences.

By 1918-1919, the political elite had shifted 360 degrees. To see the change, remember that both the Liberals and Conservatives had down-voted the Casteberg's 9 hour working day (51 hours per week) proposal and the DnA proposal of eight hours per day in 1915. In 1919, all parties would embrace the eight-hour day as a long lost brother. The social minister Berg (Liberals) led the charge when he stated that "the times demand social reforms, demand it with necessity (…) we have great demands for social reforms, and the greatest task in my opinion, is that labor now takes precedence in our country. (…) Capital should be a servant and helper for labor, but not its master. It is this which is the demand of our time".[48] Gunnar Knudsen (Liberal PM) had already by late 1918 decided that the eight-hour reform was to be made into law and implemented it in his own factories. Knudsen also made it clear to the leader of N.A.F. on November 30 1918 that the eight hour day was coming, and that it would be made into law "without any reservations" (Knutsen 1994, 20). The Liberal government - here by Berg - was not shy in the reason for the reform:

[44] NAF page 4 Sentralstyre 12.01.1919. (Rasmussen)
[45] NAF page 28 Sentralstyre 31.3.1919 (Campbell-Andersen)
[46] NAF page 48 Sentralstyre 31.3.1919 (Kopperud)
[47] NAF page 61 Sentralstyre 12.5.1919 (Kopperud)
[48] 1919 stortingstidene efterm 26 march page 646 (Statsråd Berg)

"It is imperative, for the sake of our society, that what can be done is done, to ensure that the workers can feel satisfied in their work, (..) it is with the future in mind of outmost importance for the satisfaction of the whole of society, that the desire for work is increased. And the department has faith in, that an appeasement of the old worker demand, of which we are her concerned, to a high degree would contribute to this. (..) With the 8 hour day implemented by law our country's workers will find new faith in the belief that through a development of society as it now is, we can reach a societal-order, where also they may find their place".[49]

We see a clear link between the demands of the working classes and the need for social stability as a principle justification to ensure the legitimacy of the current system. Both the liberals and conservatives agreed on this principle.[50] When on 14 June and 2 July 1919 the eight-hour act was put forward to parliament, it passed both in the lower and higher camber (Odelsting and Lagting) by *acclamation*. Klingenberg (Conservative) stated that, "we will now approve with law a demand that workers in the whole world for a lifetime has declared to be one of the most important to (..) achieve the social conditions under which they want to live and have a demand to live under"[51]. Olsen (Conservatives) would state in the second chamber that, "I find that one must salute, with both happiness and satisfaction, than one has come to agreement on such a great issue as this"[52]. What a turnaround from parties that had previously resisted the eight-hour day. This sudden change of heart did not go unnoticed by the socialists. Nygaardsvold (DnA) would lament that suddenly all parties across the ideological spectrum had come to embrace what they had so vehemently fought against just 4 years ago:

"The road to legislative reform has been hard to travel. Each time the demand of the workers for an 8-hour normal-working day was brought forward to the Storting was the demand voted down, or the reform was so distorted that it would have no impact of consequence for the workers. (..) Workers therefore had to take on the issue themselves (...). I want to add, that there is *no single issue that has to such an extent, made workers lose their faith in the parliamentary line, that parliamentary action work*. (..) As long as workers did not put any major force behind their demand for to so important demand, the Storting down voted all demands to reduce working hours to 8 hours [our cursive]".[53]

It is interesting, and we will show that this is a rhetorical pattern among DnA MPs, that Nygaardsvold made clear that the current situation and the commitment of the working class was connected to the lack of social reforms, with the eight-hour day being of especially egregious.

The eight-hour act for industrial workers followed in the foot heels of similar legislative enactments for workers in important state firms and services: for workers in military owned factories (27 of april 1918), workers in railways workshops (3 august 1918), and for workers on state railways and defense structures(1

[49] Ot.prop. nr 21 1919. pages 8-9 (Berg).
[50] Several issues did come under debate and to a vote both in the first and second chamber, such as how to treat firms with continuous production (Lian wanted 42 hours instead of 48), inclusion of commercial workers, inclusion of rural workers (landarbeidere), and the distinction in firm size on the application of the law (cut off at 5 employees).
[51] 1919 stortingstidene 19 june page 141 (Klingenberg)
[52] 1919 stortingstidene efterm 2 July page 66 (Olsen)
[53] 1919 stortingstidene efterm 2 July page 64 (Nygaardsvold)

july 1918). Conducive to these reforms was considerations of limiting grievances of workers in strategic state industries as to limit the impact of potential mass-strikes. As already outlined above, especially the railways was seen vulnerable to targeted strikes by the Knudsen Government and these policies come after a change in the governments' perception of a true revolutionary threat (Agøy 1997).

The eight-hour act was not only a result of revolutionary fear. To some degree, it had become much easier to promote a working hour reform, knowing that the International Labor Organization and the Versailles signatories all had committed to the eight-hour day. International competition was therefore less decisive than before, and it was clear that what was considered the minimum standards in labor regulation was changing (Rasmussen 2019; see also statement by Klingenerg and Casteberg in parliament references above). In addition, changes "on the ground" in form of collective agreements, made the elites aware that the initiative was slipping away from the elites. If they wanted to set the limits of the new regulation, they had to act now.

Collective bargaining and arbitration awards

Appeasement was not only pursued through legislative changes. Business could also meet (and had to respond to) worker demands in the collective bargaining system. The 1915 agreements, which had lasted for over 4 years, were to be re-negotiated in 1919 and the lack of any wage-growth in a period of massive price increases (no-indexation rules existed in agreements at this time) had led to a decisive fall in real wages. The collective bargaining results of 1919 were therefore quite generous; N.A.F would accept the eight-hour day, extensive wage-increases, and the number of paid leave was extended (from 4 to 6 days) in most agreements (A.F.L. beretning 1919/1920; see also 1950). In the words of Danielsen (1984, 20) "the concessions that were then granted were greater than in any other single year and, in most employers' opinion, exceeded what the economy could carry"[54]. In the spring of 1919, The N.A.F Board had decided that one had to avoid ending up in a major conflict ("avoid setting the score").[55] Concessions had to be made. Rasmussen argued that these concessions were to be seen as a form of "insurance" necessary, "[as restrain that any] social upheavals took place, which could lead to things, of which we had no overview".[56] N.A:F. would later summarize the results in their magazine as having taken place under "the sign of the revolution"[57]. They were insurance against giving the "Syndicalist or Bolshevik tendencies (..) a rich soil as to grow and take root".[58] Still, they were only to be accepted after some negotiation and preferably be decided under arbitration.[59] It was important not to appear that one could have given even further admissions.

By 1920, the god days were over so to speak for the unions; Rasmussen had become convinced (quite in opposition to the conservatives in government) that the revolutionary period had passed. "The revolutionary

[54] Danielsen uses the word "realøkonomisk".
[55] NAF page 7 Sentralstyre 24.4.1919 (Schuman)
[56] NAF page 51 Sentralstyre 23.1.1919 (Rasmussen)
[57] Arbeidsgiveren 1. 1920, 3. Oslo.
[58] NAF page 22 17 Sentralstyre 16.2.1920 (Rasmussen)
[59] NAF page 28 Sentralstyre 31.3.1919 (Campbell-Andersen)

waves that we feared last year would envelop us, have in this year somewhat leveled out. leveled out"[60] It was time to regain some of the lost ground of 1919. N.A.F. therefore demanded wage-reductions in all collective agreements up for re-nogiation in 1920.

N.A.F. proposals about wage-reductions was perceived as nothing but a provocation by the unions. Negotiations stalled. Fearing the increased strife would escalate and spread; the governments answer was to use the temporary arbitration Act (Furre 1983, 578; Knutsen 1994, 35). In so doing, the government pushed the fate of the negotiations into the hands of the worker friendly chief justice of the Supreme Court Thinn. The Thinnian- arbitration decisions - as they would be remembered - were excruciating for the employers: 6 days paid leave became 14, with further wage-increases all over the board. Furre (1983, 578) argues that this was the true last appeasement policy pursued by the political establishment. The Thinnian decisions also had the effect of stopping any major confrontation that could have led to a change in the basic agreements included in the collective agreements. The reason was that LO had started in 1919 to push for the inclusion of labor into management, and in order to do so, the basic clauses of bargaining agreements had to be changed. The basic clause laid out employer's prerogative to manage the firm, and the "whole history of the Employer federation rest[ed] on this clause" (Knutsen 1994, 32).

The gains would be short-lived, and the 1922 bargaining rounds would be nothing like that of 1921. Gone was Thinn, and as the unions launched what they believed would be the great showdown with the employers, one that would be so decisive that it would force the government to undertake fundamental reforms, they found their strength spent. Pervasive use of strikebreakers and the absence of a general mobilization among the populace meant the "Great Strike of 1921" ended in a decisive defeat (Bjørgum 1985, 92). Close to all agreements up for re-negotiation ended up with major wage-decreases and the number of vacation days reduced to eight (A.F.L. Beretning 1922-23). It was clear for both political and that the revolutionary zeal and organizational strength of the unions was on decline in 1922 (Knutsen 1994).

Proportional electoral system

One of the central demands of the labor movement, and especially its reformist line, was electoral reform. More precisely, the introduction of a system of proportional electoral system (DnA 1918). Over time, the increasing mismatch between the percentage of seats and the had increased . this was especially driven by the two-rounds system of 1905, which allowed the bourgeoisie parties to coordinate on the candidate best placed to The number of votes in relationship to the number of seats would decrease from 11, 61 in the 1918 election to 1,505 1921 election.

Is it plausible to understand the position of conservative politicians as reflecting not only a concern with rising socialist strength in their districts (which would reflect more direct electoral concerns),

[60] NAF page 7 Sentralstyre 20.1.1920 (Rasmussen)

Danielsen (1984, 19), in the seminal work on the conservative party in this period, writes, "the electoral reform can stand as a key example on the *intention* of the conciliatory strategy". Danielson underlined this by specifying that the party-leaders in the Liberal and Conservative parties in preparation to the vote had decided on introducing PR as a way to avoid revolution.[61] The constitutional amendment had been put forward to the Storting on 12 of December 1917, and would therefore be treated after the next election (1918). At the start of 1919, it was decided to postpone the treatment of the election commission's proposals to the end of the year. DNA would therefore threaten the bourgeoisie parties to bring the proposals to parliament, to "introduce the so strongly invoked bourgeois democracy". Speaking of withdrawing socialist MPs from parliament, or carrying out an "election-strike" the DNA made a badly veiled threat: "Closing the parliamentary option, will necessarily make the political and struggles ever more sharp, and the responsibility for this is left with the rulers".[62]

The parliamentary debate 28-29 of November shows support for our contention of integration by concessions. The party-leaders had already bargain between themselves, deciding on implementing some form of PR even if highly split on the specific form. Michelet (Conservative and leader of electoral commission) argued, "The right of suffrage is introduced in such a way as to breach with the idea of universal suffrage. (..) Most equal influence for all, rich or poor (..) The electoral system is such that a voice gets a purely different value depending on whether he lives here or there, and the results have - as we all know - become such. This has led to one of the major political parties, election by election, being under-represented, a under-representation, that the electoral commission (..) appear to be an institutional consequence of the electoral system itself. We in the Commission in agreement to (..) propose proportional elections in some form (..).[63]

The DnA representative in the electoral commission Magnus Nilssen drew the big picture:

"In 1918 we witnessed that strong forces would make themselves known within the working movement. (..) We who have participated in the electoral commission were under the strong impression (…) that time was of the essence in getting a grandiose proposal ready (…). At meetings and in the press people from all parties presented the injustice and risk of continuing an electoral system under which especially the labor party was so unjustly treated (…) I am not in doubt, that if parliament was to enact a postponement, it would do itself a disservice" (…) I am highly confident that there will be raised a strong, public and justified sentiment against parliament, if it does not take to its senses and vote on the current proposition. We all know how the situation have been in surrounding countries, and we have seen the waves wash up on our shores, and if we are serious in governing our country by legislation and by the parliamentary ways, our duty

[61] Several liberal and conservative delegates would complain that the proposal had only been discussed by the various party-leaders (party presidents), not including the delegates themselves.
[62] Dokument nr 24 (1919) fra den forsterkede konstitusjonskomite. Angående valgordningen.
[63] [63] Stortingstidene 2848 (Michelet). Forhandlinger I stortinget (nr. 366) 1919. Efterm 27 novbr. – valgordningen.

demands that we as quick as possible arrange the parliamentary lines in such a way as the people can be satisfied with it."[64]

The party leader of the liberals and prime minister, Gunnar Knudsen would state the following in his reply to a DNA MP;

"It was shown, that the party, he belonged to, didn't receive even half of the representative that it should have received in proportion to its size of the electorate. This facilitated, (..) within all parties recognized that circumstances have become such, that this could no longer go on and that it was necessary to establish a better electoral system, a more just electoral system (..) instead of 41 representatives, that party received 18. There is nothing to be startled over, that such a result can create unwillingness and indignation and awaken thoughts, which do not go together with a well ordered society."[65]

The leader of the conservatives, and later Prime Minister (Halvorsen), would argue along similar lines: "we demand of all parties that they follow the parliamentary line. It is consequently decisive that we then open for equal access to all parties to pursue their interests parliamentary. (..) The times demands it".[66] These considerations are also found in the statements of individual conservative and liberal MPs. O. C. Müller (Conservative) argued that he was prepared to vote in favor of a proportional system so "that I would give socialists the opportunity to forward their ideas within the parliamentary lines (..) [I]n order to secure the peace, as we all so much want and understand is necessary".[67] Jahren (Conservative) argued that any postponement or down voting of all proposals had to be avoided, especially because "that by my vote I might hamper a large party in our country [socialists] to work as it has been said following parliamentary lines. I believe that one must contribute what one can within reasonable limits to support that direction that wants to work to the betterment of society within the parliamentary lines". [68] A smoking gun statement if there ever was one. Christain Rud (Liberals) started out by saying that the current electoral system was "without principles and arbitrary" and "The demand of the social democrats for fair representation in parliament must at most opportune moment be accommodated: no unnecessary postponement must take place". [69] Minister of justice Blehr (Liberals) "it was stated by the socialists first representative, that one is kicking the chair under his party's parliamentarianism, if one does not solve this problem [of electoral injustice]. Yes, I do not think parliament should do so. Instead, one should endeavor to secure that development can proceed in a calm way, (..). Some things might feel to one self as a sacrifice, but one should do so in that feeling, I mean, that this sacrifice I bring happily when it proves, that it is necessary for a good and healthy development for our country".[70]

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[64] Stortingstidene 2878-9 (Nilssen). Forhandlinger I stortinget (nr. 360) 1919. Efterm 27 novbr. – valgordningen.
[65] Stortingstidene 2930 (O.C. Müller). Forhandlinger I stortinget (nr. 366) 1919. Efterm 28 novbr. – valgordningen.
[66] Stortingstidene 2876 (Halvorsen/president). Forhandlinger i stortinget (nr. 360) 1919. Efterm 27 novbr. – valgordningen
[67] Stortingstidene 2921 (O.C. Müller). Forhandlinger I stortinget (nr. 366) 1919. Efterm 28 novbr. – valgordningen.
[68] Stortingstidene 2929 (Jahr). Forhandlinger I stortinget (nr. 367) 1919. Efterm 28 novbr. – valgordningen.
[69] Stortingstidene 2955-6 (Rud). Forhandlinger I stortinget (nr. 368) 1919. Efterm 28 novbr. – valgordningen.
[70] Stortingstidene 2893-4 (Rud). Forhandlinger I stortinget (nr. 362) 1919. Efterm 28 novbr. – valgordningen.

Socialization of property and worker participation in management

Prior to 1918, the question of the involvement of workers in management or socialization an anathema.[71] As already outlined, the position of the economic and political elites was also quite clear that any infractions on the right to manage was unacceptable (Petersen 1950, 337). With the Russian revolution of November and the adoption of a radical line within DnA in 1918, the debate on the right of workers to manage change radically. The Norwegian worker movement, spearheaded by Tranmæl, advocated the company councils (bedriftsråd) within an overarching frame of branch and national councils. These were conceptualized as decision-centers: management of firms and whole industries was to be shifted into the councils as a first step to socialization (Petersen 1950, 337-8). This was a question that broke with N.A.F. "fundamental principles" and for which it was ready to "mobilization of the whole strength of the federation" (ibid.).

While the business elites did not intend to play ball, the political elites went as far as taking the initiative in the question. In the face of the changing situation of 1918, the liberal government proposed to deal with the increasing social conflict surrounding profits by firms in the traded sector with employee dividends. This new position was launched in the trontale-speach (opening of parliament) in 1918. Astooudninly, the issue was supported by the leader of the conservative group in parliament:

"What is unfortunate (..) that the traded interests have taken out exorbitant dividends. Furthermore, its unappealing that the traded interests also under these favorable conditions have held their employees wages down at such a level (..) it is completely unjustified. (..) The state cannot stand indifferent in the face of these hardships. For these reasons I find it regrettable that no employer has only in such restricted extent have experimented with having their employees revising dividends or share in the companies themselves. (..) I now view with satisfaction that the government party now wants to address this issue".[72]

He was supported by Peterson (conservatives, factory owner), he linked dividends shares explicitly to the possibility of lessening current worker troubles:

"I would say, that if there exists antidotes, that is congruent with our view of capitalist society, which can also bring in an additional element of greater social peace, greater trust, and greater harmony interests between capital and work, between the factory and its workers, then it is the greatest task which lies before us. Many have argued that we have the solution in the dividend system. (..) The government should put down a commission to evaluate this question."[73]

The result was that the government set down a commission to evaluate "the question of employer dividends and share of management". The aim was social preservation "to create a closer community of interest between industrial firms and their workers by making these partake in the company's capital and dividend

[71] st.prp. nr 134, page 1. 1918 – Bevilgning til Arbeiderkommisjonen.
[72] Stortingstidene 534 (Bull). Forhandlinger I stortinget (nr. 67) 1918. Efterm 16 mars. – trontaledebatten.
[73] Stortingstidene 596-597 (Peterson). Forhandlinger I stortinget (nr. 67) 1918. Efterm 16 mars. – trontaledebatten.

as well as their management (..)".[74] It would later be named the Worker Commission of 1918 (WC), and ended up putting forward legislative proposals on work councils (1919, 1920) and profit-sharing schemes (1922). Only impact of these efforts would be the temporary act on work councils of 1920.

Even more radical was the socialization commission of 1919. Its task was to evaluate not only the question of socialization in general, but also socialization of specific firms and industries such as "Norsk Hydro" "Meråker Bruk" "Odda smelteverk", and the complete mining industry (Danielsen 1984, 19). The 1919 commission had been pursued by the labor party, but initiated by a demand from the workers at the "Hydro Plant" in Rjukan. Several committee members of the WC also participated in the SC, meaning that it would not hand in its report until after the work of the WC was completed.

In addition, a Land Commission of 1919 was set-up to discuss the issue of inequality in arable land. Its primary task was to assess the possibility of procuring land for tenants. We will not follow the Land Commission further in this paper, as little came of its efforts.

On the issue of employee participation in management, WC decided in early 1919 to quickly develop anticipatory proposal. The WC quickly split into a majority consisting of worker representatives and university academics, and a minority consisting of business leaders. The majority proposed the establishment of a system of work councils; with firm, district and national councils. Work councils was not only to play an advisory role. Instead, they would have executive power over questions of introduction of new work schedules, procurement of technology, and in hiring of supervisors.[75] The minority would only propose a system of firm-specific councils, and their power was to be advisory only. It was the minority position that supported when the proposals was put forward to parliament by the Halvorsen (conservative) government in 1920 – with certain small modifications – and enacted.

In 1922, the commission outlined both its proposed company council scheme, but also its proposal on profit sharing. The group had ended up being split for ways, with the commission writing two major opposing legislative proposals. The majority position proposed profit sharing to be introduced in all firms (public and private) except in the primary industries. Dividends would be payed proportionally in wages and "capital wages". The latter being set by each firm. More radically, a found was to be set up which would be made up of taxes on profits from firms exceeding 10 percent. The fund would be used to buy up defunct firms and establish new firms. It was dead on arrival (Petersen 1950, 355).

Even with the limited proposals winning the day in parliament, the business elites were far from satisfied. N.A.F considered the 1920 work council act as "pure madness" as a policy in itself, but as a defensive measure against syndicalist tendencies it made sense.[76] Still, NAF and employers did not publicly convey this preference. Instead, it was stated that a reform "would create greater job satisfaction and increase work

[74] st. prp. nr 134 .page 1 1918 – Bevilgning til Arbeiderkommisjonen.
[75] ot.prop. nr. 65 om utferdigelse av en midlertidig lov om arbeiderutvalg i industrielle bedrifter

[76] NAF page 20 Sentralstyre 23.08.1920 (Rasmussen)

performance" (Danielsen 1984, 32). They were even more negative of the profit sharing scheme of 1922. It was also more in relation to the way the proposal was formed than profit sharing per say. In 1918, N.A.F had set-down its own commission to evaluate the question of profit-sharing (Petersen 1950, 350). Its conclusion in 1921 stated that while voluntary forms could be implemented satisfactory, "it is unimaginable that a compulsory arrangement can be implemented with satisfactory results (ibd., 352)". Still, N.A.F. saved its hardest criticism for the "which only went to unsatisfactory knowledge of the most simple and elementary social and economic conditions, and one could only regret that the above mentioned fractioned did not have the necessary insight on this area"[77]

The position of the radicals within the labor movement was clear on the dangers of an Elite initiated reform surrounding company councils. If the role of the councils were to be to narrow, to only focus on specific aspects of production, only have the power to suggest and not to vote through changes, their role as revolutionary institutions would be quite limited (DnA landsmøteprotokol 1920). They would instead take the form of institutions aimed at "conciliation between the classes" (ibd. 76). In its place, the workers supported the majority commission's proposal, which would have given the workers greater influence over company decisions. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly to readers of the 21th century, the unions also advocated against profit sharing. The reason was consideration as to worker solidarity within industries and support for the centralized collective bargaining system. This was a result of ideological aversion to any form of profit as capital was always a form of exploitation, but it was also a decision of strategy. The union wage-bargaining strategy was to force wage increases in high-wage firms and sectors (also likely to have higher profits and therefore automatically likely) and to then use these increases as an argument for pushing up wages in low-wage firms

Socialization is a question that goes to the heart of business elite's power-base. So, how did the individual employer respond WC and SC commissions? The WC and the SC members found that employers were far from willing to collaborate. This was especially the case when it came to the collection of statistics, which lead to the commission to in 1920 request the Storting for a new law concerning its right to collect data. Lian would himself bring this issue out in the open when he remarked in parliament "I just want to say that I have a strong feeling, a feeling that there has been an underground resistance against this task which the government has entrusted the commission. (..) This is the reason that the commission has come here to parliament to be granted the protection of the law to gain the necessary information to carry out its work".[78] The act would pass parliament, but it did signify the strong opposition of the employers against even evaluate the question.

As the fear of revolution subsided significantly with the defeats of the various strikes and fall in organizational strength, the political elite shifted in the question of socialization. The conservatives, which

[77] Expert from the N.A.F. run newsmagazine "Arbeidsgiveren" 24 of November. Cited in Peterson (1950, 355)
[78] Stortingstidene 573 (Lian). Forhandlinger I stortinget (nr. 72) 1920. Efterm 1 novbr. – sosialiseringskommiteen.

had all voted for the continuation of the SC up until 1922 would in 1923 abruptly, change their perception of the necessity of such a scheme.

In Norway, the Storting commissions had to have their yearly budgets approved by the Storting, a process that tended to be accepted by acclimation. The leader of SC estimated that the one would need an additional 30 000 kr to carry out the SC task, this was then cut down 12 000 kr by the head of the Lønningskomitee in Stortinget, Lykke of the Conservative party. The mandate was further reduced to only give a theoretical elaboration of the question of socialization, and leave out the issue of socialization of specific Norwegian firms and not to draft a legislative proposal. Socialist representatives put forward counter-proposals. The debate became heated, the socialist candidates (somewhat rightly) argued that the commission was being assassinated, pleading Lykke to not "not to start a class-warfare on an evaluation of a question such as this".[79] Madsen (DnA) pointed out further that the committee foreman was a high court justarius, and that the 12 000 kroners wouldn't even cover his own yearly wage of 14 000, which de-facto meant that he would have to stop his work in the commission. In the end, he asked

"Shall one now stop [with the work of the committee]? (..) This is in my opinion a bad use of state money, that one first sets in motion a great endeavor and so, when it is practically finished, cut it off and say, that of this we want nothing. It shows Høyres fear of having these matters evaluated; Høyre is afraid that the capitalistic society does not survive the light of day; it does not survive being investigated by a public committee".[80]

Lykke's proposal won the day against the combined vote of the various labor parties. What is the likelihood that Lykke was acting in good faith? That he was just restraining a committee that had gone overboard, by more precisely stating its mandate. First off, he had had no problem with WC and SC commissions previously, as he had even been a participant in the WC commission until entering government in 1920. The committee had been granted founding that it had asked for each year up to 1923, without any complications. It is more likely that, as the balance tipped in favor of the elites, and one feelt confiedent enough to push back against the appeasement policies of 1918-20. This change is also traceable in the party manifestoes of the conservatives. In 1909-1915, the manifests exclude any mention of any form of co-ownership or co-management. The manifesto of 1918 is therefore unique: Here it is stated that the issue of co-ownership must be "evaluated and solved" (Hørie 1918). These lines did not make it into the 1924 manifest. The change in the position of the conservatives is nothing but startling if viewed as an attempt to formulate a long-term conservative ideology, but fits within a perspective of strategic response to revolutionary pressure. Respond to socialization demands in period of weakness by setting-down a broad commission with a wide mandate to collect and process data-material, and with the power to propose a

[79] Stortingstidene 673 (Gjøstein). Forhandlinger i stortinget (nr. 72) 1923. Efterm 23 March. – kommisjonsbudgsjettet.
[80] Stortingstidene 675 (Madsen). Forhandlinger i stortinget (nr. 72) 1923. Efterm 23 March. – kommisjonsbudgsjettet.

legislative amendment. As the revolutionary period have subsided, slowly push back against the commission by challenging its mandate and then hamstringing its ability to act.

In sum, it would all amount to little. The law proposals all came to parliament at a time in when the power of the workers was on the decline, both domestically and internationally. It is therefore not surprising that little came of these quite radical proposals or that Elites worked hard to ensure nothing was to come from them.

Old-age pension

Of the Scandinavian countries, and even among the rich western-European industrial nations, Norway would be one of the last countries to implement a government-regulated old-age pension. Ironically, Norway was one of the first countries in the world to propose an old-age pension in 1844. This was followed by proposals by individual MPs in 1854, 1868, 1869 and finally a more formal proposal originating in the worker commission of 1894. The commision suggested the introduction of an old-age pension. A proposal was finally put forward to the parliament in 1899, but not put to a vote. 1902, a new commission was established in order to further evaluate the question, without any new proposals being formulated. In 1907 the peoples insurance committee was charged to evaluate the question. It handed in two proposals that would frame the pension debate ever after: a tax-financed proposal favored by DnA and an insurance scheme favored by the liberals in 1911 and 1914. The question was consequently politicized, all three major parties had pensions (using different wording confirming to their preferred structured) as early as 1909.Still, no proposition had been put forward to parliament before the war.

Coinciding with the revolutionary situation in 1918, the government unveiled the first royal proposition on an age and disability pension scheme, based on the earnings-related scheme preferred by the liberals in government. The system would only insure people of working age and the first pensions would be paid 14 years from the implementation of the scheme. All over 56 were therefore excluded. The proposition was put to treatment in parliament in 1919. The conservatives were highly critical of the proposed scheme, as it would mean the implementation of an extensive bureaucracy to control and manage the individual contributions.[81] DnA wanted a more progressive system and pensions also for the elderly at the time of implementation. It was unanimously decided to evaluate a tax-proposal to go along with the earnings-related alternative of the liberals. This was the first time parliament had agreed on the issue of old-age pensions.

Push for a tax-based system was also a major break in the line of the Conservatives. Before 1919, the conservatives had always preferred an earnings-related system, but now they sided with DnA in pushing for a tax-system. As with PR, this was an initiative from the party-leadership among the conservatives (Pettersen 1978, 13). The aim was to create a society preserving institution, using the olds-age pension as a basic sexurity without the stigma of poor relief (Danielsen 1984, 30). It was decided to evaluate the tax-alternative in a

[81] The 1918 proposal outlined contributions in proportion to income and property and that the payment was to take into account the number of children and previous contribution record. All of this involved a decisive growth in the state and municipality bureaucracy which at the time was seen as highly un-managble.

social-commission, which handed in its instilling in 1920, but the government fell before it could put forth the policy. In October 1920, the new liberal government put forward an Odelsting proposition outlining a new version of the earnings-related scheme. In January 1921, Halvorsen (conservative) put forward a revised tax-scheme proposal, but the minority of the social comate in parliament wanted an earnings-related alternative instead. It ended up being a vote for or against postponement: the liberals won the day with 45 vs 40. The stage was now set for showdown. In first treatment of the two proposals was attempted during the summer of 1923. It was again postponed, until October, when it was again treated in the Odelsting and finally made its way to Lagting.

When reaching the Lagting on the 30 November, discussion and disagreement was still prevalent. Liberal MP Høgseth decried the increasing burden of state and municipality budgets, accusing the proponents of the tax system of communism.[82] The social minister Klingenberg (Conservative) was harsh in his reply, "No, this has nothing to do with communism or socialism. If it is anything, it is policy aimed at the preservation of society!"[83] Most importantly, if not legislation was passed, the consequences could be dire: "if we go to society and say: no, we may have promised this in over 30 years, and worked with in 30 years, but you shall not have it, - if so I think one will see a reaction of that kind, that will bring no joy to anyone expect those that want our society evil".[84] Nygaardsvold (DnA) replied, "I agree that this reform, is preferable to reforms that one has taken in other countries to guard against, that the existing capitalistic society should be not be overthrown".[85] The Social democrat Magnussen underlined the consequences of postponement, "One talk so often in these times about the working class and its position to the parliamentary system of governance, its position to parliamentarianism. I think that one should consider the consequences of saying no to a reform such as this. One should not disappoint a working class, which has put its hope and trust to parliamentarianism is waiting on what the Lagting decides. One should think not just once but also to and three times".[86]

With the failure of the DnA proposal, the rest of the treatment was simply whether the government was to commit to a principle for how old-age pensions were to be organized. In the end, the Tax-option was chosen by the combined efforts of DnA, the conservatives, and part of the liberals. Even then, 15 conservative MPs voted against their own governments propsosal.

The old-age pensions would mark the end of a long-line of policy proposals initiated by conservative and liberal politicians to starve the revolutionary beast. The economic situation had change for the worse, trade union organization had declined to pre-war levels, the failed great strike of 1922 showed the weakness of the revolutionary line, and DnA would leave the Comintern in 1923. Internationally the Red Army was defeated in Poland, and retreating in tatters. The failed revolutionary uprising in Bulgaria in 1923 only

[82] Stortingstidene 249 (Rud). Forhandlinger I stortinget (nr. 32) 1923. Efterm 30 novbr. – alderstrygden.
[83] Stortingstidene 257 (Klingenberg). Forhandlinger I stortinget (nr. 32) 1923. Efterm 30 novbr. – alderstrygden.
[84] Stortingstidene 259 (Klingenberg). Forhandlinger I stortinget (nr. 32) 1923. Efterm 30 novbr. – alderstrygden.
[85] Stortingstidene 264 (Nyggardsvold). Forhandlinger I stortinget (nr. 32) 1923. Efterm 30 novbr. – alderstrygden.
[86] Stortingstidene 265 (Magnusson). Forhandlinger I stortinget (nr. 32) 1923. Efterm 30 novbr. – alderstrygden.

reinforced the fact that the World Revolution was indeed dead. It is therefore fitting, that the 1923 act was never implemented or brought before parliament. It would go the way of the socialization proposals: several legislative incentive's and proposals, new commissions and new postponements. In the end, only principles were enacted, which were never implemented. While the socialization question was dead, old-age pensions would have to wait another 13 years. In 1936, Nyggardsvold had become PM for a labor-agrarian majority coalition. He dusted of the old proposal of 1923 and pushed it through parliament (Rasmussen and Knutsen 2018).

The Signals of Revolution

There is little doubt as to the cause of these procedures and perceptions in the historical sources. The primary cause was the Bolshevik revolution (Agøy 1994, 74; Sundvall 2017) and the revolutionary and civil war events in Germany and Finland (Furre 1983). In line with our expectations, organizational linkages were important to elites in ascertaining the level of revolutionary fright. In reports and discussions, membership in international organizations were used as indicators of revolutionary sentiment among labor. The defense intelligence office for example writes already in 29 February 1918 "A named source could report that Norwegian participants in the Zimmerwald-conference now was arming themselves in congruence with the conference decision to carry out armed rebellion" (Agøy 1994, 76-77).

The socialist MPs and extra-parliamentary parts of the movements were also strategically working to foster the impression of a coming revolution, of radical syndicalist challenging the existing order. On the other hand, reformist leaders could also overplay the dangers of the syndicalist, in order to build trust, future concessions, or secure their own position. The best example of all three this is perhaps the 20-year long chairman of the A.F.L and socialist MP (1916-21) Ole O. Lian and his dealings with the N.A.F chairman Rasmussen between 1918-1922. The rising syndicalist under Tranmæl threatened to usurper Lians position. He and other reformist therefore tried to use revolutionary fear among the conservatives in order to achieve the reforms they thought would convince the members to support the reformist line. At the same time, he had secret meetings with the N.A.F chairman, stressing that not all demands were seriously meant. He even proposed various ways in which the employers would appear to meet the demands of the various syndicalist unions, but which would never be enforced. Proposals that meet with astonishment among the N.A.F. board and which was not pursued as they might threaten the position of their friend in the unions (Knutsen 1994, 34-36 40-43).

In the debate proceeding the PR-vote in 1919, we find that Labor reformist MPs in parliament uniformly adopted this tactic. MP Gjøstein didn't mock about, "there are strong forces in the direction of abandoning the parliamentary line, because parliamentarianism has not delivered (...) I would go as far as one possibly can go in maintaining the parliamentary line (...) but if that is to happen we must have an electoral [reform].[87] Neither did Buen "it is unjustifiable to continue even one more day with our current system (…) if we do

[87] Stortingstidene 2859 (Gjøstein). Forhandlinger i stortinget (nr. 359) 1919. Efterm 27 novbr. – valgordningen

not get a positive result, this would equal to kick to legs below the parliamentary work. The consequences I shall not discuss, but the responsibility rests with those that have created this situation".[88] Foshaug stated "if one wants to continue down this path, one cannot demand that the working class that struggles to promote its cause through the parliamentary channel, can continue to do so (..)I would therefore most empathically warn against postponement".[89] Again we see a rhetoric of "inclusion or else" employed by reformist, which can be interpreted both as a direct warning (as similar language was employed by the radicals), but also as a way to strengthen their position against said radicals.

Signaling was not only a result of rhetoric but also of wider situation of DnA becoming member of the Comintern. Agøy (1994, 139) for example, argues that it was hard for the military, socially and politically distant from the labor movement, to know how to interpret what was going on. They would therefore rely on easy to identify signals, which and we now quote him at length as his summary is so close to our argument it is scary:

"Times were uncertain: Germany was since March rocked by rebellions; in Great Britain far-reaching emergency laws had been enacted and a society wide paralyzing miner strike had just been averted as late as April-May 1921. For officers with limited knowledge to the working movement, it could be hard to ascertain what the quite open and visible struggle within the movement was truly about. What they did notice, was that known worker-leaders publicly, and with great vigor, was eager to transform the strike in a revolutionary direction. They, and the rest of the Norwegian bourgeoisie, took notice that DnA on the 27 of march accepted the Moskva-theses."

Summary of Appeasement

Another case for revolutionary fear can be born out of a single source. The change n party programs of the conservatives. We can see definite changes between 1909 the revolutionary period of 1918 and the post revolution election in 1924. Comparing the 1909 program to that of 1918 and 1921, the conservatives had gone from being silent on the issue to promising to: secure measures against unemployment , measures against lack of housing, and even to evaluate the question of employees dividends.[90] Only pensions had been present in the 1909 program. In the 1924 program, *none* of these issues is mentioned. The necessity of social policy innovation had dissipated in tandem with the credibility of any revolutionary threat.

In sum, the revolution sparked a decisive change both in the radicalism of the labor movement, but also in perception of labor as a radical and potential revolutionary force amongst the elites. A combination of repressive and inclusionary tactics was developed and coordinated: the aim to include labor in the existing

[88] Stortingstidene 2875 (Buen). Forhandlinger i stortinget (nr. 360) 1919. Efterm 27 novbr. – valgordningen

[89] Stortingstidene 2929-30 (Foshaug). Forhandlinger i stortinget (nr. 367) 1919. Efterm 28 novbr. – valgordningen.

[90] The conservatives (Høires valgprogram 1918) point number three on their electoral manifest mentions various social issued to be solved or policies introduced: effective measures for at remedy housing demand (bolig nød). Peoples insurance to be introduced (Folkeforsikringen gjennemføres, early name for pensions). Question of having employees and wageworkers receive dividends should be evaluated and solved. In 1921 (Høires valgprogram 1921) their manifesto also included measures against the extraordinary high unemployment.

economic and political system. The elites worked together to weaken the radical groups, and strengthen the reformist groupings, both in the trade unions and the political party. The extent to which elites in the state apparatus, political as well as economic went to motions that they clearly viewed a revolution as credible. Still, even when faced with what they believed to be revolutionary forces, both political and economic elites used stalling tactics to avoid threats to their primary interests. What is more, which we did not expect, is the degree to which revolutionary fear seems to have spurred the first informal connections between the leadership of the Employers and Unions organizations, indicating that revolutionary fear also underbuilt the creation of the Norwegian corporatist system to a larger extent than has been recognized in the literature.