


Trent MacNamara
in *Birth Control and American Modernity*
A History of Popular Ideas, 2018, Chapter 2



Race Suicide

The Moral Economy of Birth Control, 1903–1908

Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it.

Genesis 1:28

I have not that strong obligation that they say ties men to the future, by the children that succeed to their name and honour . . . I am but too much tied to the world, and to this life of myself; I am content to be in fortune's power by circumstances properly necessary to my being, without otherwise enlarging her jurisdiction over me.

Michel de Montaigne¹

**

In 1901 a young journalist named Bessie Van Vorst visited Perry, New York, a small and muddy mill town near Rochester. She planned to live among Perry's seamstresses for several weeks, document their working conditions, and write about her experiences as a "lady" among workers. She rented a room and took a job in the local shirt-making factory.

Perry's "mill girls" worked long hours and lived in crowded, slapdash boardinghouses. But they did not exhibit the same hopelessness Van Vorst had encountered during an earlier stint at a pickle factory in Pittsburgh. Many of the young seamstresses, Van Vorst wrote with surprise, were not in Perry out of hardship. Instead they worked eleven-hour days out of a desire for independence from their modestly prosperous families, toiling at least partly "for pleasure" – for weekends and evenings of shopping, lakeside amusements, and dalliances with young men. Many of them appeared happy.²

But what seemed a very American "triumph of individualism" in youth quickly became a less admirable disregard for "the important decisions of life," Van Vorst warned. Some of the girls married, but all deferred motherhood in favor of greater financial and domestic freedom. "I never

saw a baby nor heard of a baby while I was in the town,” she wrote of her three weeks in Perry. Instead she heard gossip, occasional tales of heart-break, and many appreciations of recently purchased velvet ribbons or lace. What a shame, lamented Van Vorst, that fleeting material concerns were taking the place of “tenderness, reverence, gratitude, protection . . . the feelings which one generation awakens for another.”³

Van Vorst’s magazine article would have passed quickly into obscurity had it not found its way to Theodore Roosevelt’s desk. The young president, an anxious student of demographic matters, read it and promptly dispatched a reply to the author:

I must write you a line to say how much I have appreciated your article . . . But to me there is a most melancholy side to it, when you touch upon what is fundamentally infinitely more important than any other question in this country – that is, the question of race suicide, complete or partial.⁴

Roosevelt continued for several paragraphs, moving from melancholy to anger. Seeing the letter, a publisher asked Van Vorst to quickly compile her magazine work on laboring women into a book prefaced with the president’s note. In February 1903 the book was ready, and Roosevelt’s message reached the press. One passage in particular echoed across the country:

If a man or woman, through no fault of his or hers, goes throughout life denied those highest of all joys which spring only from home life, from the having and bringing up of many healthy children, I feel for them deep and respectful sympathy . . . But the man or woman who deliberately avoids marriage, and has a heart so cold as to know no passion and a brain so shallow and selfish as to dislike having children, is in effect a criminal against the race, and should be an object of contemptuous abhorrence by all healthy people.⁵

Roosevelt’s words caused a sensation among Americans more accustomed to hearing presidents address such issues as tariff rates, railroad regulation, or the navy. To Roosevelt, however, statesmen’s typical concerns were of “wholly ephemeral importance, compared with the questions that go straight to the root of things.” “It goes without saying that, for the race as for the individual, no material prosperity, no business growth, no artistic or scientific development, will count, if the race commits suicide.”⁶

For the youthful “cowboy president” to introduce such an earthy topic, intruding himself on the homes and bedrooms of his constituents, struck many Americans as barbaric and crude, others as eccentric or comic. For the most part, though, Roosevelt’s outcry inspired respectful, earnest, and sympathetic consideration, notably in the period’s preeminent public

forum, the daily press. “Anyone can discuss it,” one editor wrote in 1903, “It is a matter that concerns every family and is of universal interest; no wonder it is profusely considered.”⁷

Ongoing public interest in “race suicide” was partly the result of Roosevelt’s long personal crusade, which lasted until his death in 1919. More important, however, were the knock-on efforts of journalists and citizens who, Roosevelt aside, felt qualified to speak to the matter by virtue of their own life experience. Letters to the editor, editorials, sermons, speeches, and miscellaneous commentary rebounded through the press and the culture at large. Where reproductive practices had previously been too obscure or too delicate a topic to merit wide public attention, now debate flourished. Following Roosevelt, cultural observers felt sanctioned to contribute to a new body of social thought – to speak aloud on subjects previously hushed.⁸

PUBLIC OPINION BEFORE POLLING

To survey that body of thought this chapter uses 605 newspaper articles – editorials, letters to the editor, and reportage – published in nine major U.S. newspapers between 1903 and 1908. Each article deals directly and primarily with questions of reproductive ethics.

Why this medium? During the 1900s newspapers saturated American culture. More circulated per day than there were households to consume them. Before radio, television, or the internet, with the media market largely to themselves, big dailies acted as clearinghouses for popular conventions and ideals. “Organized gossip” was papers’ stock in trade, as the sociologist Charles Horton Cooley wrote in 1909: “the sort of intercourse that people formerly carried on at cross-road stores or over the back fence.”

This enlargement of gossip . . . promotes a widespread sociability and sense of community . . . It also tends powerfully, through the fear of publicity, to enforce a popular, somewhat vulgar, but sound and human standard of morality.⁹

Editors avoided straying too far from the presumed opinions of their readerships, particularly in charged matters of everyday morality. Newspapers served as “narrators” and “advocates” but most importantly “as weathercocks,” observed the early public-opinion theorist James Bryce. “They indicate by their attitude what those who conduct them and are interested in their circulation take to be the prevailing opinion of

their readers. It is . . . as an index and mirror of public opinion that the press is looked to. This is the function it chiefly aims at discharging.”¹⁰

Newspapers’ “back fence” and “weathercock” functions have long inspired attempts by sociologists to mine them for social data. In 1910 Max Weber, and in 1912 Alvan Tenney, proposed large-scale press-monitoring projects to record what Tenney called “social weather.” These projects were frustrated by logistical constraints. In the twenty-first century, however, large text-searchable databases have vastly reduced the time costs of compiling thematically focused media materials. This chapter takes advantage of that development by working from samples gathered in one large database for the period 1903–1908; Chapter 3 uses the same method for 1927–1935.¹¹

Each article was coded for the presence of any of twenty-three “frames” on fertility decline, such as “economic rationality” or “religiosity” (Figures A.1 and A.2; see Appendix). The frames measure simple frequencies, usually without tracking commentators’ degrees of emphasis on, or approval for, the idea in question. So if an editorialist elaborately disparaged religious dogma, then briefly argued that small families allowed for better education, the “religion” and “education” frames would be marked equally, as single mentions. Frame frequencies are thus intended to reflect the raw prominence of various ways of thinking about birth control, especially as they changed between the 1900s and 1930s. Nuances of opinion I address qualitatively.¹²

The newspapers (Table A.1) were “establishment” broadsheets and papers of record. The people who wrote for these papers, or had their views aired in them, were predominantly white, middle class, native born, and city based. They were overwhelmingly male (85 percent), as were most readers. Few women wrote for newspapers in the 1900s, sent letters to editors, or occupied public positions that made their views newsworthy. This gender disparity biased the sample towards Roosevelt-style pronatalism, since female moralists were more likely than their male counterparts to support birth control.¹³

Finally, observers held vague and mostly unspoken assumptions about who composed the endangered “race” in “race suicide.” In the decades around 1900 “race” could designate almost any group of people – or all humankind – and Roosevelt was markedly nonspecific in drawing racial borders. What he and other commentators meant by “average men and women,” however, was the country’s dominant majority: white; nonindigent; civically engaged; native born or “the self-respecting son or daughter of immigrants.” Tacitly excluded from this “us” were three

large but marginalized populations – African-Americans, poor recent immigrants, and the white native indigent – who together made up roughly one-quarter of the country’s 76 million people. Those groups, for their part, largely ignored race suicide or treated it as a dominant-class issue. Though birthrates were falling among African-Americans, the poor, and immigrants’ descendants, no equivalent moral panic ensued in those communities. W.E.B. Du Bois, for example, spoke of race suicide as a problem of “modern European culture nations,” and speculated that “the Negro race may teach the world something” on “mother-love and family instinct.”¹⁴

EXPLAINING FERTILITY DECLINE: SELF AND SOCIETY

For years Roosevelt wondered if his pronouncements on race suicide were unbecoming of a president. Ultimately he excused himself – in part because his ideas were popular. A majority of all newspaper commentators supported the president’s pronatalism (55 percent), while just 15 percent dissented; the remainder took neutral or ambivalent stances (Figure A.3). At the poles of opinion pronatalism was even more dominant: 26 percent of writers expressed strong support, just 6 percent strong dissent. This support would decline dramatically in the two decades that followed, but in Roosevelt’s time, it held sway.¹⁵

American observers tended to see falling birthrates as a complex moral-historical issue concerning the changing relationship of self to society. Most commentators assumed, regardless of personal opinion and before assigning specific causes, that the driving force behind falling birthrates was “the modern spirit of individualism,” as one editorial board put it. For the pronatalists whose views provided a baseline for public discussion, it was obvious that “selfishness” drove the small-family trend, and that this moral failure constituted a fundamental near-term threat to the nation’s survival. Families were half the size they had been in the early republic. If fertility rates continued on their apparent trajectory towards zero, American institutions would not be transmitted through the family, new immigrants would not assimilate, and the culture would fail.¹⁶

For some pronatal moralists this disintegration was a tragic paradox of progress. There was nothing to be done: Civilizations rose and fell in unbreakable cycles of death and rebirth. More often, though, it was a call to the barricades. “All important general laws bear hard at times on the individual,” chided a Boston clergyman. Calls to subordinate vain selfhood to the timeless collective were legion. “Starting with the race

which is all race and no individual at all,” wrote a physician of post-protozoan evolution, “we may end up with the individual which is all individual – the race thus coming to an end.” Other moralists condemned their “small-souled” peers for transgressions such as avoiding children in favor of leisure, career, wealth, or adventure.¹⁷

Differences of degree, not kind, separated pro-Roosevelt stalwarts from birth control’s defenders. “All the readers will agree with me,” a woman wrote to her newspaper editor, “when I say that race suicide in the eyes of the Almighty God is a terrible sin. On the other hand, improper treatment of innocent children when better can be had is another.” Everyone objected to cultural extinction, and everyone objected to a tenth child being born into a family where nine went hungry.¹⁸

The dissenting minority, meanwhile, saw reproductive individualism as a benign trend, in line with Americans’ time-honored genius for practical self-improvement and intergenerational striving. The immediate-term welfare of individuals or nuclear families, rather than the permanence of the social body, was the most appropriate unit in evaluating reproductive ethics. “Large families are not the salvation of the nation,” a New York milliner told a reporter. “Better one child well brought up than a dozen neglected.”¹⁹

Birth control’s strongest defenders trusted that conscientious individual action would not harm society, much less extinguish it, and indeed might strengthen America in the long run. Where Roosevelt and his allies assumed a need for strong moral standards that would check human depravity, birth control supporters looked optimistically and pragmatically to the observable good nature and well-being of small families around them. “The two sons of the well-to-do New York business man, whom he can feed with the best cuts of beef, rear with intelligent discipline, and prepare for useful careers,” one editorialist observed, “will be physically, morally, and mentally superior to the whole dozen children in the fecund family of the Italian laborer of the tenements.” The Italian, too, would “in time become a section boss, and his son a contractor, who will in turn send his comparatively few children to college.”²⁰

Reproductive liberalism of this kind mimicked the economic and political liberalism that permeated respectable American opinion. Though reproductive liberals were aware of their minority status and quick to acknowledge the biological continuum’s importance, they eagerly played on their fellow citizens’ devotion to individual liberty. Self-interest had to be trusted to serve the common interest. Just as individual economic or political decisions might seem shortsighted and yet produce

a system preferable to any other, reproductive decisions could be made on short time horizons, for selfish motives and based on mundane concerns, yet result in a better overall social outcome.

Critics of all opinions could agree that reproductive control was an individual right, the legal restriction of which would be undesirable even if it were possible. But whereas pronatalists viewed that right's exercise with regret, liberalizers emphasized with remarkable uniformity birth control's positive effects on the population's "quality," if not "quantity." Over a third made this quality-quantity argument explicitly; most others did so implicitly. Smaller families, far from threatening the nation, civilized it. Rather than plunging inexorably to zero, birthrates would reach a self-governing equilibrium point where quality was maximized and quantity adequate to replace population. Somewhere in human nature or instinct, an invisible hand ensured this balance. Rather than an existential menace, mass birth control was another modern triumph of rational liberalism over the blind inertia of nature, patriarchy, or clerical fatalism. Believing in one's fellow citizens' ability to act responsibly in this way was akin to believing in the promise of democracy.

Distinctive as this position was in the public forum, birth control's defenders were few and cautious. Only a handful of speakers overtly challenged the idea that individuals owed a reproductive debt to society – asking, for example, "if people do not want to have children, whose business is it but their own?" and proposing that Roosevelt "ought not make such an old woman of himself." Arguments such as these anticipated a more private view of reproductive ethics that would become common later in the century, and eventually win formal acceptance in the U.S. Supreme Court in 1965. But in the 1900s radical reproductive liberalism remained unusual. By consensus, children remained a form of community property, and childrearing remained a legitimate interest of the collective. The question was how parents could best serve the social organism.²¹

In the absence of many voices denying any reproductive debt to society, citizen moralists divided over exactly how many children constituted repayment. Nearly all parties considered zero- or one-child families selfish, except in unusual circumstances. Two-child families were considered small, though some liberalizers defended them as adequate for high-quality social reproduction. Roosevelt and most of his allies wanted more: "all that I have ever said," the president wrote to E.A. Ross, "was that here in America, if the average family able to have children at all did not have three or four children, the American blood would die out – which

is a statement not only of morals but of mathematics.” A family standard of at least three children seemed necessary to replace population, given high rates of child mortality and the permanent minority of childless people.²²

Precise accountancy of this kind was a side issue for most commentators, however. More important were fundamental moral divides that predisposed some couples to accept children at *any* number, while disposing others in the opposite direction. The key question was how to interpret intergenerational shifts in these divides – whether to call the new ways selfish or conscientious, spiritually shortsighted or practically farsighted.

MORAL ECONOMY

Within this broad self-society framework, moralists had many ideas about what caused their peers to have one number of children or another (Figure A.1). Economic factors were most important: 43 percent of commentators thought economic calculation depressed fertility, and/or associated large families with poverty. By comparison, 23 percent mooted the next-most common frame: changes in perceived divine or natural order. Insofar as the declining birthrate was a specific sort of social problem, rather than a generalized moral upheaval, it was an economic question before all else.²³

In reproductive matters, however, economic reasoning was inextricable from moral intuition. For citizen moralists, lines between healthy economic “prudence” and malignant greed or selfishness were fluid, unclear, and ultimately drawn by feelings for the right more than deliberate calculations of cost and benefit. Reproductive questions demanded reflection on money’s rightful purposes, not the most rational ways to use it. Virtually no one disputed the small family’s rationality, but one moralist’s enlightened foresight and self-respect was another’s pettiness or cowardice.²⁴

Half of all “economic” commentators made explicit, disapproving connections between economy and morality – framing small families as an outgrowth of luxury or decadence. “What were formerly the luxuries of the rich have become the necessities of the poor,” one complained. “Commercialitis,” “money-love,” “the siren calls of fashion,” “the patent leather life . . . the universal climb on the social staircase”: all these tempted the selfish, particularly in cities. “Where money makes for self-indulgence,” one aphorist wrote, “children make for self-denial.”²⁵

The other half of economic-minded observers were less overtly moralistic. For some, a small family was an adaptive means of maintaining or advancing one's economic position (the "rationality" frame). For others it was a way of avoiding becoming poor or behaving like the poor ("poverty"). These observers took some measure of moral responsibility from the individual and placed it on "society" or "the times." Uncertain economic circumstances pushed modern people to protect themselves by limiting their families. Just a quarter of "rationality" or "poverty" commentators, however, saw socioeconomic pressures as sufficient to explain the small-family trend. For the remainder, decisions about fertility occurred at the nexus of economic self-interest and equally essential contingencies concerning God, natural order, modernization, or some other definitive realm of experience. Just one in ten commentators framed declining birthrates as the simple result of individual-level rational economic choice, without disparaging "love of display and luxuries" or otherwise complicating the context in which such choices were made.²⁶

Even the strictest rationalists, meanwhile, often took a moral tack – heaping scorn on the all-powerful economic systems that encouraged small families. "For the capitalists to condemn the masses because they limit their families is like blaming a man for being prostrate when we have knocked him down," wrote one editorialist. Until the "strenuous rush for wealth" was moderated, another observer wrote, well-intentioned Americans would remain "victims of circumstance": "race suicide must continue until the economic problem is solved."²⁷

For all the importance Americans attached to economic calculation as a factor in fertility decline, then, it would be less accurate to say that economics dominated the conversation than to say moral economy did so. Fertility decline was not the product of changing economic structures per se, nor of people comprehending birth control's rationality for the first time. It arose as people rethought life's end purposes, including standards of material comfort and security.²⁸

The Rooseveltian majority thought moral priority should go to eternal orders, not material comfort, except in extreme circumstances. The dissident minority saw dignity in their peers' higher economic expectations and careful planning. For neither group were parents mere economic actors; they were moral agents whose departures from past standards would reinforce themselves over time. Their actions seemed destined to bring about a radically new climate of belief about the place of children in a good life, for better or worse.²⁹

WORLDLINESS AND TRANSCENDENCE

If the moral economics of self and society underpinned many Americans' understandings of why families had become smaller, a second overarching frame on fertility decline concerned the interplay of worldly pragmatism and transcendence. "Pragmatic" and "transcendent" were not common terms in the race suicide debate, but they capture two ubiquitous ideas from it. Transcendent-minded people's first references were to otherworldly objects such as God, natural order, or imagined timeless continuums like the family or society. Pragmatists focused on the present material world and the individual's mastery of it. Family size was determined in part by parents' orientations towards the immediate here and now, on the one hand, or the eternal and universal, on the other.

The transcendent-minded had more children. They were less likely to see their life's primary meaning in terms of observable rewards accumulated in a lifetime. Rather than regarding themselves as cosmic end-products, they found meaning in mystical chains of being that fulfilled the intentions of a higher power. Their view to eternity helped them glide over the day-to-day concerns of raising children in any number.

Pragmatists had fewer children because they weighed risk more carefully and doubted the reality or authority of invisible moral orders. They might have transcendent or quasi-transcendent goals in other realms, such as career, learning, art, social service, or mystical discovery, but were less likely to express their desire for self-expansion in the irreversible, costly, physical form of a biological family.

Regardless of approval for birth control, most commentators assumed that Americans were becoming less transcendent-minded in general, less likely to steer transcendent impulses into children, and consequently less inclined to take existential pride in a large family. This trend chafed pronatalists despite the fact that many of them, Roosevelt included, would not have hesitated to call themselves pragmatists and include pragmatism among American culture's signal virtues. The same skeptical practicality that made Americans self-reliant democrats and tradesmen was petty and graceless when applied to the family. It showed a lack, Roosevelt argued, of "devotion to high ideals, a proper care for the things of the spirit."³⁰

In reproductive matters at least, pronatalists encouraged their peers to cast their gaze on the infinite horizon rather than matters of the day. "Do not sell your soul for a few earthly desires," one moralist warned

parents. "This life is short, and will soon fade away." A humorist mocked childless couples' pettiness and myopia with a fifty-item list of points over which a divorcing husband and wife had quarreled: "... because the Mormons are not Indians; because pineapples do not grow in Canada; because he fell in the creek; because he shot the pig; because he sat down on his hat; and BECAUSE THEY HAD NO CHILDREN."³¹

Liberalizers framed worldly pragmatism favorably. Family limitation was a rejection of "blind fatalism," a recognition of "sin, disease, distress, and ... uncertainty," and an embrace of the modern duty "to perfect the practical comfort and well being of the world." A new millennium would occur exactly when people ceased to "believe everything is in the hands of Providence, that the Lord alone is responsible and that the Lord will provide." No holy spirit demanded, sent, educated, or provided for children. It was no longer the fashion, thankfully, "to let ... children take the common chance in life." Instead, reproduction presented a series of complex but solvable technical problems, the end of which could be a "better world." The president was "right" about race suicide, conceded the *Chicago Tribune's* editors, but they could not fault parents for acting pragmatically: "Beneath all exaggerations there exists the big fact that children are no longer casual happenings. Every new human life is more and more a problem and a responsibility."³²

Questions of worldliness and transcendence pervaded discussion of the role of God and nature in family size. Though the Bible offered contradictory messages on family size, most Americans assumed the Christian God wanted his flock to bear children abundantly. God had commanded his people to "be fruitful" and killed Onan for "spilling his seed on the ground." Clergy and devout laypeople mixed these common scriptural references into cloudier evocations of Christians' obligation to perpetuate a species God had created in his own image.

Theology interested few commentators, however. Formal religious teaching was worth little in the face of slackening religious or mystical feeling – a key variable in the small-family trend. "The evil is deep seated," wrote one pronatalist citizen, "and the harder to combat that its votaries fall into it of their free will, require no organization, supply their own public opinion, and are beyond the reach of the law. The only law that can affect it is the law of God; the only tribunal that can check it is in the individual soul." Invocations of declining religious obedience, such as a doctor's insistence that previous generations had "heeded the injunction of the Bible to 'multiply on the face of the earth,'" were comparatively rare.³³

If traditional theism seemed less important than general transcendent-mindedness, it also took a back seat to informal sensibilities about nature and natural law. Whatever a person believed about divine commandment, a sense that transcendent Nature “wanted” or demanded reproduction was uniquely important for action. A couple was more likely to have any number of children if a new birth provided them a sense of connection to the universe and a feeling of doing its work. Mystical naturism thus paralleled formal theism and complemented its attention to eternal order. But naturism also held special power in a self-consciously modern and material world, since it required no belief in God, knowledge of doctrine, or acceptance of specific prophetic teachings.³⁴

Naturist arguments flourished in tandem with criticism of urban vice and corruption, a common trope of the period. Race suicide was “nature’s protest against the unnatural town life.” Childless urbanites had lost touch with “the delights of life where one can observe the beauties of nature.” “The cities and the rush of things” were “breaking up the home or making it unfruitful.” Some critics believed race suicide was inevitable unless more families could be kept on the land, in contact with wild nature – or at least moved to “suburban cottages inhabited mainly by children.” Prospects for this sort of reform appeared grim. “What with shortened lives, bachelorhood, late or childless marriages, and small families,” E.A. Ross wrote in an op-ed, “the cities constitute so many blast furnaces where the talented rise and become incandescent, to be sure, but for all that are incinerated without due replacement.”³⁵

Compounding cities’ inherent moral deficiencies was the practical problem of landlord discrimination against large families. Most American city-dwellers rented their homes, and landlords had both the right and inclination to turn away tenants based on the number and unruliness of their children. With Roosevelt’s campaign, this practice came under fire. Landlords were ridiculed for posting signs prohibiting “Dogs and Children” and levying surcharges on large families. Stories circulated about a Brooklyn woman with five children who had been turned down by eighty-seven apartment houses despite her husband’s steady job. Illustrious inventors, businesspeople, and political leaders had received similar treatment. “The penalty of raising a family,” reported *The Washington Post*, “is banishment to a section of the city where the streets are unpaved and ill-lighted, and the quarters squalid.” Antichild landlords seemed to incarnate the spiritual myopia of city life.³⁶

The matter of family housing inspired a few social entrepreneurs to construct apartment buildings designed for families. One in Alton,

Illinois, featured multiple playgrounds, "sand heaps," and perks for new parents like baby carriages and three months' free rent. The owner received an invitation to the White House. Housing discrimination also inspired most of the few traditional policy proposals to emerge from the race suicide debate. Chicago, Boston, Cleveland, Denver, Los Angeles, and other cities considered restricting landlords' ability to discriminate against families. None of the laws passed, however, and most observers continued to see cities' problems as primarily moral rather than legal and residential. "The landlord who insists on barring the Rooseveltian family may bring down on his selfish head the opprobrium of the anti-race suicide clubs," wrote the *Chicago Tribune*, "but he has the law with him . . . It is impossible, by mere legislative fiat, to cause the milk of human kindness to well forth from the barren paps of the perverted soul whose only god is self." The basic problem, given that cities seemed set to grow indefinitely, was to infuse the new Babylons with the godly naturalness of the countryside and the past.³⁷

In this quest, naturism and religious teaching often melded together. American Protestants had long detected in "nature" both dangerous wildness and earthly clues to divine intent. As modernist Protestants adapted their teachings to science and abstracted their God, the idea that semidivine nature demanded reproduction remained one belief that united them with traditionalists. Among educated Catholics, meanwhile, natural law was an oft-cited underpinning of formal theology. "All violations of the laws of nature are violations of God's laws and must ultimately be punished," declared one Catholic clergyman. God's will and nature's demands merged into one another.³⁸

More than a complement to religious belief, however, moralists invoked natural order as an alternate cosmic force, omitting any reference to formal theism. The advice writer Mary Terhune skewered bloodless city women who refused to nurse their children, since that act demoted them from "refined intellectual beings" to "mammal females." Elite writers, summoning the common association of the working classes with natural vitality, used the innocent-spirited, outdoor-living poor as foils for the conniving, velvet-walled rich. One writer recounted the parable of three brothers in Philadelphia: a corrupt official without children, an anxious postman with two, and a boisterous oyster seller who lived happily in a shanty with his sixteen children. "A wealthy lady, childless . . . offered to take any one of the sixteen and make him her heir," whereupon the peddler's wife indignantly "drove her from the house with a broom," her "rage

aroused at the idea that she could be asked to spare one when she only had sixteen.” Race suicide was a disorder of the denatured – men and women who had mastered their animal natures to the point of losing them entirely, and lived in and for an “artificial world” of bricks, crowds, business, refined tastes, and social anxieties. Valuing life across generations seemed to require that survival itself remain a struggle, as it was in the animal kingdom, among the working classes, and on the land. To invest oneself completely in the superfluities of human creation was to die completely.³⁹

Many naturists were secular Protestants who had been influenced by Charles Darwin and his interpreters. Roosevelt himself was typical of this group. Lambasting a New Jersey preacher who advised his flock to confine themselves to two children so they could “taste a few good things,” the president thundered:

The people who had acted on this base and selfish doctrine would [soon give] place to others with braver and more robust ideals. Nor would such a result be in any way regrettable; for a race that practiced such doctrine ... would thereby conclusively show that it was unfit to exist, and that it had better give place to people who had not forgotten the primary laws of their being.

Roosevelt’s disingenuous endorsement of nature over nation was tarter than other moralists’ naturism, but no less convinced that natural law demanded a new kind of piety.⁴⁰

In the discussion of nature and procreation were echoes of old theological debates within Protestantism. Some commentators believed “nature” demanded that morally free humans conform to its dictates; others considered it a predestinatory force. The former position was more common, but a smaller group of naturists took the more fatalistic view, declaring that American civilization, as a body, was aging and entering organic decline. “Civilization has always carried within itself the seeds of its own decay,” one columnist wrote. “We cannot escape the penalty that every dominant race has paid to nature.” From this perspective the passing of civilizations was bittersweet, inevitable, and perhaps even romantically beautiful. E.A. Ross called it the “theory of national afternoons.”⁴¹

For the majority who wished to believe in freely willed agency, appeals to nature-religion were not always the answer. Roosevelt’s naturism struck some respectable people as “animal” or sensual, and the president faced occasional criticism as a “pagan.” More than once the president was compelled to clarify that he was not calling for unrestrained sexuality or

nihilistic biological competition among peoples. Rather than “an instigation to a riot of physical forces in mankind,” an administration surrogate wrote in 1903, the president was making “an appeal to the moral being.” His efforts were “merely a protest against a form of selfishness which robs nature of her perfect work.”⁴²

Regardless of their exact views on nature and God, most pronatalists agreed that the central question in the race suicide debate was how to instill transcendent-mindedness in urbanizing, secularizing Americans. Whether this vision was rooted in naturist mysticism, divine revelation, or both was less important than whether *any* vision of the eternal could remain viable in places “where the sky is seen only as a rift between solid walls of masonry.” No one wanted a full reversion to the “old times,” but nearly everyone hoped that children would retain some hold on the transcendent imagination – enough, at least, to provide reasonable continuity to the American experiment.⁴³

TIME

Moral time formed the final major dividing line between parents of small and large families. For citizen moralists, anyone who rejected modernity, wholly or in part, tended to have more children. So did people whose sense of relevant time extended beyond their lifetimes and far into the past and future. Pronatalists thus pleaded for expansive views of relevant time. “Individuals,” scolded one, were “deliberately, in their own persons, putting an end to the process – millions of years in duration – which has produced them.” Parents, lamented another, seemed to see children as “mere chattel” rather than the fulfillment of a sublime rite. “There are lots of people that do not like children, won’t have any, and do not care whether it’s race suicide or not; they are living for themselves and their generation and are not lying awake at night thinking about posterity.”⁴⁴

Religious commentators amply supplemented this line of thought, asserting that life was purposeless without a clear commitment to eternal laws and enduring institutions like family, nation, or church. By the 1930s this sort of religious traditionalism would dominate the much-reduced ranks of American pronatalists. In Roosevelt’s time, however, many “baby boosters” made their case in secular terms, as a defense of America’s democratic progressivism. Roosevelt and his allies hoped that Americans who no longer felt bound to divine or natural continuums might respond to an alternate call to eternalize republican civil religion. The licentious French may be “indifferent to the future,” as one patriot

argued, but more should be expected of Americans, who “build their greatness for posterity.” “Without family, without the loves and cares and responsibilities of family, what is a man’s work worth? Without a noble future, without a magnificent posterity to inherit the fruits of its endeavors and to build upon them a yet nobler state – what is the nation’s life worth?”⁴⁵

Weaker views to eternity were especially dangerous in republican America, where the nation depended on the self-reinforcing virtue of its citizens. In other domains, rights might replace duties to noble effect, but in reproduction, that transition threatened to undermine the rights-granting society. “The current of public sentiment,” as one critic wrote, “is in most serious danger of cursing its blessings.”⁴⁶

The baby boosters’ reproductive traditionalism sat awkwardly with the progressivism of many of their number. The progressive ethos was neither mystical nor indebted to eternal orders. Progressives wanted open-ended social improvement through technocratic leadership, scientific discovery, and continual moral reform. Perpetual adaptation was necessary for survival. “The worst evils we have to combat have inevitably evolved along with the evolution of society itself,” as Roosevelt wrote, “and the perspective of conduct must change from age to age.”⁴⁷

The progressive view of history created a series of apparent paradoxes for secular republican pronatalists. Even as they asked one another to adopt eternal time horizons, progress itself appeared to spring from (and reinforce) the shortening of those horizons. Progressives criticized Americans’ attention to the practical present world, then turned and asserted that the same practicality was the driving force of the country’s world-leading progress. They questioned the sustainability of modern societies, then argued that modernity made them worth saving. Though “modern times” and the spread of “human will and choice” had caused the falling birthrate, one critic observed, “this power to control” now appeared to work against “social welfare and progress.”⁴⁸

Birth control’s defenders, also progressives, seized on these contradictions. They worked to shift the focus away from the *scope* of personal time (did a person perceive binding commitments outside the immediate term?) towards the *direction* of historical time (was a person modern?). Birth control was good, they argued, because by common acclamation it was associated with innumerable modern improvements. People with small families were freer, wealthier, healthier, better educated, less dogmatic,

and better able to control their worlds and contribute to progress. The decline of mystical eternalism was a good thing for everyone – not least the relatively few children born into prudent families. Practical immediate-term outlooks and limited families, far from threatening progress, were preconditions of it.

This proved a strong argument, and one that would grow rapidly in the decades to follow. Because everyone could agree that birth control's spread reflected “modern ideas,” “modern life,” “modern civilization,” or “the modern spirit,” every perceived advancement in medicine, or engineering, or wealth, also became a potential credit to birth control's legitimacy. Small families were an expression of “modern conditions” which “all tend to discourage matrimony,” as one letter-writer put it. Couples with few children might be “calculating,” but they also expressed a fundamentally American skepticism in the face of arbitrary antiquity or dogma. “It is a thoroughly American belief that a life that is merely existed is not worth living.”⁴⁹

For most citizen observers, the spread of smaller families was an expression of every change that separated the present world from the half-remembered ancestral one. Older generations had been more awed by the claims of eternity than those of history. Now people had a clearer picture of the chancy and shifting worlds in which they lived. There were obvious benefits to this clarity, but also a danger of spiritual myopia. Hundreds of moralists thus tried to spell out the eternal's value to individuals, society, and even to progress. They believed such a campaign might bring basic moral reform. A generation later they would be less hopeful.

GENDER

With some exceptions like landlord discrimination, Americans tended to explain the small-family trend in terms of sweeping intergenerational moral-economic change. Narrower-gauge explanations seemed insufficient. Virtually no one attributed falling birthrates to growing availability or knowledge of contraceptive methods, for example. Surprisingly few saw educational costs or content as a major factor. High fertility among immigrants and the poor was not seen as a cause of low fertility among the native middle classes, as in Francis Walker's “shock” theory. The idea that children were once economic assets (on farms) but had since become liabilities (in cities) was virtually absent.⁵⁰

Most notable in its absence was a clear conception of birth control as revolution for and by women. The mostly male newspaper commentariat did not see the small-family trend as strongly motivated by women or associated with their interests (see Figure A.4). Pronatalists seeking culprits for race suicide generally addressed themselves to both sexes, as did liberalizers pinpointing beacons of progress. There was scant panic over women's escape from domesticity, pursuit of education, or special susceptibility to luxury. There was little celebration of women's gradual emancipation from domestic drudgery.

Instead, a majority of commentators never alluded to gender in any way, even briefly, while another 11 percent specifically mentioned *both* men and women as contributors to falling birthrates. The remaining third associated falling birthrates with one sex or the other, often weakly. Of these, three in five framed birth control as a women's issue, two in five as a men's issue.

Male moralists of the period had little compunction about criticizing specific faults in women's behavior, including deficiencies of femininity or maternal "warmth." But critics saw men as well as women as culprits in race suicide. Women had much to gain from a small family. But men were understood as the original sinners in the sexual regime. More than women, they sought out nonreproductive, nonmarital, recreational sex. Men were more likely to be calculating individualists. They controlled marriage proposals, and many critics saw declining birthrates as a result of men's reluctance to marry. Major contraceptive techniques were under men's physical control. As heads of household, husbands were liable for their families' material welfare. Censure for hungry or ragged broods fell on them more than on their wives. "The responsibility for the neglect and nonsupport of the children rests, in the great majority of cases, upon man while the labor, privations, and pain fall upon the woman," explained the *Chicago Tribune*.⁵¹

Women commentators often sought to assert their sex's special interest in reproductive reform. Whereas just 18 percent of men spoke of women's agency – actual or deserved – in fertility decisions, 46 percent of women did so. But whether these observers believed their fellow women *were* the key determiners of fertility outcomes or *should be* was not always clear. For example, when a female speaker derided "women who remain at home, attend to domestic duties, and rear large families" as "primitive squaws," she clearly framed fertility as a women's issue. But it was not clear if she was making an observation about who controlled family size, or who ought to do so. By contrast, few commentators seemed to think

men *should* govern family size, though many believed they *did*, at least in part.⁵²

This ambiguity regarding female agency stemmed partly from the disparity between women's heavy domestic responsibilities and limited power. The hour-to-hour rewards of a small family were greater for the women, in terms of tasks and anxieties foregone. But women's economic and social dependency limited their authority over consequential household decisions. Meanwhile men, though their rewards were less immediate, exercised greater authority. That domestic power disparity, combined with the widespread presumption of men's relatively mercenary nature – their irreligion, orientation toward worldly gain, and lack of “maternal instinct” – made them no less suspect than women in the eyes of pronatalists. The same power and pragmatism made them appear as potential leaders to liberalizers.

Inattention to gender did not reflect the *absence* of gendered divides in fertility motivation, but the perception that traditional male and female roles – and their modern evolution – might influence family-size preferences *in either direction*. Neither feminine nor masculine norms provided moralists with clear, unidirectional clues as to why families were shrinking. Women, as women, were pulled in two directions. On the one hand, “the old feminine instincts” disposed even “the new woman” to appreciate children. Women's religious and moral superiority lent them a clearer vision of the family's higher purpose, and checked men's aversion to commitment and domestic responsibility. On the other hand, natural “love of children” might make mothers “anxious to have only one or two feel they could only truly nurture.” Modern women also did “not believe,” as one woman wrote, “that the price of motherhood should be freedom and the right to self-ownership.”⁵³

Men, too, were pulled in two directions. A man might wish to carry on his family name. His paternity represented sexual potency and full manhood, and he might take pride in a large family while suffering few of its day-to-day burdens. But men were also rovers rather than nesters, and avatars of the modernity's cold calculation. At worst they were serial seducers; at best, victims of “industrial conditions which render it impossible for a large portion of the young men in the community to marry.” These gendered crosscurrents helped ensure that as moralists surveyed their social worlds, they made no necessary association of smaller families with either sex or with any gender-specific complex of revolutionary ideas. Both

sexes had compelling reasons to want children or avoid them, at any number.⁵⁴

Stronger than the case for women's special agency in birth control's spread is the case for women's greater urgency and sympathy in addressing family limitation – regardless of ability to act. Women newspaper commentators were much more likely to oppose pronatalism than men: just 41 percent of women supported the president's position (versus 57 percent of men) while 42 percent opposed it (versus 12 percent of men). Female reformers had already distinguished themselves as some of birth control's few public advocates, campaigning for voluntary motherhood and in a few cases, penning defiantly anti-Roosevelt defenses of their childlessness. "I am not prepared to say that I absolutely refuse to accept the charge of motherhood," wrote "A Bachelor Maid" in 1904, "but I do refuse – and I have no words to express the loathing with which I regard this idea – to be looked upon as a mere means of swelling the census report." "Such women as 'The Bachelor Maid' and I are products of modern conditions," added another anonymous reader. In the future, this writer hoped, women could have both motherhood and freedom. "Meanwhile, I deny the right of any one to criticize me who is not doing something to lighten the pressure of those social conditions which have forced this dilemma not only upon me, but upon thousands of American women."⁵⁵

Women also differed in their views of birth control's risks and rewards, framing birth control as a health issue far more often (26 percent) than men (7 percent). The physical danger of bearing children and sometimes exhausting or dispiriting challenges of raising them gave women an extra incentive to limit their families. "Women ... are the ones most intimately and immediately concerned," as the progressive journalist Lydia K. Commander wrote in 1907, after interviewing several hundred New Yorkers for a book on race suicide.⁵⁶

In any culture gender assumptions may become so naturalized as to go unspoken. It is possible that, just as some Americans spoke of "race suicide" without needing to clarify what they meant by "race," others spoke of smaller families without needing to specify that women were responsible for that trend. "But," Commander continued, "it does not appear that American men are more desirous than women of large families." One of Commander's interviewees, a doctor practicing among "people in comfortable circumstances,"

guessed that “men probably on the whole desire children more than women”:

Naturally they would; they get all the pride and miss the pain. But in my experience they are usually satisfied with two or three – often with one. Sometimes men welcome a large family and will seem pleased over every additional arrival, but they are the exceptions.

Another doctor did not believe “there is any considerable sentiment in favor of large families among men. President Roosevelt would find himself in a minority even among his own sex.” Commander’s female interviewees backed up these accounts: “the majority of women with whom I have personally come in contact confirm this evidence of physicians.”⁵⁷

Both women and men were essential to legitimizing fertility control in America. Women might hold special power in demanding fewer children due to the risks and demands of maternity. Men might spurn domestic responsibilities or take hedonic views of sex. In most cases, however, women and men seem to have taken moderately different routes to similar conclusions about the value of children to a dignified and righteous life. They moved on separate but broadly parallel tracks. As moral priority shifted from imposing continuums to living, practical selves, children became a greater burden on both parents. Rearing them became more expensive and less cosmically valuable, not for men or for women in particular, but for millions of modern people seeking dignity within a society in flux.

CONCLUSIONS

Demographers often note how “quietly” reproductive ethics changed before the 1960s. That assessment is true of the early twentieth-century United States in the sense that few Americans openly supported fertility control as a solution to social or personal problems. And it is true in the sense that outspoken activism was less important than private action in birth control’s rise to popularity and legitimacy.⁵⁸

But fertility change in the U.S. was not quiet in a general civic sense. Particularly after Roosevelt’s “trumpet-blast protest” in 1903, popular debate over reproductive ethics was vigorous. “Race suicide” became a household term. Speculation on its causes and consequences became part of the period’s civic furniture. “This is a pretty hard question for

‘mere man’ or a mere newspaper to discuss, and it is much pleasanter to talk and to write about other subjects,” as one editor wrote. But discuss it Americans did. Race suicide seemed at once important and invisible, apparent and impossible to explain. “It seems to be one of those vast, slow, silent movements which pass almost unperceived at the time,” wrote one critic, “but are more potent to shape the destinies of mankind than war or policies which look so much more important to a near vision.”⁵⁹

The debate focused attention on the private evolution of moral conventions that had long been taken for granted. It produced a few halting proposals to rewrite those conventions in light of modern progress. But most reaction was more conservative. Instead of reacting to smaller families with the characteristic progressive optimism of turn-of-the-century middle classes, American moralists mostly produced a sprawling attempt to restate and reinforce “old-fashioned” virtues that appeared, paradoxically, to be a precondition of further progress. “If it were possible for the *Post* to be pessimistic as to the republic’s future,” the Washington daily wrote, “a cause could be readily found in our social statistics.” Democratic progress required the continued biological production of democratic progressives.⁶⁰

The mere fact that these codes had to be spelled out caused considerable consternation among the pronatal majority: “when a people begins to talk about the ‘duty’ of marriage,” one critic commented, “it is about time to bring down the curtain.” Americans nevertheless proclaimed that duty with passion, giving voice to a code that, in common memory, had formed a basic moral backdrop to life during “the simpler days of the Republic.” Men and women were born into reproductive debt. They were links in a chain rather than finished products. Children were an individual gratification but also a form of community and cosmic property. Good citizens did what was necessary to perpetuate themselves, their families, and their communities. They supported and celebrated their peers in this endeavor. Without such a common view to the eternal, children would not be worth the trouble.⁶¹

This fragile consensus emerged in public view only because it was breaking down. With every year it seemed to hold less power to sway action. “Why should men sacrifice to plant trees whose fruit they would never taste?” one essayist asked. “I suppose we all settle the question for ourselves,” wrote another, as if to answer. “And if one sins, that one, and no other, will suffer.”⁶²



FIGURE 2.1 Three “female medicines,” early twentieth century. Courtesy Dittrick Medical History Center, Case Western Reserve University.



FIGURE 2.2 Abortifacient tablets, early twentieth century. Courtesy Dittrick Medical History Center, Case Western Reserve University.



FIGURE 2.3 Syringes used to apply douching solutions. Courtesy Dittrick Medical History Center, Case Western Reserve University.




FIGURE 2.4 Box of condoms, c.1931.



FIGURE 2.5 Postcard, c.1906. Courtesy Deanna Dahlsad.




FIGURE 2.6 Postcards, c.1905-10.

RACE SUICIDE FOILED ON THE BANKS OF THE WATAUGA



(Special to The Times-Dispatch.)
 BRISTOL, TENN., October 27.—President Roosevelt is in receipt of a picture of the model anti-race suicide family, which is in many other respects a model one. It is that shown in the accompanying cut.

The family represented in this picture is a product of East Tennessee, and is an ideal representative of the "simple life." The picture is that of J. I. Reece and wife and their family of thirteen children, ten boys and three girls.

Mr. Reece is fifty-two years of age and his wife is forty-seven. They were married thirty years ago, when he was twenty-two and she sixteen years of age. In the thirty years of their married life fourteen children have been born to them, but one of the number died. The oldest of the living children is twenty-nine and the youngest five years.

This family now resides at Emmett, Sullivan county, Tennessee, ten miles from Bristol, but was reared in the Watauga Valley, near the picturesque spot where ex-Governor Bob Taylor was born, and where the music of this genial politician's fiddle was a constant source of inspiration to the young set in the childhood days of Mr. Reece and the winsome little girl who was destined to become his wife.

The Reece family is one of the happiest in all the wide world. The marriage was a happy one, and through all the years that have followed the wedding ceremony this man and his good wife have maintained a spirit of good

cheer and have imparted it to their children. Indeed, the simple life has found permanent reign in the family, and happiness has been made so happy that not a one of the thirteen bright boys and girls would desert it for a million dollars.

In the world's goods the family is not rich, but it has ever been rich in the sunlight and good cheer of a happy home; and the death call, which summoned one of the number—a little child—from the family circle, visiting its heart-rending grief upon the household, but brought the

family closer together in the bonds of a common sympathy and affection, so that the gentler and better influences have had all to do with shaping their destiny. It is easy, therefore, to understand how from the oldest to the youngest child the principles of a model rural life—in all its beauty and simplicity—have been instilled. And so it is that not a single member of this family has been addicted to bad habits of any character, every one being sober, obedient, energetic and faithful to every duty, each cheerfully accepting what they all, without exception, have received as they grew up—the advantage of a common school education.

Mr. and Mrs. Reece are naturally very proud of their children, and Mr. Reece has occasion, too, to be gratified with his success in a business way. He began his married life with \$150 as his only material asset, and, although ever since carrying the burden of a constantly increasing family, he has not only fed and clothed the family and given to the children a public school education, but by his industry and economy has accumulated sufficient to be the proud possessor of a fertile farm in the Watauga Valley, valued at \$4,000.

The history of this bright, good-natured, cheerful family, unacquainted with the bitter disappointments of the reckless and misguided ambitions in the higher circles, strangers to practices which have blighted so many lives, is the history of a success whose price is not money, and which cannot be had for a mere cash consideration.

Cure for Drunkenness.

Orrine Treatment is to be Used at Home Without Publicity or Loss of Time from Business.

Thousands of persons who really want to quit the use of whiskey or beer, realize that they cannot do so without medical help, yet they cannot afford the time or perhaps the money to go to a sanitarium. Happily a new cure for drunkenness has been discovered, which is to be taken at home, and costs less than the average drinker will spend in a day. In using Orrine there is absolutely no publicity.

The remedy is sold by leading druggists in every city and town, or it can be sent by mail. If a cure is not effected your money is refunded.

Send to the Orrine Co., Washington, D. C., for free booklet and consultation blank. Mailed in plain, sealed envelope. Orrine is sold and guaranteed by Polk Miller Drug Co., 321 East Main Street, and Polk Miller-Chidrey Co., First and Broad Streets.

FIGURE 2.7 A family of fourteen from Emmett, Tennessee. Many large families sent similar photographs to President Theodore Roosevelt, who often replied with a note of congratulations. *Richmond Times-Dispatch*, Oct. 28, 1906.



FIGURE 2.8 Two-child family, Vermont, 1939.

2 RACE SUICIDE

1. Michel de Montaigne, *Works*, ed. and trans. William Hazlitt (London, 1845), 463.
2. The idea that single young women labored for “pin money,” not subsistence, was a common trope in Gilded Age America. Van Vorst’s reports from other towns took a darker view of women’s industrial work.
3. Mrs. John [Bessie] Van Vorst and Marie Van Vorst, *The Woman Who Toils: Being the Experiences of Two Ladies as Factory Girls* (New York, 1903), 82, 85.
4. *Ibid.*, vii. On Roosevelt’s concern with falling birthrates from 1892 onwards, see Thomas G. Dyer, *Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race* (Baton Rouge, La., 1980), 142–45.
5. Van Vorst, *Woman Who Toils*, viii.
6. “To Bishop Doane,” *Boston Globe*, January 27, 1905.
7. *Life*, March 12, 1903. Light humor about race suicide was common in newspapers’ column-fillers, and in some towns and cities groups of schoolchildren watched Roosevelt speak from beneath giant banners reading “No Race Suicide Here.” Other issues remembered solemnly by historians were similarly subject to newspaper wits: Anne Ruggles Gere observes that “the ‘new woman,’” for example, became a “comic icon” in the popular press between

1890 and 1920. (Gere, *Intimate Practices: Literacy and Cultural Work in U.S. Women's Clubs, 1880–1920* (Urbana, Ill., 1997), 141)

8. “What is there in marriage that makes thoughtful people so uncomfortable?” asked George Bernard Shaw in 1908. “The answer to this question is an answer which everybody knows and nobody likes to give. What is driving our ministers of religion and statesmen to blurt it out at last is the plain fact that marriage is now beginning to depopulate the country with such alarming rapidity that we are forced to throw aside our modesty like people who, awakened by an alarm of fire, rush into the streets in their nightdresses or in no dresses at all.” George Bernard Shaw, “Preface to ‘Getting Married’” (New York, 1909), 12. Public discussion of fertility control was difficult enough throughout the nineteenth century that many respected doctors and sociologists entertained the idea that lower fertility might be the result of physiological degeneration rather than voluntary action. See, e.g., Charles F. Emerick, “Is the Diminishing Birth-rate Volitional?” *Popular Science*, January 1911. Social critics used physiological explanations for falling fertility as arguments against the education of women, whose alleged over-involvement in “nervous” or “brain” work led, they thought, to the underdevelopment of their reproductive capacities. On Victorian medical advice regarding fertility decline and “limited vital energy,” see Anita Clair Fellman and Michael Fellman, *Making Sense of Self: Medical Advice Literature in Late Nineteenth Century America* (Philadelphia, 1981), 75–87.
9. Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind* (New York, 1911), 84. On newspaper circulation per household see Melvin L. DeFleur and Sandra Ball-Rokeach, *Theories of Mass Communication* (New York, 1975). The “ritual” view of communication interprets media content not simply as a means of transmitting information but as a forum where readers construct and practice life rituals. See James Carey, “A Cultural Approach to Communication” in Carey, ed. *Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society* (New York, 2009 (1975)). For a review of subsequent developments in the field, see John J. Pauly, “Ritual Theory and the Media” in Robert S. Fortner, P. Mark Fackler, eds., *The Handbook of Media and Mass Communication Theory*, vol. 1 (Chichester, Eng., 2014). In order of frequency, the 605 articles came from the *Chicago Tribune* (151), *Washington Post* (96), *Boston Globe* (92), *New York Times* (89), *Los Angeles Times* (57), *Atlanta Constitution* (49), *Baltimore Sun* (40), *New York Tribune* (27), and *Hartford Courant* (4).
10. James Bryce, *The American Commonwealth*, vol. 2 (London, 1888), 263. Bryce’s analysis has since been endorsed by contemporary scholars of public opinion: “One thing is clear,” write Carroll Glynn and coauthors: “Bryce understood – as no one before him really did – the very critical role of newspapers in the communication of public opinion.” Carroll Glynn, Susan Herbst, Garrett O’Keefe, and Robert Y. Shapiro, *Public Opinion* (Boulder, Colo., 1999), 45; see also p. 93–102, 381–415. Scholars have sometimes emphasized newspapers’ role in “manufacturing” public opinion – rather than ratifying it – but we should not underestimate the press’s reflective and populist role. “A text corpus is the representation and expression of a community

that writes,” Martin Bauer argues. “Content analysis allows us to construct indicators of worldviews, values, attitudes, opinions, prejudices and stereotypes, and compare these across communities. In other words, content analysis is public opinion research by other means.” Martin W. Bauer, “Classical Content Analysis: A Review” in Martin Bauer and George Gaskell, eds., *Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound: A Practical Handbook* (Thousand Oaks, Cal., 2000), 133–34. The view of newspapers as manipulators of public opinion (on behalf of a capitalist class of advertisers) owes much to Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (1988); Ferdinand Tönnies, *Critique of Public Opinion* (1922); and to a lesser extent, Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion* (New York, 1922). Lippmann noted, however, that “a newspaper can flout an advertiser, it can attack a powerful banking or traction interest, but if it alienates the buying public, it loses the one indispensable asset of its existence . . . Patronage of the advertisers depends upon the editor’s skill in holding together an effective group of customers. These customers deliver judgment according to their private experiences and their stereotyped expectations.” (Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, 324, 333). On the tendency of historians to focus on newspaper’s biases and inaccuracies, Robert Darnton writes that “newspapers should be read for information about how contemporaries construed events, rather than for reliable knowledge of events themselves.” Darnton, “The Library in the New Age,” *New York Review of Books*, June 12, 2008.

11. The database is ProQuest Historical Newspapers. My primary search term was “race suicide” – the phrase commonly used on all sides of the debate to introduce the subject of birthrates and birth control. I supplemented this search with another – “birth rate (and) family (or) children” – to rule out the possibility of thematic or other anomalies. From the combined results I excluded duplicates (such as wire service stories), very short items such as column fillers, and over 100 short articles documenting the great size of a local family but lacking analytic content (these articles often included a family picture, plus caption, under the headline “No race suicide here”). On Weber, Tenney, and other predecessors of content analysis, see Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology* (Thousand Oaks, Cal., 2013), 4–7. Some of the difficulties of using newspapers for this sort of project before optical character recognition are spelled out in Cynthia Goldstein, *The Press and the Beginning of the Birth Control Movement in the United States* (Ph.D. diss., Pennsylvania State University, 1985), ch. 1. For a synopsis of elite magazines’ reaction to Roosevelt’s race suicide pronouncement, see Gail Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880–1917* (Chicago, 1996), 202–5. Bederman argues that the Roosevelt-catalyzed race suicide discussion “made it possible, for the first time since the eighteenth century, for respectable American men to publically celebrate male sexuality” and “probably facilitated the development of modern ideologies of gender, in which sexual expressiveness became a hallmark of healthy manhood or womanhood” (p. 205).

12. I developed each frame using a “grounded theory” approach, refining categories as I notated the source documents, then returning to the documents and notes for coding. Eleven frames I classified as “explanatory,” meaning they implied a cause for fertility decline (Figure A.1). The remaining twelve were descriptive or “other” (Figure A.2). Cases where this divide was not clear-cut included gender language, which could be explanatory, and the “poverty” frame, which included descriptions of large families as a phenomenon of the poor *and* explanations which cast fertility control as a means of avoiding poverty. Because the latter predominated, I classified “poverty” as explanatory. On the use of frames in historical demography, see John R. Wilmoth and Patrick Ball, “The Population Debate in American Popular Magazines, 1946–90,” *Population and Development Review* 18: 4 (December, 1992); Laura Stark and Hans-Peter Kohler, “The Debate over Low Fertility in the Popular Press: A Cross-National Comparison, 1998–1999,” *Population Research and Policy Review* 21:6 (December, 2002); Stark and Kohler, “The Popular Debate about Low Fertility: An Analysis of the German Press, 1993–2001,” *European Journal of Population* 20: 4 (December, 2004). A notable application of ProQuest-based newspaper content analysis to American cultural and gender history is Estelle B. Freedman, “‘Crimes which Startle and Horrify’: Gender, Age, and the Racialization of Sexual Violence in White American Newspapers, 1870–1900,” *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 20:3 (2011). One application of content analysis to U.S. gender history is Joanne Meyerowitz, “Beyond the Feminine Mystique: A Reassessment of Postwar Mass Culture, 1946–1958,” *Journal of American History* 79:4 (March 1993).
13. Of the 605 articles analyzed, 304 primarily record the views of editors, columnists, or reporters. Though these articles were usually unsigned, we can assume male authorship for a large majority. The 301 remaining articles record the views of non-journalists, such as public speakers or writers of letters to the editor. Among working-class Americans, “the more sensational newspapers . . . are the ones universally read,” observed one student of 200 working families in 1907 (Louise Bolard More, *Wage-Earners’ Budgets: A Study of Standards and Cost of Living in New York City* (New York, 1907), 141).
14. Roosevelt to Albert Shaw, April 3, 1907, *Presidential Addresses and State Papers* (New York, 1910), vol. 6; W.E.B. Du Bois, *The Negro Family* (Atlanta, 1908), 42. The same inattention to in-group birthrates prevailed among England’s working classes – see Sian Pooley, “Parenthood, Child-Rearing and Fertility in England, 1850–1914,” *The History of the Family* 18:1 (2013) – and in rural U.S. papers, which, like African-American papers, gave “race suicide” minimal coverage, the term confined mostly to wire service reports or reprints from big urban papers. In a sample of ten small-town newspapers from a dairy-farming county in northern New York state, for example, 130 articles on race suicide and birthrates were printed between 1903 and 1908, but just eight were produced locally: four editorials, three articles about large local families, and one about county school enrollments. Over the same period the German-language immigrant press largely ignored the issue, though it covered the militarist cradle competition between

Germany and France. Spanish- and French-language dailies were nearly silent. Regarding the “one-quarter” estimate, the *Twelfth Census of the United States* (1900) enumerated 8,883,991 “Negroes” (Census Bulletin 8, p. 19), 1,471,332 non-English speakers (Vol. 2, p. 490), and 1,916,434 native white illiterates over ten years of age (Vol. 2, p. 413). I use illiteracy as a rough proxy for indigence because the U.S. government did not establish a standard measure of poverty until the 1960s. Some commentators believed Roosevelt and his allies addressed themselves only to “the better class” or “old Americans” while others thought he was encouraging indiscriminate breeding across the board – “mustangs” rather than “thoroughbreds,” as one columnist wrote. Historians have generally characterized Roosevelt’s race suicide campaign as patriarchal and racist, and that is partly true: Roosevelt expected more domestic self-sacrifice from women than men, and reflexively addressed his concerns to the enfranchised white majority. Roosevelt nevertheless looked askance at many of his period’s prevailing racial theories, mocking, for example, the “unconscious and rather pathetic humor in the simplicity of half a century ago which spoke of the Aryan and the Teuton with reverential admiration” (Theodore Roosevelt, “Biological Analogies in History,” Romanes Lecture, Oxford, England, June 7, 1910). He called the racial designation “Anglo-Saxon” “meaningless,” and was appalled that “many of the European races which come to this country with traditions of large families soon fall into the ‘American way’” (“The President,” *Ladies’ Home Journal*, February 1906). Roosevelt’s racial liberality seems to have extended only to people of European descent – not to “race differences as fundamental as those which divide from one another the half-dozen great ethnic divisions of mankind” – though he noted that it was “easy to forget how brief is this period of unquestioned supremacy of the so-called white race.” Even a “barbaric race” could “suddenly develop a more complex cultivation and civilization” (Romanes lecture, 1910). On women’s domestic roles, Roosevelt held both conventional and progressive views. He believed “the primary duty of the husband is to be the home-maker, the breadwinner for his wife and children, and that the primary duty of the woman is to be the helpmate, the housewife, and mother” (“Address before the National Congress of Mothers,” Washington, DC, March 13, 1905). But he also supported a variety of women’s rights causes throughout his life, and framed falling birthrates as a failure of “men and women,” rather than mothers alone. On Roosevelt’s racialism see Dyer, *Roosevelt*; Gary Gerstle, “Theodore Roosevelt and the Divided Character of American Nationalism,” *Journal of American History* 86:3 (December 1999). On the intersection of race and gender in Roosevelt’s thought, see Bederman, *Manliness and Civilization*, ch. 5.

15. On Roosevelt’s doubts see Dyer, *Roosevelt*, 153. “It is very well to talk race suicide, but there is a place for such talk, and that place is not in the columns of a public newspaper,” one reader warned the *Boston Globe* (November 3, 1907).
16. “President on Race Suicide,” *The Baltimore Sun*, March 15, 1905.

17. “New Books,” *The Washington Post*, November 12, 1904; “No Race Suicide – Gibbons,” *The New York Times*, October 20, 1907.
18. “Everybody’s Column,” *The Boston Globe*, October 14, 1906.
19. “The Question of Race Suicide,” *New York Tribune*, April 13, 1903.
20. “Race Suicide,” *The New York Times*, September 25, 1905.
21. “Children Cost Too Much,” *Los Angeles Times*, December 9, 1905. The Supreme Court decision was *Griswold v. Connecticut*.
22. Roosevelt to E.A. Ross, July 11, 1911, quoted in Ross, *Seventy Years of It: An Autobiography* (New York, 1936), 243. On the emergence of two- or three-child norm among northeastern Americans before 1900, and the demographic validity of Roosevelt’s concerns, see Paul A. David and Warren C. Sanderson, “The Emergence of a Two-Child Norm among American Birth-Controllers,” *Population and Development Review* 13:1 (1987).
23. Throughout this book quantitative measures are meant to read comparatively against parallel figures in this book, not as stand-alone indicators of public opinion.
24. Notable economic theories of fertility include Gary S. Becker, “An Economic Analysis of Fertility” in Becker, ed., *Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries* (Princeton, 1960), Richard Easterlin, “The Economics and Sociology of Fertility: A Synthesis” in Charles Tilly, ed., *Historical Studies in Changing Fertility* (Princeton, 1978). A cogent review of economic theories is included in Dov Friedlander, Barbara S. Okun, and Sharon Sega, “The Demographic Transition Then and Now: Processes, Perspectives, and Analyses,” *Journal of Family History* 24:4 (1999).
25. “Race Suicide,” *The Baltimore Sun*; “Race Suicide in Fact,” *Atlanta Constitution*, January 24, 1904; “‘Immorality’ in Best of Menus,” *Chicago Tribune*, January 22, 1905; “Discerns Causes of Race Suicide,” *Chicago Tribune*, August 5, 1905; “Chicago Now Presents Race Suicide Problem,” *Atlanta Constitution*, January 24, 1904.
26. “Some Great Problems,” *Los Angeles Times*, August 20, 1905.
27. “Race Suicide,” *The Baltimore Sun*; “Stork Not in Dollar Race,” *Chicago Tribune*, January 4, 1907.
28. This “moral economy” was less overtly political than that described in E.P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century,” *Past & Present* 50:1 (1971), where the same term helps explain the actions of subordinate groups in response to economic changes they consider unjust.
29. Arguments for integrating economic and ideational factors, rather than opposing them, include David Kertzer, “Religion and the Decline of Fertility: Conclusions” in Frans van Poppel and Renzo Derosas, eds., *Religion and the Decline of Fertility in the Western World* (Dordrecht, 2006); John Casterline, “Introduction” in *Diffusion Processes and Fertility Transition: Selected Perspectives* (Washington, DC, 2001), 1–22. On the self-replication of fertility behavior see Julia A. Jennings, Allison R. Sullivan, and J. David Hacker, “Intergenerational Transmission of Reproductive Behavior during the Demographic Transition,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Volume 42: 4 (Spring 2012).

30. Theodore Roosevelt, “Address to the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church,” May 16, 1908, in *Presidential Addresses and State Papers* (New York, 1910), vol. 7.
31. “Everybody’s Column,” *The Boston Globe*, October 14, 1906; “A Georgia Domestic Tragedy,” *Atlanta Constitution*, June 1, 1905.
32. “Mankind to Fly,” *The Los Angeles Times*, September 13, 1908; “A Woman on the Race Suicide Question,” *The New York Times*, March 1, 1903; “Children of Ghetto District,” *Chicago Tribune*, February 14, 1903; “Topics of the Times,” *The New York Times*, May 13, 1908; “What People Talk About,” *The Boston Globe*, October 6, 1906; “The President and the Babies,” *Chicago Tribune*, March 17, 1905.
33. “A Plea for the Child,” *The New York Times*, September 28, 1902; “Old Stock Will Disappear,” *The Boston Globe*, February 15, 1903. Demographers’ attention has increasingly turned to this sort of “inner-light” religious feeling, as opposed to more formal indicators like church attendance rates. Second demographic transition (SDT) theory, for example, attributes persistent post-1960 subreplacement fertility in the West to “the reduction in religious practice, the abandonment of traditional religious beliefs (heaven, sin, etc.), and a decline in individual sentiments of religiosity (prayer, meditation, etc.).” Using values surveys, SDT theorists have correlated relatively high fertility with, for example, their trust in churches or belief in “the importance of God in life.” Ron Lesthaeghe and Johan Surkyn, “Value Orientations and the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) in Northern, Western and Southern Europe: An Update,” *Demographic Research* 3 [2004], 51, 64. On the importance of shared cultural outlooks within and between religious groups, as opposed to religious doctrine per se, see Kevin McQuillan, *Culture, Religion, and Demographic Behaviour: Catholics and Lutherans in Alsace* (Montreal, 1999) and Ernest Benz, “Family Limitation among Political Catholics in Baden in 1869” in Renzo Derosas and Frans van Poppel, eds., *Religion and the Decline of Fertility in the Western World* (Dordrecht, 2006).
34. Philippe Ariès, “Two Successive Motivations for the Declining Birth Rates in the West,” *Population and Development Review* 6:4 (December, 1980) – the essay that inspired for SDT theory – posits “immutable Nature” rather than codified religiosity as the indispensable element in the “traditional beliefs” which before the 1960s prevented Westerners from limiting fertility more widely. In France, “even the atheists of the eighteenth century condemned [contraceptive practices] as a violation ‘Natural Law,’ the new divinity,” writes Alfred Sauvy in *General Theory of Population* (London, 1969), 362. On naturistic pronatalism in early twentieth-century America see Laura L. Lovett, *Conceiving the Future: Pronatalism, Reproduction, and the Family in the United States, 1890–1938* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2007).
35. “Is Race Suicide Economic Agent?” *Chicago Tribune*, April 2, 1905; “Col. Monroe’s Doctrine,” *The Washington Post*, March 18, 1903; “Marriage Makes Men Brave,” *Chicago Tribune*, March 10, 1907; “City and Children,” *Chicago Tribune*, March 26, 1905; “American Race Has Reached Its Zenith, Educator Says,” *Chicago Tribune*, August 4, 1905. On cities, overcivilization, and race suicide see T.J. Jackson Lears, *No Place of*

- Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880–1920* (New York, 1981), 26–34.
36. “Aid to Race Suicide,” *Chicago Daily Tribune*, June 8, 1904; *The Washington Post*, Mar 8, 1903. Landlords largely retained the right to decline families with children through the 1970s.
 37. *American Architect and Building News*, September 3, 1904; “A Great Man,” *The Boston Globe*, November 15, 1905; “Childless Flat Is Legal,” *Chicago Tribune*, June 7, 1905. Proposals to tax bachelors and childless couples also came before various lawmaking bodies in early twentieth-century America – including at least nineteen state legislatures – though few passed and perhaps none were effective. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, “Taxing Bachelors in America, 1895–1939” in John Tiley, ed., *Studies in the History of Tax Law*, vol.6 (Oxford, 2012).
 38. “Little Talks with Big Men,” *The Washington Post*, December 3, 1905.
 39. Janet Golden, *A Social History of Wet Nursing in America: From Breast to Bottle* (Cambridge, Eng., 1996), 138; *American Journal of Clinical Medicine* 13: 7 (1906).
 40. Roosevelt, “Mother’s Congress Address.”
 41. Theodore Roosevelt, “Message to Congress,” December 3, 1906, in *Presidential Addresses and State Papers* (New York, 1910), vol. 5; “Race Suicide Inevitable,” *The Washington Post*, December 7, 1903; E.A. Ross, “Recent Tendencies in Sociology,” *Quarterly Journal of Economics* (May 1903).
 42. “Large Families or Small?” *The Washington Post*, May 1, 1903; “The Characteristics of Theodore Roosevelt, the Man,” *Washington Post*, March 5, 1905. Another Roosevelt surrogate noted that the White House received countless photos of large families, often with a “jocular inscription,” from readers of “the comic weeklies.” The president was glad to receive these “playful evidences of popular interest in what he has tried to say, although in some cases they reflect painfully a misapprehension of what he really means.” (“The President,” *Ladies’ Home Journal*, February 1906.)
 43. “City and Children,” *Chicago Tribune*, March 26, 1905.
 44. “Reviews of New Books,” *The Washington Post*, November 12, 1904; “Little Babe Bartered Off,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 17, 1904. In a popular 1905 advice manual for young men, Senator Albert Beveridge wrote “Your father made the old home. Prove yourself worthy of him by making the new home . . . What abnormal egotism the attitude of him who says, ‘This planet, and all the uncounted centuries of the past, were made for *me* and nobody else, and I will live accordingly. I will go it alone.’” (Beveridge, *The Young Man and the World* (New York, 1905), 152).
 45. “France’s Race Problem,” *The Washington Post*, December 6, 1907.
 46. “Roosevelt to the Mothers’ Congress,” *The Independent*, March 23, 1905.
 47. Roosevelt to E.A. Ross, September 19, 1907, quoted in Ross, *Sin and Society, An Analysis of Latter-day Iniquity* (Boston, 1907), ix–xi.
 48. “Too Few Children in World,” *Chicago Tribune*, November 25, 1908.

49. “What People Talk About,” *The Boston Globe*, March 30, 1906; “Race Suicide,” *The Boston Globe*, February 14, 1903; “Trusts Bar to Babies,” *The Washington Post*, January 5, 1907.
50. Though education fees surely factored into broadly “economic” rationales for limitation, overall, commentators only mentioned education at the rate of less heralded factors like housing discrimination.
51. “If Poor, Avoid Children,” *Chicago Tribune*, December 23, 1907. On men’s breadwinning role and ambivalence about entering it, see Stephen M. Frank, *Life with Father: Parenthood and Masculinity in the Nineteenth Century American North* (Baltimore, 1998), 83–112. When a son of Lydia Pinkham tried to pass out flyers for his mother’s “Vegetable Compound and Uterine Tonic” to passers-by in New York City, he found that men would accept the offer but women would decline in embarrassment (Janet Farrell Brodie, *Contraception and Abortion in Nineteenth Century America* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1994), 192).
52. “Primitive Squaws,” *Chicago Tribune*, March 8, 1903.
53. *The Washington Post*, September 25, 1904; “State Babies Advocated as a Mercy to Mothers,” *Atlanta Constitution*, May 28, 1905; “Why I Have No Family,” *The Independent*, March 23, 1905.
54. “Race Suicide,” *The Boston Globe*, February 14, 1903.
55. “Why I Do Not Marry,” *The Independent*, June 30, 1904; “Why I Have No Family,” *The Independent*, March 23, 1905. For a similarly themed essay from a man’s perspective, see “‘Race Suicide’ and Common Sense,” *North American Review*, June 1903.
56. Commander, *The American Idea* (New York, 1907), 32. Also on women’s differing interest and agency in family limitation see Carl N. Degler, *At Odds: Women and the Family in America from the Revolution to the Present* (New York, 1980), ch. 8.
57. Commander, *American Idea*, 35.
58. E.g. Ron Lesthaeghe, “The Second Demographic Transition in Western Countries: An Interpretation,” in Karen Oppenheim Mason and An-Magritt Jensen, eds., *Gender and Family Change in Industrialized Countries* (Oxford, 2003 [1995]), 21. Lesthaeghe is a key developer of the benchmark theory of Second Demographic Transition (SDT), which uses large-scale values surveys to describe a sea change in reproductive attitudes and behavior in the 1960s. Before that decade (during the “first” demographic transition) parents across the West altruistically focused greater economic resources on fewer children, leading to below-replacement fertility. From the 1960s onward (the “second” transition) this economic altruism was overlaid with a more hedonic, existentially secure, spiritually questing moral regime, ensuring that fertility stayed below replacement into the present. Sexual and gender revolutions, plus generalized antiauthoritarianism, replaced child-centered “rationalization” with self-actualizing “individualization.” SDT theory’s basic historical narrative receives some support from early twentieth-century U.S. qualitative testimony, but on a different timescale. In American moralists’ eyes familistic altruism and “self-fulfilling” individualism were longstanding and overlapping phenomena rather than sequential developments with a pivot point in the

1960s. Observers saw both trends clearly in both the 1900s and 1920s–30s. In arguing for two successive demographic transitions Lesthaeghe argues that “the ‘one transition’ view simply blurs history,” but blurriness may be a good metaphor for the attitudinal shifts in orientations towards self, society, and the cosmos that abetted fertility transition. Though the “two transitions” schema may be fundamentally valid as a broad cultural narrative, a messy, ambivalent, reversible blur divides these two ideal types. On SDT and American qualitative testimony see Trent MacNamara, “Why ‘Race Suicide’? Cultural Factors in U.S. Fertility Decline, 1903–1908,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 44:4 (2014).

59. “Has the Small Family Become an American Ideal?,” *The Independent*, April 14, 1904; “Mrs. Frake on Babies,” *The Los Angeles Times*, December 9, 1905; “General Decline of Human Fertility in Western Nations,” *Current Literature*, March 1906.
60. “Warning by Two Presidents,” *The Washington Post*, February 15, 1903.
61. “History from the Standpoint of a Biologist,” *The Independent*, April 30, 1903; “The President,” *Ladies’ Home Journal* (February 1906).
62. “Mr. G.H. Wells: The Prophet of The New Order,” *The Arena* (August 1906); “Everybody’s Column,” *The Boston Globe*, October 13, 1907.

Bibliography

- Abbasi-Shavazi, Mohammad Jalal, Peter McDonald, and Meimanat Hosseini-Chavoshi. *The Fertility Transition in Iran: Revolution and Reproduction* (Dordrecht, Neth., 2009)
- Adams, Henry. *The Education of Henry Adams: An Autobiography* (Boston, 1918)
- Ade, George. *Single Blessedness, and Other Observations* (New York, 1922)
- Adsera, Alicia. "Religion and Changes in Family-Size Norms in Developed Countries," *Review of Religious Research* 47:3 (2006)
- Aengst, Jennifer. "The Politics of Fertility: Population and Pronatalism in Ladakh," *Himalaya* 32:1
- Allen, Grant. *Post-Prandial Philosophy* (London, 1894)
- Allen, Nathan. "Changes in New England Population," *Popular Science* (August 1883)
- Allen, Nathan. *Population – Its Law of Increase* (Lowell, Mass., 1870 [1868])
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (New York, 2006 [1983])
- Anderson, Steven D. "KOA" in Christopher H Sterling, ed., *Concise Encyclopedia of American Radio* (New York, 2010)
- Anthias, Floya and Nira Yuval-Davis. "Contextualizing Feminism: Gender, Ethnic and Class Divisions" in Marco Martiniello and Jan Rath, eds., *Selected Studies in International Migration and Immigrant Incorporation* (Amsterdam, 2010)
- Aoki, Reiko. "A Demographic Perspective on Japan's 'Lost Decades,'" *Population and Development Review* 38:51 (2013)
- Ariès, Philippe. "Two Successive Motivations for the Declining Birth Rates in the West," *Population and Development Review* 6:4 (December 1980)
- Armstrong, Elizabeth A. and Mary Bernstein. "Culture, Power, and Institutions: A Multi-Institutional Politics Approach to Social Movements," *Sociological Theory* 26:1 (2008)
- Arnold, Matthew. "In Harmony with Nature" in *Poetical Works* (London, 1891).
- Axinn, William G., Marin E. Clarkberg, and Arland Thornton. "Family Influences on Family Size Preferences," *Demography* 31:1:1 (February 1994)

- Bachrach, Christine A. and S. Philip Morgan. "A Cognitive-Social Model of Fertility Intentions," *Population and Development Review* 39:3 (September 2013)
- Bahr, Howard M. and Kathleen S. Bahr. "Families and Self-Sacrifice: Alternative Models and Meanings for Family Theory" *Social Forces* 79:4 (2001)
- Bailey, Amy Kate. "How Personal Is the Political? Democratic Revolution and Fertility Decline," *Journal of Family History* 34:4 (October 2009)
- Baker, Jean H. *Margaret Sanger: A Life of Passion* (New York, 2011)
- Balbo, Nicoletta and Nicola Barban. "Does Fertility Behavior Spread among Friends?" *American Sociological Review* 79:3 (2014)
- Banks, J.A. *Victorian Values: Secularism and the Size of Families* (London, 1981)
- Banks, J.A. and Olive Banks. *Feminism and Family Planning* (London, 1964)
- Barber, Jennifer, William Axinn, and Arland Thornton. "The Influence of Attitudes on Family Formation Processes" in Ron Lesthaeghe, ed., *Meaning and Choice: Value Orientations and Life Course Decisions* (The Hague, 2002)
- Basten, Stuart and Quanbao Jiang. "Fertility in China: An Uncertain Future," *Population Studies* 69:51 (2015)
- Basu, Alaka Malwade and Sajeda Amin. "Conditioning Factors for Fertility Decline in Bengal: History, Language Identity, and Openness to Innovations," *Population and Development Review* 26:4 (December 2000)
- Bauer, Martin W. "Classical Content Analysis: A Review" in Martin Bauer and George Gaskell, eds., *Qualitative Researching with Text, Image and Sound: A Practical Handbook* (Thousand Oaks, Cal., 2000)
- Bean, Lee L., Geraldine P. Mineau, and Douglas L. Anderton. *Fertility Change on the American Frontier: Adaptation and Innovation* (Berkeley, 1990)
- Beaujot, Roderic, Ching Jiangqin Du, and Zenaida Ravanera. "Family Policies in Quebec and the Rest of Canada: Implications for Fertility, Child-Care, Women's Paid Work, and Child Development Indicators," *Canadian Public Policy* 39:2 (2013)
- Beaujot, Roderic and Juyan Wang. "Low Fertility in Canada: The Nordic Model in Quebec and the US Model in Alberta," *Canadian Studies in Population* 37:3/4 (2010)
- Beck, Ulrich, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash. *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order* (Cambridge, Eng., 1994)
- Beck, Ulrich, Wolfgang Bonss, and Christoph Lau. "The Theory of Reflexive Modernization: Problematic, Hypotheses and Research Programme," *Theory, Culture & Society* 20:2 (2003)
- Becker, Gary S. "An Economic Analysis of Fertility" in Becker, ed., *Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries* (Princeton, 1960)
- Becker, Gary S. and H.G. Lewis. "On the Interaction between the Quantity and Quality of Children," *Journal of Political Economy* 81:2 (1973)
- Bederman, Gail. *Manliness and Civilization: A Cultural History of Gender and Race in the United States, 1880-1917* (Chicago, 1995)
- Beebe, Gilbert Wheeler. *Contraception and Fertility in the Southern Appalachians* (Baltimore, 1942)

- Bellah, Robert N., Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler and Steven M. Tipton. *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (New York, 1985)
- Beisel, Nicola. *Imperiled Innocents: Anthony Comstock and Family Reproduction in Victorian America* (Princeton, 1997)
- Bendroth, Margaret Lamberts. *Growing Up Protestant: Parents, Children, and Mainline Churches* (New Brunswick, N.J., 2002)
- Bengtson, Vern L. *Families and Faith: How Religion is Passed Down across Generations* (Oxford, 2013)
- Benjamin, Daniel J., David Cesarini, Matthijs J. H. M. van der Loos, Christopher T. Dawes, Philipp D. Koellinger, Patrik K. E. Magnusson, Christopher F. Chabris, Dalton Conley, David Laibson, Magnus Johannesson, and Peter M. Visscher, "The Genetic Architecture of Economic and Political Preferences," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 109:21 (2012)
- Benjamin, Louise. "'Controversy for Controversy's Sake'? Feminism and Early Radio Coverage of Birth Control in the U.S." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Communication Association, Dresden, Germany, June 16, 2006
- Bennett, John W. and Seena B. Kohl. *Settling the Canadian-American West, 1890-1915: Pioneer Adaptation and Community Building* (Lincoln, Neb., 1995)
- Benz, Ernest. "Family Limitation among Political Catholics in Baden in 1869" in Renzo Derosas and Frans van Poppel, eds., *Religion and the Decline of Fertility in the Western World* (Dordrecht, 2006)
- Berkman, Joyce. "The Fertility of Scholarship on the History of Reproductive Rights in the United States" *History Compass* 9:5 (2011)
- Beveridge, Albert. *The Young Man and the World* (New York, 1905)
- Bijak, Jakub, Dorota Kupiszewska, and Marek Kupiszewski. "Replacement Migration Revisited: Simulations of the Effects of Selected Population and Labor Market Strategies for the Aging Europe, 2002-2052," *Population Research and Policy Review* 27:3 (2008)
- Billings, John S. "The Diminishing Birth-Rate in the United States," *Forum* 15 (August 1893)
- Binion, Rudolph. "Marianne in the Home: Political Revolution and Fertility Transition in France and the United States," *Population: An English Selection* 13 (2001)
- Blake, Judith. "Coercive Pronatalism and American Population Policy" in Ellen Peck and Judith Senderowitz, eds., *Pronatalism: The Myth of Mom and Apple Pie* (New York, 1974)
- Bledsoe, Caroline. *Contingent Lives: Fertility, Time, and Aging in West Africa* (Chicago, 2002)
- Blight, David W. "The Memory Boom: Why and Why Now?" in Pascal Boyer and James V. Wertsch, eds., *Memory in Mind and Culture* (Cambridge, Eng., 2009)
- Blom, Ida. "Master of Your Own Body and What Is in It - Reducing Marital Fertility in Norway, 1890-1930" in Angelique Janssens, ed., *Gendering the Fertility Decline in the Western World* (Bern, 2007)

- Bloom, David E., David Canning, Günther Fink, and Jocelyn Finlay. "The Cost of Low Fertility in Europe," *European Journal of Population* 26:2 (2010)
- Bongaarts, John and Susan Cotts Watkins, "Social Interactions and Contemporary Fertility Transitions," *Population and Development Review* 22:4 (December 1996)
- Botev, Nikolai. "Could Pronatalist Policies Discourage Childbearing?" *Population and Development Review* 41:2 (2015)
- Boydston, Jeanne. "Gender as a Question of Historical Analysis," *Gender & History* 20:3 (2008)
- Brandt, Allan M. *No Magic Bullet: A Social History of Venereal Disease in the United States* (Oxford, 1987)
- Brodie, Janet Farrell. *Contraception and Abortion in Nineteenth Century America* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1994)
- Bryant, John. "Theories of Fertility Decline and the Evidence from Development Indicators," *Population and Development Review* 33:1 (March 2007)
- Bryce, James. *The American Commonwealth*, vol. 2 (London, 1888)
- Bullough, Vern, ed., *Encyclopedia of Birth Control* (Santa Barbara, Cal., 2001)
- Burch, Thomas K. "Demography in a New Key: A Theory of Population Theory" *Demographic Research* 9 (2003)
- Burnham, John C. *Health Care in America: A History* (Baltimore, Md., 2015)
- Butz, William P. "First, Do No Harm," *Vienna Yearbook of Population Research* (2008)
- Byers, Edward. "Fertility Transition in an Early New England Commercial Center: Nantucket, Ma., 1680-1840," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 13 (1982)
- Cain, Mead. "The Economic Activities of Children in a Village in Bangladesh," *Population and Development Review* 3:3, 1977
- Caldwell, John C. "Demographic Theory: A Long View," *Population and Development Review* 30:2 (2004)
- Caldwell, John C. "On Net Intergenerational Wealth Flows: An Update," *Population and Development Review* 31:4 (December 2005)
- Caldwell, John C. "Three Fertility Compromises and Two Transitions," *Population Research and Policy Review* 27:4 (2008)
- Caldwell, John C., Barkat-e-Khuda, Bruce Caldwell, Indrani Pieris and Pat Caldwell, "The Bangladesh Fertility Decline: An Interpretation," *Population and Development Review* 25:1 (March 1999)
- Calhoun, Arthur. *A Social History of the American Family from Colonial Times to the Present*, vol. III (Cleveland, 1919)
- Calvert, John. *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism* (Oxford, 2013)
- Campo-Engelstein, Lisa. "Contraceptive Responsibility: Trust, Gender and Ideology," Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University (2009)
- Carey, James. "A Cultural Approach to Communication" in Carey, ed., *Communication as Culture: Essays on Media and Society* (New York, 2009 [1975])
- Caron, Simone. *Who Chooses? American Reproductive History since 1830* (Gainesville, Fl., 2008)

- Carr-Saunders, A.M. *The Population Problem: A Study in Human Evolution* (Oxford, 1922)
- Carter, Susan B., Roger L. Ransom, and Richard Sutch. "Family Matters: The Life-Cycle Transition and the Antebellum American Fertility Decline" in Timothy Guinnane, William Sundstrom and Warren Whatley, eds., *History Matters: Essays on Economic Growth, Technology, and Demographic Change* (Palo Alto, 2004)
- Casterline, John B. "Introduction" in Casterline, ed., *Diffusion Processes and Fertility Transition: Selected Perspectives* (Washington, D.C., 2001)
- Charles, Enid. *The Practice of Birth Control: An Analysis of the Birth Control Experiences of Nine Hundred Women* (London, 1932)
- Charles, Enid. *The Twilight of Parenthood* (London, 1934)
- Cherlin, Andrew. *Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage* (Cambridge, Mass., 1992 [1981])
- Chesler, Ellen. *Woman of Valor: Margaret Sanger and the Birth Control Movement in America* (New York, 1992)
- Chudacoff, Howard P. *The Age of the Bachelor: Creating an American Subculture* (Princeton, 1999)
- Cleland, John and Christopher Wilson, "Demand Theories of the Fertility Transition: An Iconoclastic View," *Population Studies*, 41 (March 1987)
- Clement, Elizabeth Alice. *Love for Sale: Courting, Treating, and Prostitution in New York City, 1900-1945* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2006)
- Coale, Ansley and Susan Cotts Watkins, eds., *The Decline of Fertility in Europe* (Princeton, 1986)
- Coale, Ansley J. and Melvin Zelnik. *New Estimates of Fertility and Population in the United States* (Princeton, 1963)
- Cohen, Lizabeth. *A Consumer's Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York, 2003)
- Coleman, David. "Why We Don't Have to Believe without Doubting in the 'Second Demographic Transition': Some Agnostic Comments," *Vienna Yearbook of Population Research* 2 (2004)
- Coleman, David and Stuart Basten. "The Death of the West: An Alternative View," *Population Studies* 69:51 (2015)
- Coleman, David. Review of Jonathan V. Last, "What to Expect When No One's Expecting: America's Coming Demographic Disaster," *Population and Development Review* 39:4 (December 2013)
- Coleman, David. "Immigration and Ethnic Change in Low-Fertility Countries: A Third Demographic Transition," *Population and Development Review* 32:3 (September 2006)
- Commander, Lydia Kingsmill. *The American Idea: Does the National Tendency Toward a Small Family Point to Race Suicide or Race Development?* (New York, 1907)
- Connelly, Matthew. *Fatal Misconception: The Struggle to Control World Population* (Cambridge, Mass., 2008)
- Cooke, Kathy J. "The Limits of Heredity: Nature and Nurture in American Eugenics before 1915," *Journal of the History of Biology* 31:2 (1998)
- Cooley, Charles Horton. *Human Nature and the Social Order* (New York, 1902).

- Cooley, Charles Horton. *Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind* (New York, 1911)
- Cooper, James F. *Technique of Contraception: The Principles and Practice of Anti-Conceptional Methods* (New York, 1928)
- Cooper, James F. *An Outline of Contraceptive Methods* (New York, 1930)
- Cooper, John M. *Birth Control* (Washington, D.C., 1923)
- Cott, Nancy F. "Passionlessness: An Interpretation of Victorian Sexual Ideology, 1790-1850," *Signs* 4: 2 (Winter 1978)
- Cott, Nancy. *Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation* (Cambridge, Mass., 2000)
- Craig, Lee A. *To Sow One Acre More: Childbearing and Farm Productivity in the Antebellum North* (Baltimore, 1993)
- Cunningham, Mick. "The Influence of Parental Attitudes and Behaviors on Children's Attitudes toward Gender and Household Labor in Early Adulthood," *Journal of Marriage and Family* 63 (2001)
- Danborn, David B. *Sod Busting: How Families Made Farms on the Nineteenth-Century Plains* (Baltimore, 2014)
- Darnton, Robert. "The Library in the New Age," *New York Review of Books*, June 12, 2008
- David, Paul A. and Warren C. Sanderson. "Rudimentary Contraceptive Methods and the American Transition to Marital Fertility Control, 1855-1915," in Stanley L. Engerman and Robert E. Gallman, eds., *Long-Term Factors in American Economic Growth* (Chicago, 1986)
- David, Paul A. and Warren C. Sanderson. "The Emergence of a Two-Child Norm among American Birth-Controllers," *Population and Development Review* 13:1 (1987)
- Davies, Margaret Llewelyn, ed. *Maternity: Letters from Working Women* (London, 1978 [1915])
- Davis, David Brion. *The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823* (New York, 1999 [1975])
- Davis, Katherine B. *Factors in the Sex Life of Twenty-Two Hundred Women* (New York, 1929)
- Davis, Kingsley and Pietronella van den Oever. "Demographic Foundations of New Sex Roles," *Population and Development Review* 8:3 (1982)
- Davis, Rebecca L. "'Not Marriage at All, but Simple Harlotry': The Companionate Marriage Controversy," *Journal of American History* 94:4 (2008).
- DeFleur, Melvin L. and Sandra Ball-Rokeach. *Theories of Mass Communication* (New York, 1975)
- Degler, Carl N. *At Odds: Women and the Family in America from the Revolution to the Present* (New York, 1980)
- Degler, Carl N. "What Ought to Be and What Was: Women's Sexuality in the Nineteenth Century," *American Historical Review* 79 (1974)
- Delbanco, Andrew. *The Real American Dream: A Meditation on Hope* (Cambridge, Mass., 1999)
- Demeny, Paul. "Population Policy and the Demographic Transition: Performance, Prospects, and Options," *Population and Development Review* 37:SI (2011)

- Demeny, Paul. "Population Policy Dilemmas in Europe at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century," *Population and Development Review* 29 (2003)
- Demeny, Paul. "Sub-Replacement Fertility in National Populations: Can It Be Raised?" *Population Studies* 69:51 (2015)
- Demos, John. *Circles and Lines: The Shape of Life in Early America* (Cambridge, Mass., 2004)
- Derose, Laurie F. and Alex Ezeh. "Men's Influence on the Onset and Progress of Fertility Decline in Ghana, 1988–98," *Population Studies* 59:2 (July 2005)
- Derose, Laurie F., F. Nii-Amoo Dodoo, Vrushali Patil. "Fertility Desires and Perceptions of Power in Reproductive Conflict in Ghana," *Gender and Society* 16:1 (February 2002)
- Dickinson, Robert L. and Lura Beam. *A Thousand Marriages: A Medical Study of Sex Adjustment* (Baltimore, 1931)
- Du Bois, W.E.B. *The Negro Family* (Atlanta, 1908)
- Dumont, Arsène. *Depopulation and Civilization: A Demographic Study* (1990 [1890])
- Dyer, Thomas G. *Theodore Roosevelt and the Idea of Race* (Baton Rouge, La., 1980)
- Easterlin, Richard, George Alter, and Gretchen Condran. "Farms and Farm Families in Old and New Areas: The Northern States in 1860" in Maris Vinovskis and Tamara Herve, eds., *Family and Population in Nineteenth-Century America* (Princeton, 1978)
- Easterlin, Richard. "The Economics and Sociology of Fertility: A Synthesis," in Charles Tilly, ed., *Historical Studies in Changing Fertility* (Princeton, 1978)
- Eberstadt, Nicholas. "Drunken Nation: Russia's Depopulation Bomb," *World Affairs* (Spring 2009)
- Edvinsson, Sören and Sofia Kling. "The Practice of Birth Control and Historical Fertility Change: Introduction," *The History of the Family* 15 (June 2010)
- Elder, Glen, Jr. *Children of the Great Depression: Social Change in Life Experience* (Chicago, 1974)
- Engelman, Peter. *A History of the Birth Control Movement in America* (Santa Barbara, Cal., 2011)
- Esping-Andersen, Gøsta and Francesco Billari. "Re-theorizing Family Demographics," *Population and Development Review* 41 (2015)
- European Commission, *Europe's Demographic Future: Facts and Figures on Challenges and Opportunities*, pt. 3 (2007)
- Everaert, Huub. "Changes in Fertility and Mortality around the Abolition of Slavery in Suriname," *The History of the Family* 16:3 (August 2011)
- Fass, Paula S. *The Damned and the Beautiful: American Youth in the 1920s* (Oxford, 1979)
- Fass, Paula S. *The End of American Childhood: A History of Parenting from Life on the Frontier to the Managed Child* (Princeton, 2016)
- Fellman, Anita Clair and Michael Fellman. *Making Sense of Self: Medical Advice Literature in Late Nineteenth Century America* (Philadelphia, 1981)
- Finer, Lawrence B. and Mia R. Zolna. "Unintended Pregnancy in the United States: Incidence and Disparities, 2006," *Contraception* 84:5 (November 2011)

- Fisher, Kate. *Birth Control, Sex, and Marriage in Britain, 1918–1960* (Oxford, 2006)
- Fite, Warner. “Birth Control and Biological Ethics,” *International Journal of Ethics* (October 1916)
- Folbre, Nancy. *Greed, Lust and Gender: A History of Economic Ideas* (Oxford, 2010)
- Fordham, Elias Pym. *Personal Narrative of Travels in Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, Kentucky; and of a Residence in Illinois Territory: 1817–1818* [Frederic Austin Ogg, ed.] (Cleveland, 1906)
- Forster, Colin and Graham Tucker. *Economic Opportunity and White American Fertility Ratios: 1800–1860* (New Haven, Ct., 1972)
- Fortner, Robert S. *Radio, Morality, and Culture: Britain, Canada, and the United States, 1919–1945* (Carbondale, Ill., 2005)
- Fowler, James H. and Christopher T. Dawes. “In Defense of Genopolitics,” *American Political Science Review* 107:2 (May 2013).
- Frank, Stephen M. *Life with Father: Parenthood and Masculinity in the Nineteenth Century American North* (Baltimore, 1998)
- Franklin, Benjamin. “Observations Concerning the Increase of Mankind” (1751) in Alfred Henry Smith, ed., *Writings of Benjamin Franklin*, vol. III (New York, 1907)
- Franks, Angela. *Margaret Sanger’s Eugenic Legacy: The Control of Fertility* (Jefferson, N.C., 2005)
- Freedman, Estelle B. “‘Crimes which Startle and Horrify’: Gender, Age, and the Racialization of Sexual Violence in White American Newspapers, 1870–1900,” *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 20:3 (2011)
- Freedman, Estelle B. and John D’Emilio. *Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America* (New York, 1988)
- Frejka, Tomas and Charles F. Westoff. “Religion, Religiousness and Fertility in the U.S. and in Europe,” *European Journal of Population* 24:1 (2008)
- Frejka, Tomas and Sergei Zakharov. “The Apparent Failure of Russia’s Pronatalist Family Policies,” *Population and Development Review* 39:4 (2013)
- Friedlander, Dov, Barbara S. Okun, and Sharon Sega. “The Demographic Transition Then and Now: Processes, Perspectives, and Analyses,” *Journal of Family History* 24:4 (1999)
- Gauthier, Anne H. and Dimitir Philipov. “Can Policies Enhance Fertility in Europe?” *Vienna Yearbook of Population Research* (2008)
- Gecas, Viktor and Monica A. Seff. “Families and Adolescents: A Review of the 1980s,” *Journal of Marriage and Family* 52:4 (November 1990)
- Gere, Anne Ruggles. *Intimate Practices: Literacy and Cultural Work in U.S. Women’s Clubs, 1880–1920* (Urbana, Ill., 1997)
- Gerstle, Gary. “Theodore Roosevelt and the Divided Character of American Nationalism,” *Journal of American History* 86:3 (December 1999)
- Gibson, Campbell. “*Population of the 100 Largest Cities and Other Urban Places in the United States: 1790 to 1990*” (Washington, 1998)
- Giddens, Anthony. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age* (Palo Alto, 1991)

- Giddens, Anthony. *The Consequences of Modernity* (Palo Alto, 1990)
- Gilfoyle, Timothy. *City of Eros: New York City, Prostitution, and the Commercialization of Sex* (New York, 1994)
- Gipson, Jessica and Michelle Hindin. "The Effect of Husbands' and Wives' Fertility Preferences on the Likelihood of a Subsequent Pregnancy, Bangladesh 1998–2003," *Population Studies* 63:2 (July 2009)
- Glass, Jennifer, Vern L. Bengtson and Charlotte Chorn Dunham. "Attitude Similarity in Three-Generation Families: Socialization, Status Inheritance, or Reciprocal Influence?" *American Sociological Review* 51:5 (October 1986)
- Glynn, Carroll, Susan Herbst, Garrett O'Keefe, and Robert Y. Shapiro. *Public Opinion* (Boulder, Colo., 1999)
- Golden, Janet. *A Social History of Wet Nursing in America: From Breast to Bottle* (Cambridge, Eng., 1996)
- Goldscheider, Calvin and William D. Mosher. "Patterns of Contraceptive Use in the United States: The Importance of Religious Beliefs," *Studies in Family Planning* 22 (1991)
- Goldstein, Cynthia. *The Press and the Beginning of the Birth Control Movement in the United States* (Ph.D. diss., Pennsylvania State University, 1985)
- Goldstone, Jack A., Eric P. Kaufmann and Monica Duffy Toft, eds., *Political Demography: How Population Changes are Reshaping International Security and National Politics* (Boulder, Col., 2012)
- Gordon, Linda. *The Moral Property of Women: A History of Birth Control Politics in America* (Urbana, Ill., 2002)
- Gordon, Linda. *Woman's Body, Woman's Right: A Social History of Birth Control in America* (New York, 1976)
- Gornick, Janet and Marcia K. Meyers, eds., *Gender Equality: Transforming Family Divisions of Labor* (London, 2009)
- Greenhalgh, Susan. "Anthropology Theorizes Reproduction: Integrating Practice, Political Economic, and Feminist Perspectives" in Susan Greenhalgh, ed., *Situating Fertility: Anthropology and Demographic Inquiry* (Cambridge, Eng., 1995)
- Gurstein, Rochelle. *The Repeal of Reticence: A History of America's Cultural and Legal Struggles Over Free Speech, Obscenity, Sexual Liberation, and Modern Art* (New York, 1996)
- Hacker, J. David. "Child Naming, Religion, and the Decline of Marital Fertility in Nineteenth-Century America," *The History of the Family* 4:3 (1999)
- Hacker, J. David. "Rethinking the 'Early' Decline of Marital Fertility in the United States," *Demography* 40 (2003)
- Haines, Michael R. and Avery M. Guest. "Fertility in New York State in the Pre-Civil War Era," *Demography* 45 (2008)
- Hajo, Cathy Moran. *Birth Control on Main Street: Organizing Clinics in the United States, 1916–1939* (Urbana, Ill., 2010)
- Hall, Ruth, ed., *Dear Dr. Stopes: Sex in the 1920s* (London, 1978)
- Haller, John S. and Robin M. Haller. *The Physician and Sexuality in Victorian America* (Urbana, Ill., 1974)

- Hammel, E.A. "Theory of Culture for Demography," *Population and Development Review* 13:3 (1990)
- Hansen, Randall and Desmond King. *Sterilized by the State: Eugenics, Race, and the Population Scare in Twentieth Century America* (Cambridge, Eng., 2013)
- Harper, John Paull. 'Be fruitful and multiply': *The reaction to family limitation in nineteenth-century America* (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1975).
- Hatemi, Peter K., Nathan A. Gillespie, Lindon J. Eaves, Brion S. Maher, Bradley T. Webb, Andrew C. Heath, Sarah E. Medland, David C. Smyth, Harry N. Beeby, Scott D. Gordon, Grant W. Montgomery, Ghu Zhu, Enda M. Byrne, and Nicholas G. Martin. "A Genome-Wide Analysis of Liberal and Conservative Political Attitudes," *Journal of Politics* 73:1 (January 2011)
- Hayford, Sarah R. and S. Philip Morgan. "Religiosity and Fertility in the United States: The Role of Fertility Intentions," *Social Forces* 86:3 (2008)
- Heady, Patrick. "Fertility as a Process of Social Exchange," *Demographic Research* 17 (2007)
- Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky. *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (1988)
- Himes, Norman E. *Medical History of Contraception* (New York, 1963 [1936])
- Hirschman, Charles. "Why Fertility Changes," *Annual Review of Sociology* 20 (1994)
- Hitlin, Steven and Jane Allyn Piliavin. "Values: Reviving a Dormant Concept," *Annual Review of Sociology* 30 (2004)
- Hodgson, Dennis. "Demography as Social Science and Policy Science" *Population and Development Review* 9:1 (March 1983)
- Hoffert, Sylvia D. *Private Matters: American Attitudes toward Childbearing and Infant Nurture in the Urban North, 1800-1860* (Urbana, Ill., 1989)
- Holz, Rosemarie Petra. *The Birth Control Clinic in a Marketplace World* (Rochester, N.Y., 2012)
- Houellebecq, Michel. *Submission* (New York, 2015)
- Hout, Michael, Andrew Greeley, and Melissa J. Wilde. "The Demographic Imperative in Religious Change in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology* 107:2 (September 2001)
- Hoyert, D.L. "Maternal Mortality and Related Concepts," *National Center for Health Statistics, Vital Health Stat* 3:33 (2007)
- Hyatt, Harry Middleton. *Folk-Lore from Adams County Illinois* (New York: 1935)
- Inglehart, Ronald and Wayne E. Baker. "Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values," *American Sociological Review* 65:1 (February 2000)
- Inkeles, Alex and David H. Smith. *Becoming Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing Countries* (Cambridge, Mass., 1974)
- Inkeles, Alex. *Exploring Individual Modernity* (New York, 2013 [1983])
- Jameson, Elizabeth. *All that Glitters: Class, Conflict, and Community in Cripple Creek* (Urbana, Ill., 1998)
- Janssens, Angélique, ed., *Gendering the Fertility Decline in the Western World* (Bern, 2007)

- Jennings, M. Kent, Laura Stoker and Jake Bowers. "Politics across Generations: Family Transmission Reexamined," *The Journal of Politics* 71:3 (July 2009)
- Johansen, Shawn. *Family Men: Middle-Class Fatherhood in Industrializing America* (Abingdon, Eng., 2015 [2001])
- Johnson-Hanks, Jennifer A., Christine A. Bachrach, S. Philip Morgan, and Hans-Peter Kohler. *Understanding Family Change and Variation: Toward a Theory of Conjunctural Action* (Dordrecht, 2011)
- Johnson-Hanks, Jennifer. "Demographic Transitions and Modernity," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 37 (October 2008)
- Johnson-Hanks, Jennifer. "On the Modernity of Traditional Contraception: Time and the Social Context of Fertility," *Population and Development Review* 28:2 (2002)
- Johnson-Hanks, Jennifer. *Uncertain Honor: Modern Motherhood in an African Crisis* (Chicago, 2006)
- Juergensmeyer, Mark. *Global Rebellion: Religious Challenges to the Secular State* (Berkeley, 2008)
- Kalwij, Adriaan. "The Impact of Family Policy Expenditure on Fertility in Western Europe," *Demography* 47:2 (May 2010)
- Kanaanah, Rhoda Ann. *Birthing the Nation: Strategies of Palestinian Women in Israel* (Berkeley, 2002)
- Kaufmann, Eric P. *Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth: Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century* (London, 2010)
- Kennedy, David M. *Birth Control in America: The Career of Margaret Sanger* (New Haven, 1970)
- Kertzer, David I. "Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches to Historical Demography," *Population and Development Review*, 23 (December, 1997)
- Kertzer, David I. and Dennis P. Hogan, *Family, Political Economy, and Demographic Change: The Transformation of Life in Casalecchio, Italy, 1861-1921* (Madison, Wisc., 1989)
- Kertzer, David I. and Tom Fricke, eds. *Anthropological Demography: Toward a New Synthesis* (Chicago, 1997)
- Kevels, Daniel J. *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity* (Berkeley, 1985)
- Khawaja, Marwan. "The Recent Rise in Palestinian Fertility: Permanent or Transient?" *Population Studies* 54:3 (2000)
- King, Rosalind Berkowitz. *Women's Fertility in Late Modernity* (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Pennsylvania, 2000)
- Kinsey, Alfred. *Sex Behavior in the Human Male* (Bloomington, Ind., 1998 [1948])
- Kiser, Clyde. "The Indianapolis Fertility Study: An Example of Planned Observational Research," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 17:4 (1953)
- Klandermans, Bert and Conny Roggeband, eds. *Handbook of Social Movements across Disciplines* (New York, 2009)
- Klein, Herbert. *A Population History of the United States* (Cambridge, Eng., 2004)
- Klepp, Susan E. *Revolutionary Conceptions: Women, Fertility, and Family Limitation in America, 1760-1820* (Chapel Hill, 2009)

- Kling, Sofia. "I Think I'd Rather Die than Go through with a Pregnancy Again." Experiences of Childbearing and Birth Control in Sweden in the 1930s" in Janssens, ed., *Gendering the Fertility Decline* (Bern, 2007)
- Kneeland, George with Katherine Bement Davis. *Commercialized Prostitution in New York City* (New York, 1913)
- Knowlton, Charles. *Fruits of Philosophy* (1832)
- Kohler, Hans-Peter, Jere R. Behrman, and Susan C. Watkins. "The Density of Social Networks and Fertility Decisions: Evidence from South Nyanza District, Kenya," *Demography* 38:1 (2001)
- Koonz, Claudia. *Mothers in the Fatherland: Women, the Family and Nazi Politics* (Abingdon, Eng., 1986)
- Kopp, Marie E. *Birth Control in Practice: Analysis of Ten Thousand Case Histories of the Birth Control Clinical Research Bureau* (New York, 1930)
- Kornhauser, Marjorie E. "Taxing Bachelors in America, 1895-1939" in John Tiley, ed., *Studies in the History of Tax Law*, vol. 6 (Cambridge, Eng., 2013)
- Kramer, Karen. *Maya Children: Helpers at the Farm* (Cambridge, Mass., 2009)
- Krause, Elizabeth. *A Crisis of Births: Population Politics and Family-making in Italy* (Belmont, Cal., 2005)
- Kreager, Philip. "Aristotle and Open Population Thinking," *Population and Development Review* 34:4 (December 2008)
- Kreager, Philip. "Demographic Regimes as Cultural Systems" in David Coleman, ed., *The State of Population Theory* (Oxford, 1986)
- Krippendorff, Klaus. *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology* (Thousand Oaks, Cal., 2013)
- Kuczynski, R.R. "Fecundity of the Native and Foreign-Born Population in Massachusetts," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 16 (1901)
- Kulu, Hill et al. "Fertility by Birth Order among the Descendants of Immigrants in Selected European Countries," *Population and Development Review* 43 (2017)
- Kyvig, David. *Repealing National Prohibition* (Chicago, 1979)
- Ladd-Taylor, Molly, ed. *Raising a Baby the Government Way: Mothers' Letters to the Children's Bureau, 1915-1932* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1986)
- Laqueur, Walter. *The Last Days of Europe: Epitaph for an Old Continent* (New York, 2007)
- Laqueur, Thomas W. *Solitary Sex: A Cultural History of Masturbation* (New York, 2004)
- Larsen, Charles. *The Good Fight: The Life and Times of Ben B. Lindsey* (Chicago, 1972)
- Lasch, Christopher. *The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations* (New York, 1979)
- Lears, Jackson. *No Place of Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture, 1880-1920* (New York, 1981)
- Leasure, J. William. "A Hypothesis about the Decline of Fertility: Evidence from the United States," *European Journal of Population* 5:1 (1989)
- Leavitt, Judith Walzer. *Brought to Bed: Childbearing in America, 1750-1950* (Oxford, 1986)

- Lee, Ronald. "Intergenerational Transfers, the Biological Life Cycle, and Human Society," *Population and Development Review* 38:51 (February 2013)
- Leet, Don R. "Population Pressure and Human Fertility Response: Ohio, 1810–1860," *The Journal of Economic History* 34:1 (March 1974)
- Leete, Richard, ed., *Dynamics of Values in Fertility Change* (Oxford, 1999)
- Lesthaeghe, Ron. "A Century of Demographic and Cultural Change in Western Europe: An Exploration of Underlying Dimensions," *Population and Development Review* 9:3 (1983)
- Lesthaeghe, Ron. "The Second Demographic Transition in Western Countries: An Interpretation" in Karen Oppenheim Mason and An-Magritt Jensen, eds., *Gender and Family Change in Industrialized Countries* (Oxford, 2003 [1995]), 21
- Lesthaeghe, Ron. "The Unfolding Story of the Second Demographic Transition," *Population and Development Review* 36:2 (2010)
- Lesthaeghe, Ron and Lisa Neidert. "The Second Demographic Transition in the United States: Exception or Textbook Example?" *Population and Development Review*, 32:4 (2006)
- Lesthaeghe, Ron and Johan Surkyn. "Cultural Dynamics and Economic Theories of Fertility Change," *Population and Development Review* 14:1 (Mar., 1988)
- Lesthaeghe, Ron and Johan Surkyn. "Value Orientations and the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) in Northern, Western and Southern Europe: An Update," *Demographic Research* 3 (2004)
- Lesthaeghe, Ron and Chris Wilson. "Modes of Production, Secularization, and the Pace of Fertility Decline in Western Europe, 1870–1930," in *The Decline of Fertility in Europe*, Ansley J. Coale and Susan Cotts Watkins, eds., (Princeton, 1986)
- Lewis, Alfred Henry, ed. *Speeches and Messages of Theodore Roosevelt, 1901–1905* (Washington, D.C., 1906)
- Lewis, Jan and Kenneth A. Lockridge. "'Sally Has Been Sick': Pregnancy and Family Limitation among Virginia Gentry Women, 1780–1830," *Journal of Social History* 22 (Autumn, 1988)
- Lichtenberger, James P. *Divorce: A Study in Social Causation* (New York, 1909)
- Lincoln, Abraham. "Second Annual Message to Congress," December 1, 1862
- Lincoln, Edward J. "Japan's Long-Term Economic Challenges," *Comparative Economic Studies* 53:3 (2011)
- Lindsey, Ben B. and Wainwright Evans. *The Companionate Marriage* (Garden City, N.Y., 1929 [1927])
- Lippmann, Walter. *A Preface to Morals* (New York, 1929)
- Lippmann, Walter. *Public Opinion* (New York, 1922)
- Livi Bacci, Massimo. "Too Few Children and Too Much Family," *Daedalus* 130:3 (2001)
- Longman, Phillip. "The Return of Patriarchy," *Foreign Policy* 153 (2006)
- Longman, Phillip. *The Empty Cradle: How Falling Birthrates Threaten World Prosperity (And What to Do About It)* (New York, 2004)
- Lovett, Laura. *Conceiving the Future: Pronatalism, Reproduction and the Family in the United States, 1890–1930* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2007)

- Luker, Kristin. *Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood* (Berkeley, 1984)
- Lutz, Wolfgang, Vegard Skirbekk, and Maria Rita Testa. "The Low-Fertility Trap Hypothesis: Forces that May Lead to Further Postponement and Fewer Births in Europe," *Vienna Yearbook of Population Research* 4 (2006)
- Lynch, Katherine A. "Theoretical and Analytical Approaches to Religious Beliefs, Values, and Identities during the Modern Fertility Transition" in Derosas and van Poppel, eds., *Religion and the Decline of Fertility*
- Lynd, Robert S. and Helen Merrell Lynd. *Middletown: A Study in American Culture* (New York, 1929)
- Lynd, Robert S. and Helen Merrell Lynd. *Middletown in Transition: A Study in Cultural Conflicts* (New York, 1937)
- Lystra, Karen. *Searching the Heart: Women, Men, and Romantic Love in Nineteenth-Century America* (Oxford, 1987)
- MacKellar, Landis, Tatiana Ermolieva, David Horlacher, and Leslie Mayhew. *The Economic Impacts of Population Ageing in Japan* (Northampton, Mass., 2004)
- Mackinnon, Alison. "Were Women Present at the Demographic Transition? Questions from a Feminist Historian to Historical Demographers," *Gender & History* 7 (1995)
- MacNamara, Trent. "Why 'Race Suicide'? Cultural Factors in U.S. Fertility Decline, 1903–1908," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 44:4 (2014)
- Main, Gloria L. "Rocking the Cradle: Downsizing the New England Family," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 37:1 (2006)
- Martinelli, Alberto. *Global Modernization: Rethinking the Project of Modernity* (Thousand Oaks, Cal., 2005)
- Mason, Karen Oppenheim and Herbert L. Smith. "Husbands' versus Wives' Fertility Goals and Use of Contraception: The Influence of Gender Context in Five Asian Countries," *Demography* 37:3 (2000)
- Mason, Karen Oppenheim. "Explaining Fertility Transitions," *Demography* 34:4 (November 1997)
- May, Dean L. *Three Frontiers: Family, Land, and Society in the American West, 1850–1900* (Cambridge, Eng., 1994)
- May, Elaine Tyler. *Great Expectations: Marriage and Divorce in Post-Victorian America* (Chicago, 1980)
- May, Elaine Tyler. *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era* (New York, 2008 [1988])
- Macleod, David I. *The Age of the Child: Children in America, 1890–1920* (New York, 1998)
- McCann, Carole Ruth. *Birth Control Politics in the United States, 1916–1945* (Ithaca, 1999)
- McCurdy, John Gilbert. *Citizen Bachelors: Manhood and the Creation of the United States* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2009)
- McDonald, Peter. "Gender Equity in Theories of Fertility Transition," *Population and Development Review* 26 (2000)
- McDonald, Peter. "Low Fertility and the State: The Efficacy of Policy," *Population and Development Review* 32:3 (September 2006)

- McLaren, Angus and Arlene Tigar McLaren. *The Bedroom and the State: The Changing Practices and Politics of Contraception and Abortion in Canada, 1880-1980* (Toronto, 1997)
- McLaren, Angus. *A History of Contraception: From Antiquity to the Present Day* (Cambridge, Mass., 1990)
- McLaren, Angus. *Sexuality and Social Order: The Debate over the Fertility of Women and Workers in France, 1770-1920* (New York, 1983)
- McLaren, Angus. *Twentieth Century Sexuality: A History* (Oxford, 1999)
- McNicoll, Geoffrey. "Legacy, Policy, and Circumstance in Fertility Transition," *Population and Development Review* 35:4 (December 2009)
- McNicoll, Geoffrey. "Reflections on Post-Transition Demography," *Population and Development Review* 38:SI (2013)
- McNicoll, Geoffrey. "Taking Stock of Population Studies: A Review Essay," *Population and Development Review* 33:3 (2007)
- McQuade, Lena. "Troubling Reproduction: Sexuality, Race, and Colonialism in New Mexico, 1919-1945," Ph.D. dissertation, University of New Mexico (2008)
- McQuillan, Kevin. *Culture, Religion, and Demographic Behaviour: Catholics and Lutherans in Alsace, 1750-1870* (Montreal, 1999)
- Mencken, H.L. *In Defense of Women* (New York, 1922)
- Meyer, Wilkinson and Jimmy Elaine. *Any Friend of the Movement: Networking for Birth Control, 1920-1940* (Columbus, Oh., 2004)
- Meyerowitz, Joanne. "Beyond the Feminine Mystique: A Reassessment of Postwar Mass Culture, 1946-1958," *Journal of American History* 79:4 (March 1993)
- Mintz, Steven and Susan Kellogg. *Domestic Revolutions: A Social History of American Family Life* (New York, 1987)
- Moen, Phyllis, Mary Ann Erickson and Donna Dempster-McClain. "Their Mother's Daughters? The Intergenerational Transmission of Gender Attitudes in a World of Changing Roles," *Journal of Marriage and the Family* 59 (1997)
- Mohr, James. *Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of National Policy* (Oxford, 1979)
- Molnos, Angela. *Attitudes towards Family Planning in East Africa* (Munich, 1968)
- Montaigne, Michel. *Works*, ed., and trans. William Hazlitt (London, 1845)
- Montgomery, Mark R. and Woojin Chung. "Social Networks and the Diffusion of Fertility Control in the Republic of Korea" in Richard Leete, ed., *Dynamics of Values in Fertility Change* (Oxford, 1999)
- Montgomery, Mark R. and John B. Casterline. "Social Learning, Social Influence, and New Models of Fertility," *Population and Development Review* 22:SI (1996)
- More, Louise Bolard. *Wage-Earners' Budgets: A Study of Standards and Cost of Living in New York City* (New York, 1907)
- Morgan, S. Philip and Kellie Hegewen. "Is Very Low Fertility Inevitable in America? Insights and Forecasts from an Integrative Model of Fertility" in Alan Booth and Ann C. Crouter, eds., *The New Population Problem: Why*

- Families in Developed Countries are Shrinking and What it Means* (Mahwah, N.J., 2005)
- Morone, James A. *Hellfire Nation: The Politics of Sin in American History* (New Haven, 2003)
- Mosher, Clelia Duel. *The Mosher Survey: Sexual Attitudes of 45 Victorian Women*, James Mahood and Kristine Wenburg, eds., (New York 1980)
- Murray, John E. and Bradley A. Lagger, "Involuntary Childlessness and Voluntary Fertility Control during the Fertility Transition: Evidence from Men Who Graduated from an American College," *Population Studies* 55:1 (2001)
- National Industrial Conference Board, *The Cost of Living in Twelve Industrial Cities* (New York, 1928)
- Nelson, Paula M. *After the West Was Won: Homesteaders and Town-Builders in Western South Dakota, 1900-1917* (Iowa City, Ia., 1986)
- Noonan, John T., Jr. "Demographic and Intellectual History," *Daedalus* (Spring 1968)
- Noonan, John T., Jr., *Contraception: A History of its Treatment by the Catholic Theologians and Canonists* (Cambridge, Mass., 1965)
- Norris, Pippa and Ronald Inglehart. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide* (Cambridge, Eng., 2004)
- Notestein, Frank. "Population: The Long View" in Theodore W. Schultz, ed., *Food for the World* (Chicago, 1945)
- Nugent, Jeffrey B. "The Old-Age Security Motive for Fertility," *Population and Development Review* 11:1 (March, 1985)
- Ojeda, Christopher, and Peter K. Hatemi. "Accounting for the Child in the Transmission of Party Identification," *American Sociological Review* 80:6 (2015)
- Parkerson, Donald H. and Jo Ann Parkerson. "Fewer Children of Greater Spiritual Quality": Religion and the Decline of Fertility in Nineteenth-Century America," *Social Science History* 12:1 (1988)
- Parrado, Emilio A. and S. Philip Morgan. "Intergenerational Fertility among Hispanic Women: New Evidence of Immigrant Assimilation," *Demography* 45:3 (2008)
- Patterson, James T. *Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945-1974* (Oxford, 1996)
- Pauly, John J. "Ritual Theory and the Media" in Robert S. Fortner, P. Mark Fackler, eds., *The Handbook of Media and Mass Communication Theory*, vol. 1 (Chichester, Eng., 2014)
- Paxson, Heather. *Making Modern Mothers: Ethics and Family Planning in Urban Greece* (Berkeley, Cal., 2004)
- Pernick, Martin. *The Black Stork: Eugenics and the Death of "Defective" Babies in American Medicine and Motion Pictures since 1915* (New York, 1996)
- Pescosolido, Bernice A. and Jack K. Martin. "Cultural Authority and the Sovereignty of American Medicine: The Role of Networks, Class, and Community," *Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law* 29 (2004)
- Philipov, Dimiter, Zsolt Speder, and Francesco C. Billari. "Soon, Later, or Ever? The Impact of Anomie and Social Capital on Fertility Intentions in Bulgaria (2002) and Hungary (2001)," *Population Studies* 60:3 (2006)

- Plant, Rebecca Jo. *Mom: The Transformation of Motherhood in Modern America* (Chicago, 2010)
- Pollak, Robert A. and Susan C. Watkins. "Cultural and Economic Approaches to Fertility: Proper Marriage or Mesalliance?" *Population and Development Review* 19:3 (September 1993)
- Polybius. *Histories*, vol. 2, trans. Evelyn Shuckburgh (London, 1889)
- Pooley, Sian. "Parenthood, Child-Rearing and Fertility in England, 1850–1914," *The History of the Family* 18:1 (2013)
- Popenoe, Paul and Roswell Johnson. *Applied Eugenics* (New York, 1918)
- Preston, Samuel H. "Changing Values and Falling Birth Rates," *Population and Development Review* 12 (1986)
- Pritchett, Lant and Martina Viarengo. "Why Demographic Suicide? The Puzzles of European Fertility," *Population and Development Review* 38:51 (2013)
- Rainwater, Lee. *And the Poor Get Children: Sex, Contraception and Family Planning in the Working Class* (Chicago, 1960)
- Randolph, Vance. *Ozark Superstitions* (New York, 1947)
- Ranum, Orest A., and Patricia Ranum, eds. *Popular Attitudes toward Birth Control in Pre-Industrial France and England* (New York, 1972)
- Reagan, Leslie J. *When Abortion Was a Crime: Women, Medicine, and Law in the United States, 1867–1973* (Berkeley, 1997)
- Reed, James. *From Private Vice to Public Virtue: The Birth Control Movement and American Society since 1830* (New York, 1978)
- Reher, David. "Economic and Social Implications of the Demographic Transition," *Population and Development Review* 37:51 (2011)
- Riddle, John M. *Contraception and Abortion from the Ancient World to the Renaissance* (Cambridge, 1992)
- Riddle, John M. *Eve's Herbs: A History of Contraception and Abortion in the West* (Cambridge, Eng., 1997)
- Riley, John Winchell and Matilda White. "The Use of Various Methods of Contraception," *American Sociological Review* 5:6 (December 1940)
- Riley, Nancy E. and James McCarthy. *Demography in the Age of the Postmodern* (Cambridge, Eng., 2003)
- Robinson, Caroline Hadley. *Seventy Birth Control Clinics: A Survey and Analysis Including the General Effects of Control on Size and Quality of Population* (Baltimore, 1930)
- Roosevelt, Theodore. "Biological Analogies in History," Romanes Lecture, Oxford, England, June 7, 1910 (New York, 1910)
- Roosevelt, Theodore. *Presidential Addresses and State Papers* (New York, 1910)
- Roosevelt, Theodore. *Realizable Ideals* (San Francisco, 1912)
- Roscher, Wilhelm. "Wilhelm Roscher on Means of Promoting Population Increase," *Population and Development Review* 32:3 (2006)
- Rosen, Christine. *Preaching Eugenics: Religious Leaders and the American Eugenics Movement* (New York, 2005)
- Rosen, Ruth. *The Lost Sisterhood: Prostitution in America, 1900–1918* (Baltimore, 1983)
- Ross, Edward A. "The Causes of Race Superiority," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 18 (July, 1901)

- Ross, Edward A. *Seventy Years of It: An Autobiography* (New York, 1936)
- Ross, Edward A. *Sin and Society, An Analysis of Latter-day Iniquity* (Boston, 1907)
- Rothman, Ellen K. "Sex and Self-Control: Middle-Class Courtship in America, 1770–1870," *Journal of Social History* 15 (1982)
- Rothman, Sheila M. *Women's Proper Place: A History of Changing Ideals and Practices, 1870 to the Present* (New York, 1978)
- Rothstein, William G. *American Physicians in the Nineteenth Century: From Sects to Science* (Baltimore, 1972)
- Rutenberg, Naomi and Susan Cotts Watkins. "The Buzz outside the Clinics: Conversations and Contraception in Nyanza Province, Kenya," *Studies in Family Planning* 28:4 (December 1997)
- Ryan, Mary P. *Cradle of the Middle Class: The Family in Oneida County, New York, 1790–1865* (Cambridge, Eng., 1981)
- Ryder, Norman. "The Future of American Fertility," *Social Problems* 26:3 (1979)
- Sachsenmaier, Dominic, S.N. Eisenstadt, and Jens Riedel, eds. *Reflections on Multiple Modernities: European, Chinese and Other Interpretations* (Leiden, Neth., 2002)
- Sanderson, Warren. "Below-Replacement Fertility in Nineteenth Century America," *Population and Development Review* 13:2 (June 1987)
- Sanderson, Warren C., and Sergei Scherbov. "A Near Electoral Majority of Pensioners: Prospects and Policies," *Population and Development Review* 33:3 (2007)
- Sanger, Margaret. *Autobiography* (New York, 1938)
- Sanger, Margaret. *Motherhood in Bondage* (Columbus, Oh., 2000 [1928])
- Sanger, Margaret. *The Pivot of Civilization* (New York, 1922)
- Sanger, Margaret. *Woman and the New Race* (New York, 1920)
- Sarrazin, Thilo. *Deutschland schafft sich ab: Wie wir unser Land aufs Spiel setzen [Germany Does Itself In]* (Munich, 2010)
- Sauvy, Alfred. *Fertility and Survival: Population Problems from Malthus to Mao Tse-Tung* (New York, 1961)
- Sauvy, Alfred. *General Theory of Population*, trans. Christophe Campos (London, 1969 [1966]), 388)
- Schindlmayr, Thomas. "Explanations of the Fertility Crisis in Modern Societies: A Search for Commonalities," *Population Studies* 57:3 (2003)
- Schoen, Johanna. *Choice and Coercion: Birth Control, Sterilization, and Abortion in Public Health and Welfare* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2005)
- Schneider, Jane C. and Peter T. Schneider. *Festival of the Poor: Fertility Decline and the Ideology of Class in Sicily, 1860–1980* (Tucson, Ariz., 1996)
- Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. *The Vital Center: The Politics of Freedom* (Boston, 1949)
- Schwartz, Timothy T. *Fewer Men, More Babies: Sex, Family, and Fertility in Haiti* (Plymouth, Eng., 2009)
- Secombe, Wally. "Starting to Stop: Working-Class Fertility Decline in Britain," *Past & Present* 126 (February, 1990)
- Shaw, George Bernard. *Getting Married* (New York, 1909)
- Shorter, Edward. "Female Emancipation, Birth Control, and Fertility in European History," *American Historical Review* 78 (1973)

- Shorter, Edward. *Women's Bodies: A Social History of Women's Encounter With Health, Ill-Health, and Medicine* (New York, 1992 [1982])
- Simmons, Christina. *Making Marriage Modern: Women's Sexuality from the Progressive Era to World War II* (Oxford, 2009)
- Sinclair, Upton. *The Book of Life: Mind and Body* (Girard, Ks., 1922)
- Smith, Daniel Scott. "Family Limitation, Sexual Control, and Domestic Feminism in Victorian America," *Feminist Studies* 1:3, 1973
- Smith, Kevin, John R. Alford, Peter K. Hatemi, Lindon J. Eaves, Carolyn Funk, and John R. Hibbing. "Biology, Ideology, and Epistemology: How Do We Know Political Attitudes Are Inherited and Why Should We Care?" *American Journal of Political Science* 56:1 (January 2012)
- Sobotka, Tomáš. "Does Persistent Low Fertility Threaten the Future of European Populations?" in Johan Surkyn, Patrick Deboosere, Jan Van Bavel, eds., *Demographic Challenges for the 21st Century: A State of the Art in Demography* (Brussels, 2008)
- Sogner, Sølvi. "Abortion, Birth Control, and Contraception: Fertility Decline in Norway," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 34:2 (Autumn 2003)
- Solinger, Rickie. *Pregnancy and Power: A Short History of Reproductive Politics in America* (New York, 2005)
- Solinger, Rickie. *Reproductive Politics: What Everyone Needs to Know* (Oxford, Eng., 2013)
- Søland, Birgitte. *Becoming Modern: Young Women and the Reconstruction of Womanhood in the 1920s* (Princeton, 2000)
- Spengler, Oswald. *The Decline of the West*, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (London, 1928 [1922])
- Stark, Laura and Hans-Peter Kohler. "The Debate over Low Fertility in the Popular Press: A Cross-National Comparison, 1998–1999," *Population Research and Policy Review* 21:6 (December 2002)
- Stark, Laura and Hans-Peter Kohler. "The Popular Debate about Low Fertility: An Analysis of the German Press, 1993–2001," *European Journal of Population* 20:4 (December 2004)
- Starr, Paul. *The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry* (New York, 1982)
- Stern, Alexandra. *Eugenic Nation: Faults and Frontiers of Better Breeding in Modern America* (Berkeley, 2005)
- Stern, Paul C., Thomas Dietz, Troy Abel, Gregory A. Guagnano, and Linda Kalof. "A Value-Belief-Norm Theory of Support for Social Movements: The Case of Environmentalism," *Research in Human Ecology* 6:2 (1999)
- Stix, Regine K. and Frank Notestein. "Effectiveness of Birth Control," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 7:1 (January 1934)
- Stix, Regine K. and Frank W. Notestein. "Effectiveness of Birth Control: A Second Study of Contraceptive Practice in a Selected Group of New York Women," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 13:2 (1935)
- Stone, Lawrence. *The Family, Sex, and Marriage in England, 1500–1800* (New York, 1977)

- Stone, Lee Alexander. *Sex Searchlights and Sane Sex Ethics: An Anthology of Sexual Knowledge* (Chicago, 1922)
- Stopes, Marie. *Mother England: A Contemporary History* (London, 1929)
- Strangeland, Charles. *Pre-Malthusian Doctrines of Population: A Study in the History of Economic Theory* (New York, 1904)
- Swidler, Ann. "Cultural Power and Social Movements" in Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans, eds., *Social Movements and Culture* (Minneapolis, 2004 [1995])
- Szolysek, Mikolaj. "Science without Laws? Model Building, Micro Histories and the Fate of the Theory of Fertility Decline," *Historical Social Research* 32:2 (2007)
- Szreter, Simon. *Fertility, Class and Gender in Britain, 1860–1940* (Cambridge, Eng., 1994)
- Szreter, Simon, Robert A. Nye, and Frans van Poppel. "Fertility and Contraception during the Demographic Transition: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 34:2 (Autumn, 2003)
- Teitelbaum, Michael. *The British Fertility Decline: Demographic Transition in the Crucible of the Industrial Revolution* (Princeton, 1984)
- Temkin-Greener, Helena and Alan C. Swedlund. "Fertility Transition in the Connecticut Valley: 1740–1850," *Population Studies* 32:1 (1978)
- Tentler, Leslie Woodcock. *Catholics and Contraception: An American History* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2004)
- Tentler, Leslie Woodcock. "'The Abominable Crime of Onan': Catholic Pastoral Practice and Family Limitation in the United States, 1875–1919," *Church History* 71:2 (2002)
- Therborn, Göran. *Between Sex and Power: Family in the World 1900–2000* (London, 2004)
- Thompson, E.P. "The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century," *Past & Present* 50:1 (1971)
- Thomson, Elizabeth, Elaine McDonald, and Larry L. Bumpass. "Fertility Desires and Fertility: Hers, His, and Theirs," *Demography* 27:4 (November, 1990)
- Thornton, Arland. "The Developmental Paradigm, Reading History Sideways, and Family Change," *Demography* 38:4 (2001)
- Thornton, Arland. *Reading History Sideways: The Fallacy and Enduring Impact of the Developmental Paradigm on Family Life* (Chicago, 2005)
- Tobin, Kathleen A. *The American Religious Debate over Birth Control, 1907–1937* (Jefferson, N.C., 2001)
- de Tocqueville, Alexis. *Democracy in America*, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York, 2012 [1840])
- Todd, Peter M., Thomas T. Hills, Andrew T. Hendrickson. "Modeling Reproductive Decisions with Simple Heuristics," *Demographic Research* 29 (2013)
- Toft, Monica Duffy. "Wombfare: The Religious and Political Dimensions of Fertility and Demographic Change" in Jack A. Goldstone, Eric P. Kaufmann, and Monica Duffy Toft, eds., *Political Demography: How Population Changes are Reshaping International Security and National Politics* (Boulder, Col., 2012)
- Tone, Andrea. *Devices and Desires: A History of Contraceptives in America* (New York, 2002)

- Townshend, Nicholas W. "Parenthood, Immortality, and the End of Childhood" in Graham Allan and Nathanael Thomas Lauster, eds., *The End of Children?: Changing Trends in Childbearing and Childhood* (Vancouver, 2012)
- Tooze, Adam. "Germany's Unsustainable Growth: Austerity Now, Stagnation Later," *Foreign Affairs* 91:5 (2012)
- Tönnies, Ferdinand. *Critique of Public Opinion* (1922)
- Tucker, George. *Progress of the United States in Population and Wealth in Fifty Years* (New York, 1843)
- Turner, Frederick Jackson. "The Significance of the Frontier in American History" *Annual Report of the American Historical Association* (1894)
- U.S. Centers for Disease Control. "Achievements in Public Health, 1900–1999: Healthier Mothers and Babies," *Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report* 48:38 (October 1999)
- United Nations Population Division. *Replacement Migration: Is it a Solution to Declining and Aging Populations?* (New York, 2000)
- United Nations Population Division. *World Population Prospects* (New York, 2015)
- United States Department of Agriculture. *The Agricultural Outlook for 1929* (Washington, 1929)
- Van Bavel, January. "Subreplacement Fertility in the West Before the Baby Boom: Past and Current Perspectives," *Population Studies* 64 (March 2010)
- Van Bavel, Jan and David Reher. "The Baby Boom and Its Causes: What We Know and What We Need to Know," *Population and Development Review* 39:2 (2013)
- van de Kaa, Dirk. "Europe's Second Demographic Transition," *Population Bulletin* 42 (1987)
- van de Kaa, Dirk. "The True Commonality: In Reflexive Modern Societies Fertility Is a Derivative," *Population Studies* 58:1 (2004)
- van de Walle, Etienne. "Fertility Transition, Conscious Choice, and Numeracy," *Demography* 29:4 (1992)
- van de Walle, Etienne. "Motivations and Technology in the Decline of French Fertility" in R. Wheaton and T. Hareven, eds., *Family and Sexuality in French History* (Philadelphia, 1980)
- van de Walle, Etienne and Elisha P. Renne, eds. *Regulating Menstruation: Beliefs, Practices, Interpretations* (Chicago, 2001)
- van de Walle, Etienne and Virginie De Luca. "Birth Prevention in the American and French Fertility Transitions: Contrasts in Knowledge and Practice," *Population And Development Review* 32:3 (September 2006)
- van Poppel, Frans and Renzo De Rosas, eds. *Religion and the Decline of Fertility in Europe* (Dordrecht, 2007)
- Van Vorst, Mrs. John [Bessie], and Marie Van Vorst. *The Woman Who Toils: Being the Experiences of Two Ladies as Factory Girls* (New York, 1903)
- Vice Commission of the City of Chicago. *The Social Evil in Chicago: A Study of Existing Conditions* (1911)
- Vinovskis, Maris A. "Socioeconomic Determinants of Interstate Fertility Differentials in the United States in 1850 and 1860," *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 6:3 (1976)

- Vinovskis, Maris A. *Fertility in Massachusetts from the Revolution to the Civil War* (New York, 1981)
- Vreeland, Francis M. "The Process of Reform with Especial Reference to Reform Groups in the Field of Population," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan (1929)
- Walker, Francis A. "Restriction of Immigration," *Atlantic Monthly* (June 1896)
- Walters, Ronald G. *Primers for Prudery: Sexual Advice to Victorian America* (Baltimore, 2000 [1974])
- Watkins, Susan Cotts and Angela D. Danzi. "Women's Gossip and Social Change: Childbirth and Fertility Control among Italian and Jewish Women in the United States, 1920-1940," *Gender and Society* 9:4 (August 1995)
- Watkins, Susan Cotts. "Conclusions" in Watkins and Ansley Coale, eds., *The Decline of Fertility in Europe* (Princeton, 1986)
- Watkins, Susan Cotts. "Fertility Determinants" in Edgar F. Borgatta and Rhonda J. V. Montgomery, eds., *Encyclopedia of Sociology*, 2nd edn., vol. 2 (New York, 2006)
- Watkins, Susan Cotts. "If All We Knew about Women Was What We Read in 'Demography,' What Would We Know?" *Demography*, 30 (1993)
- Watkins, Susan Cotts. "Local and Foreign Models of Reproduction in Nyanza Province, Kenya," *Population and Development Review* 26:4 (December 2000)
- Weiss, Jessica. *To Have and to Hold: Marriage, the Baby Boom, and Social Change* (Chicago, 2000)
- Welskopp, Thomas and Alan Lessoff. *Fractured Modernity: America Confronts Modern Times, 1890s to 1940s* (Munich, 2012)
- Wells, Robert V. "Family History and Demographic Transition," *Journal of Social History* 9:1 (1975)
- Wells, Robert V. "Family Size and Fertility Control in Eighteenth-Century America: A Study of Quaker Families," *Population Studies* 25:1 (1971)
- Wertz, Richard W. and Dorothy C. Wertz. *Lying In: A History of Childbirth in America* (New Haven, 1989 [1977])
- Westoff, Charles and Elise Jones. "The End of 'Catholic' Fertility," *Demography* 16:2 (1979)
- White, Richard. *It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own: A New History of the American West* (Norman, Okla., 1991)
- Wilcox, Delos F. *Ethical Marriage* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1900)
- Wilmoth, John R. and Patrick Ball. "The Population Debate in American Popular Magazines, 1946-90," *Population and Development Review* 18:4 (December 1992)
- Winter, Jay and Michael Teitelbaum. *The Global Spread of Fertility Decline: Population, Fear, and Uncertainty* (New Haven, 2013)
- Wolf, Jacqueline H. *Deliver Me from Pain: Anesthesia and Birth in America* (Baltimore, Md., 2009)
- Woodsong, Cynthia, Michele Shedlin and Helen Koo. "The 'Natural' Body, God and Contraceptive Use in the Southeastern United States," *Culture, Health & Sexuality* 6:1 (2004)

- Wrigley, E.A. "Fertility Strategy for the Individual and the Group" in Charles Tilly, ed., *Historical Studies of Changing Fertility* (Princeton, 1978)
- Yang, C.K. *The Chinese Family in the Communist Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass., 1959)
- Yasuba, Yasikichi. *Birthrates of the White Population of the United States, 1800-1860: An Economic Study* (Baltimore, 1962)
- Zelizer, Viviana A. *Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of Children* (Princeton, 1994 [1985])

PRESS SOURCES

Atlanta Constitution
Baltimore Sun
Birth Control Review
Boston Globe
Chicago Tribune
Council Bluffs Nonpareil
Denver Post
Der Spiegel
Dissent
Economist
El Paso Herald
Freedom
Great Falls Tribune
The Guardian
Hartford Courant
The Independent
Life
The Ladies' Home Journal
Los Angeles Times
Medical Age
New York Times
New York Tribune
Popular Science
Red Book
Rocky Mountain News
San Francisco News
The Telegraph
Trenton Evening Times
Washington Post