Positional Deprivation and Support for Radical Right and Radical Left Parties

Brian Burgoon[a], Sam van Noort[b], Matthijs Rooduijn[a] and Geoffrey Underhill[a]

[a] University of Amsterdam (Amsterdam Institute for Social Science Research)
[b] University of Cambridge (Centre of Development Studies)

ABSTRACT

We explore how support for radical parties of both the left and right may be shaped by what we call "positional deprivation," where growth in income of individuals at a given point in the income distribution is outpaced by income growth elsewhere in that distribution. We argue that positional deprivation captures the combination of over-time and relative misfortune that can be expected to distinctly spur support for radical left and right parties. We explore this possibility by matching new measures of positional deprivation to individual-level survey data on party preferences in 20 European countries from 2002 to 2014. We find that positional deprivation is robustly correlated with supporting radical populist parties. First, positional deprivation generally, measured as average income growth across deciles of a country's distribution minus a respondent's own decile's growth, is associated with respondents' retreat from mainstream parties and with support for both radical right and, particularly, radical left parties. Second, positional deprivation relative to the highest and the lowest ends of the income spectrum play out differently for radical-right and for radical-left support. A respondent's positional deprivation relative to the wealthiest decile's growth in his or her country tends to spur support for radical left but not radical right parties. In contrast, positional deprivation relative to the poorest decile's growth in a respondent's country tends to spur support for radical right but not left parties. The results suggest that focusing on the combination of over-time and relative economic misfortune may be key to how economic experience shapes radical backlash of the left and right.

Keywords: politics, electoral, parties, voters, income distribution, radical right, radical left, positional deprivation

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1. INTRODUCTION

The rise of radical right and radical left parties surely rates among the most important developments in recent European political economy. Such radicalism has long simmered in Europe's post-War electoral politics, but the gains for radical parties and programmes have in recent years broadened and deepened. The broadening has touched countries that long resisted the radical tide, like Germany and its radical right Alternative for Germany (AfD). The broadening goes further, as many mainstream parties of the centre right and left have in recent years adopted some of the programmatic positions and rhetoric of radical parties (Abou-Chadi 2016; Van Spanje 2010). The deepening, meanwhile, involves the sustained electoral gains achieved by parties of both the radical right and -left. On the right, this includes the Danish Freedom Party (DF), the Dutch Party of Freedom (PVV), and Italy's League (formerly known as the Lega Nord (LN)). On the left, radical-left parties like Greece's Syriza and Spain's Podemos have become as influential as, or fully overshadow, both mainstream and radical right parties. There are major differences between and among radical left and radical right parties, such as on issues of migration and redistribution (Ivarsflaten 2008; Rooduijn et.al. 2017), but the radical parties share a focus on economic and political nationalism, euroscepticism, and anti-system, anti-elite positioning (Hooghe et.al. 2002; March and Mudde 2005; Hopkin 2019 forthcoming). The broadening and deepening of such radicalism pose major challenges to economic and political policies long defining the Western democratic order, and may have unleashed potentially deeper challenges to the integrity of democracy itself.

Such developments justify the extensive academic attention that has been devoted to exploring the underpinnings of voting for such parties, including the possible role of economic conditions and insecurities. Progress in such inquiry hinges on identifying economic conditions relevant to the support for radical parties. Existing studies within this line of research have focused on individual- and aggregate-level conditions like income, unemployment, exposure to trade shocks, education, and aggregate inequalities (cf. Betz 1994; Kriesi et al. 2008; Colantone and Stanig 2017; Autor et.al. 2016; Rydgren and Ruth 2013; Gomez et al. 2016; Sperber 2010; Ramiro 2016). These conditions, however, do not directly touch-upon the resentments that qualitative reporting has found to prevail among political supporters of radical parties: a feeling of 'losing-out' compared to one's own past *and* compared to other groups in society.(Cramer 2016; Hochschild 2016).

This paper focuses more precisely on such combined dynamic *and* positional experience by developing and operationalizing the concept of "positional deprivation" and arguing that variation in such positional deprivation helps explain variation in support for radical-right and radical-left parties. We define positional deprivation as a situation where the increase (decrease) in disposable income of an individual is smaller (larger) *relative to* the growth in income of other groups in the same country's income distribution. We expect such positional deprivation to foster feelings of unjust misfortune, resentments which in turn get channelled towards blaming mainstream political institutions and parties. As a result, positional deprivation can be expected to spur a retreat from mainstream politics and an embrace of anti-elite radical parties and party programmes.

In particular, we focus on two hypotheses with regard to the relationship between positional deprivation and political behaviour. First, we generally expect that individuals facing greater positional deprivation are more likely to support parties with either radical left or –radical right orientations. We expect this pattern to emerge net of standard economic factors like individual-level education, income, and employment, or aggregate-level economic growth and inequality. We also expect the pattern to show-up net of other ways in which political discontent can manifest itself, such as political withdrawal or non-participation in electoral politics. Second, we expect positional deprivation relative to higher and lower ends of the income spectrum to have distinct implications for radical left and radical right support. Radical left populism has been found to focus on issues of economic redistribution and redressing privileges of the rich elite (e.g. March 2011; Visser et.al. 2014), while radical right populism has been found to focus more on advancing the interests of the "modal" citizen relative to "outsiders" and the "undeserving poor" (e.g. Mudde 2007; Swank and Betz 2003). Hence, we hypothesize that "upper-register" positional deprivation (relative to the income growth among the wealthiest in one's country) spurs support for radical left more than for radical right parties, while "lower-register" positional deprivation (relative to the growth among the poorest in one's country) spurs support for radical right more than for radical left parties.

To test these propositions we make use of European Social Survey (ESS) data on individual-level support for political parties in twenty European countries from 2002 to 2014. Given that the ESS only measures a respondents' current income, and only measures this current income on the decile (rather than interval/ratio) level, we use Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) data to measure changes in real household income across deciles in a given

country-year and match this data to the ESS. Our operationalization of the concept of positional deprivation therefore consists of the increase/decrease of the mean income growth for all deciles (or a particular decile) in a country's income distribution minus the growth of a respondents' income decile in the past five years.

Using this measurement strategy we find significant support for both hypotheses. First, consistent with Hypothesis 1, respondents in deciles experiencing less growth or more decline than the income growth of other deciles in the country's income spectrum are more likely to support a radical party of the right or left. Second, consistent with Hypothesis 2, we find that positional deprivation relative to the wealthiest decile (upper-register deprivation) tends to spur support for radical left but not for radical right parties. In contrast, a respondent's positional deprivation relative to the poorest decile (lower-register deprivation) tends to spur support for radical right but not for radical left parties. In supplemental analysis using data on a party's substantive platforms, we also find that mainly radical-right parties and lower-register positional deprivation are associated with nationalist and autarchic party platforms. These various results are robust to a range of estimators and individual and aggregated-level controls, including country and time fixed effects. And they are robust to taking account of the possibility that respondents may support no party or have withdrawn support for mainstream parties. Taken together, our exploration supports the view that positional deprivation may be an important wellspring of Europe's radical right and -left populism.

2. RADICAL BACKLASH AND THE NEED FOR ATTENTION TO SIMULTANEOUSLY DYNAMIC AND POSITIONAL MEASURES

In the extensive literature clarifying radical right and left populism, economic fortune and misfortune have received plenty of attention, and revealed to be major factors undergirding radical populism. For instance, individual economic insecurities grounded in socio-economic class, unemployment and, particularly, low income are major predictors of voting radical right (see Lubbers et al., 2002; Werts et al., 2013; Rydgren, 2013; Oesch and Rennwald 2018) and radical left (see Gomez et al. 2016; Sperber 2010; Ramiro 2016; Rooduijn et al. 2017). There is also some evidence that exposure to globalization and trade spur electoral support for radical-left and, particularly, radical-right parties (Betz 1994; Swank and Betz 2003; Kriesi et al. 2008; Autor et al. 2016; Calantone and Stanig 2018). Voting studies have also clarified how radical-right and radical-left voting and support are significantly influenced by macro-level economic conditions like aggregate GDP or regional

growth or inflation (Van der Brug et al. 2005; Lucassen and Lubbers, 2012; Rydgren and Ruth 2013); income inequality (Coffé et al. 2007; Pontusson and Rueda 2010; Han 2016); and aggregate unemployment (Jackman and Volpert 1996; Knigge 1998; Golder 2003; Lubbers et al. 2002; cf. Arzheimer 2009; Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Ford and Goodwin 2010; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Rydgren and Ruth, 2013). The direction and strength of such effects empirically has been mixed, with macroeconomic conditions often revealed to matter mainly in interaction with other aggregate conditions like immigration (Arzheimer 2009; Rydgren and Ruth 2013) or with individual-level income insecurity (Han 2016; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017). The ambiguous role of such economic conditions has understandably informed work that theoretically and empirically emphasizes the role of more cultural-political conditions, most obviously race and immigration (e.g. Van der Brug et al. 2005; Werts et.al 2013; Lubbers et.al. 2002; Ivarsflaten 2008; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Bustikova 2014).

An important problem, however, is that the economic conditions receiving the most systematic attention do not fully link-up to the distinct *combination of dynamic (over-time) and positional (inter-group)* economic anxieties that journalistic and qualitative studies suggest are at play for supporters of radical-right and radical-left parties and populism. Extensive reporting and recent scholarship has chronicled the role of real and perceived losses in economic standing driving political disenchantment, where citizens feel discarded for their skills or economic value (Wallace-Wells 2017; Beauchamp 2017a, 2017b; Lozada 2016; Gest et.al. 2018). Many (often the same) journalists, however, also chronicle how frustrated groups decry their unfair economic position *relative to* particular other groups in the polity or world. The dynamic and relative, hence, come-together to shape radical revolt (Beauchamp 2017a, 2017b; Lozada 2016). Recent qualitative case and ethnographic work exploring anti-elite resentments and populism highlight this combination of dynamic and positional misfortune (Hochschild 2016; Gest 2016; Cramer 2016a). Cramer's case study on the politics of resentment in Wisconsin finds people worried about increasingly scarce health care, jobs, and taxation in rural places, combined with 'a deeply felt sense of not getting their "fair share"…' (Cramer 2016b). Hochschild (2016) echoes this finding, famously culminating in the 'line-cutter' metaphor: Many citizens feel as if they are waiting ever longer in a line for something that they deserve, while undeserving people cut in, and are allowed to do so in a way that unfairly slows the line's progress.

The key is that the combination of dynamic and positional economic misfortune gets only partially captured by well-studied measures of income, unemployment, inequality, or

skill-level. These latter highlight the dynamic *or* the positional, not both simultaneously. Measures of income growth (e.g. individual income change or aggregate GDP growth), for instance, capture dynamic, year-on-year development, but do not direcly gauge how this dynamic compares to the dynamic for other people in one's polity. And measures of income inequality – such as GINI-indices or polarization measures (e.g. 90^{th} to 10^{th} income ratios) capture relative position, but lack explicit attention to over-time dynamics.

The shortcoming also applies to some of the most innovative recent explorations of economic misfortune. For instance, exploration of ethnic-based "horizontal inequality" have clarified economic frustrations underlying conflict (e.g. Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011). But even such nuance into relative suffering continues to lack an explicit over time dimension. And recent innovations have done a lot to clarify *over-time dynamics* – such as Case and Deaton's (2017) discussion of "cumulative disadvantage" in the labour-market experience of key socio-demographic groups. Other examples include Chetty et.al.'s studies (Chetty et.al. 2014; Chetty et.al. 2016) of how current generations of Americans are much less likely than previous generations to be doing better than their parents, or Margalit's (2013) evocative analysis of rare panel-data clarifying within-subject over-time changes in income, employment, and economic insecurity in the United States. But not only are all these hard to extend to cross-country comparisons; they also leave out the *positional* aspect of economic suffering – how one is doing relative to one's contemporaries in society.

The measures that most explicitly combine the dynamic and the positional are 'growth incidence curves' that gauge income growth across subsets of the income distribution (Ravaillon and Chen 2003). These have informed many studies of economic development and economic policy, but they have not been much applied to studies of political economy. An exception is Bartels's (2008) study of how changes in disposable income vary across the US income distribution and across presidencies or periods of legislative control. More broadly, Branko Milanovic's study of global-level inequalities – allowing comparison of the poorest Indian with the richest American – included creation of the first-ever *global growth-incidence-curves* of cross-centile real earnings for the whole world economy (Milanovic 2013; Lakner and Milanovic 2015). This yielded, among other patterns, the now-famous 'elephant curve', where the world's middle class (disproportionately China's rising middle class) is shown to have experienced very high changes in disposable income while the world's upper-middle class (disproportionately lower middle classes in Western economies) have seen among the lowest gains across the world's income distribution (Lakner and

Milanovic 2015, p. 216). These studies highlight over-time and positional dynamics of economic deprivation and inequality in isolated countries and time-periods, or in truly global economic experience. More importantly, growth incidence curves have not been leveraged to create single-measure quantification of the combination of dynamic and positional misfortune comparable across a range of countries. They are less suited, hence, to the challenge of understanding whether and how political-economic experiences combining the dynamic and positional influence Europe's radicalism and populism.

3. POSITIONAL DEPRIVATION AS A SOURCE OF RADICAL-RIGHT AND -LEFT BACKLASH

We attempt to gain a more dynamic and positional understanding of the economic roots of support for radical-right and radical-left parties. This begins with clarifying that we understand radical parties to be either anti-*liberal* parties operating within the borders of the democratic system, or extreme left and right anti-democratic parties justifying the use of violence (March 2011; Mudde 2007; Rooduijn et.al. 2017). Many though not all radical parties are also clearly populist, emphasizing the sovereignty of the people and arguing that the 'good' people (defined in various, often ethnic-nationalist, terms) are exploited or betrayed by an 'evil' elite (Mudde 2007; Rooduijn and Akkerman 2015). Some radical parties, however, are anti-liberal nationalist but not so championing of the embattled 'good' people, and some (like Greece's Golden Dawn) espouse anti-democratic violence. Such radical parties, hence, are strictly speaking less populist (see Mudde 2007).

To clarify the simultaneously dynamic and positional roots of the radical left and radical right, so understood, we focus on the possible role of what we call 'positional deprivation':[1] the extent to which an individual voter has seen his/her income increase/decrease relative to others in the same society – for instance how someone in a given decile or centile has experienced income growth that is outstripped by the growth of other deciles or centiles in society. We expect that positional deprivation spurs support for both radical right and radical left parties, and induce voters to favour any party that is more anti-globalization, nationalist, and authoritarian in its positioning.

The core intuition behind this argument is that citizens whose own fortunes have regressed or been outpaced compared to others – that is, those experiencing more positional

[1] Our label emphasizes the positional or relative aspect of the concept, even though the dynamic (over time) aspect is just as important. For simplicity's sake, however, we stick with the shorter locution rather than the cumbersome 'Dynamic and Relative Deprivation'.

deprivation – will feel economically deprived and/or be attuned to feelings of economic unfairness. Of course, absolute over-time deprivation matters to wellbeing. How much real household income has gone up, either in the aggregate or for a given centile or decile of the distribution, likely fosters perceived economic wellbeing, above-and-beyond one's level of income. This comports with literature suggesting significant long-term effects of experiencing material-economic improvement (e.g. Veenhoven 1991). However, positional deprivation – having done more poorly or less well *relative* to others in one's country's income spectrum – can be expected to foster a distinct and strong sense of relative deprivation, that one is not doing as well as others in the national economy.

This notion evokes, of course, the widely debated concept of 'relative deprivation' (see Crosby, 1976; Runciman, 1966; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). Runciman (1966: 10) defines 'relative deprivation' as a situation where a person: (i) desires to have X but does not have it; (ii) believes that someone else, or some other people, which may include him/herself at some previous point in time, *do* have X; and (iii) perceives it as both feasible and just that he/she has X. The psychological mechanism underlying relative deprivation theory is that unsatisfied expectations lead to feelings of frustration that subsequently shape socio-political behavior. Such an idea comports with much longer-standing ideas closer to economics about the positional character of well-being and competition developed in relation to consumption behaviour (Duesenberry 1949; Hirsch 1977; Frank 1985; Ackerman 1997; Sanders 2010; Feltlovich and Ebeju 2014). It is also in line with the empirical finding that general happiness, life satisfaction and perceptions of wellbeing more broadly are as or more strongly influenced by relative as by absolute material-economic position (Clark and Oswald 1996; Smith et al. 2012).[2] Such implications should reside in felt economic experience, even if members of the polity cannot be expected to know anything precisely about the dynamics of their own, let alone others' centiles or deciles in the income spectrum. 'Keeping up with the Joneses' involves noticing when one's neighbours have been able to graduate to a larger car or lifestyle, mindful of one's own evolving lot.

The crux of our argument is that such positional deprivation can have fundamental implications for radical positioning of voters, spurring support for radical right populism through at least two (not necessarily distinct) causal mechanisms. First, people who have seen their household incomes grow less strongly, or decrease more significantly, relative to others

[2] We know of no studies, however, considering the effects of calculations of relative deprivation or position in terms of *changes* in one's economic condition – only in terms of static condition.

in society might be inclined to assign the cause of their relatively declining fortunes to existing/past government policy where radical-right or radical-left populist parties explicitly campaign against, such as: globalization, European Union integration, immigration or elite political corruption or insider privileges. In this way voters may be attracted to radical right and radical-left parties because they believe that the policies these parties propose will increase aggrieved voters' (relative and/or absolute) economic well-being more significantly as compared to the alternative policies available in the political space. Van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie (2000) find, for example, that voting for radical-right parties, just like for other parties, is largely motivated by pragmatic considerations. Since the legitimacy of any political system is at least partly dependent on the (perceived) quality of outputs, resentments generated by positional deprivation might also undermine faith in political-institutional anchors of Western liberalism (democracy, constitutionalism, freedom and human rights). In line with this idea, Klandermans, Roefs, and Olivier (2001) find that relative deprivation erodes the trustworthiness and legitimacy of political institutions.

Second, positional deprivation may increase support for radical-right and radical-left parties because the radical ideologies provide easy 'scapegoats' for the (allegedly) unjust deprivation that voters face. Much existing psychology literature, in line with this perspective, has linked relative deprivation to dynamics of intergroup hostility and prejudice (Mummendey et.al. 1999; Runciman, 1966). These studies suggest that the angry resentments generated by relative deprivation will most likely be emotionally directed towards "out-group" members. Which group is perceived as the relevant 'other' surely varies across individuals and time, but the main foils of radical right and radical left populists constitute convenient scapegoats for positionally deprived voters. Obvious 'others' that could be blamed for relative and dynamic economic hardship are immigrants or other "non-natives"; so too, however, are native ethnic minorities, or the native super-rich 1%, or the 'welfare-cheating' poor (van Oorschot 2008). Out-group scapegoating might also be directed toward the European Union or other international or supranational institutions since these institutions constrain national-level autonomy while political identities are overwhelmingly national. Finally, out-group scapegoating can extend to broader blaming of economic globalization, trade openness, and internationalism more generally (Van der Waal & De Koster, 2017).

Both of these two mechanisms – programmatic focus or scapegoating associated with radical left and radical right politics – can be expected to translate exposure to positional deprivation into support for radical left and radical right parties. The disgruntlement

unleashed or awakened by positional deprivation might yield general retreat from politics, a withdrawal of support for established or any other political parties, and motivate lower political participation of any kind (e.g. non-voting) (Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Dalton and Weldon 2005; Hooghe et.al. 2011; Guiso et al. 2017). But for many voters and settings, the experience of positional deprivation should spur support for the parties that most embrace anti-system/elite/EU/globalization nationalism and more radical political economic reform.

3.1. Hypotheses

In light of the above mechanisms, we focus on two hypotheses as to how positional deprivation can be expected to spur support for radical right or radical left parties. The first focuses on how positional deprivation in general ought to affect support for radical right and radical left parties in general. The positional deprivation's tendency to awaken scapegoating and discontent with established policy programmes should encourage votes to choose or switch to radical right or radical left parties. The party families may differ in their appeals, reflecting the broader left and right political traditions: the radical-left's relatively greater emphasis on redistribution or the radical-right's relatively greater emphasis on (anti-) immigration (Rooduijn et.al. 2017). But radical-left and radical-right parties, and their programmes and discourse, share a focus on economic and political nationalism and euroscepticism (Hooghe et al., 2002; Ford and Goodwin, 2010; Visser et al. 2014; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2007), and (frequently) populist anti-system and anti-elite positioning (Barr 2009; Rooduijn and Akkerman, 2015; March and Mudde 2005; Hopkin 2018 forthcoming). These positions signal the promise of taking-on the culprits of the misfortunes of positional deprivation. Radical right and left ideologies, further, focus particularly on group-based (un-)deservingness and lost and/or fading economic privileges that may be music to positionally deprived ears.

If so, any given measure of positional deprivation can be expected to foster radicalism, for instance positional deprivation relative to the growth of the average, or to the richest, or the poorest, on a country's income distribution. To be sure, positional deprivation relative to the richest on the income spectrum might awaken more resentments and political ferment than does, say, average positional deprivation (relative to average income growth across the income spectrum), or than positional deprivation relative to the poorest on the income

spectrum. But we expect any such positional deprivation to spur radicalism. Our first hypothesis, hence, is general:

> Hypothesis 1:
> *Individuals experiencing lower gains than the gains of the average, the highest or the lowest segments of the country's income spectrum are more likely to support or vote for radical left or radical right parties than are individuals whose gains have outpaced the gains of others in the country's income spectrum.*

Within this general pattern, however, we do expect variation in how different kinds of positional deprivation play out for the radical left versus radical right. As just noted, 'upper-register' positional deprivation (where one's income growth is outstripped by the growth experienced by the wealthiest in the income distribution) may spur stronger resentment and radicalism than does average positional deprivation. Such upper-register positional deprivation, after all, plays-into the basic anti-elite pitch of radical left and radical right parties. One might also expect, however, that 'lower-register' positional deprivation (experiencing lower gains than the *poorest* in the country's income spectrum) might provoke a distinct resentment that one's political economy is functioning in a way that favors the poorest and least active members of the population *more* than the middle class or the "common man." Recall that a much higher proportion of citizens of industrialized economies categorize themselves as "middle class" and "middle income" than is statistically true (Evans and Kelley 2004).

Equally important, different manifestations of positional deprivation can be expected to steer voters in different radical left or radical right directions, given the differences between radical left and radical right party orientations. Radical left parties and their voters are more focused on "soak-the-rich" egalitarian appeals and have been found to be more focused on economic redistribution than have their radical right counterparts (March 2007; Rooduijn et.al. 2017; Visser et al. 2014). In contrast, radical right parties and supporters are often more focused on fairness for average citizens against opportunistic economic dependency and/or by an undeserving/lazy poor (Swank and Betz 2003; Hoggett et al. 2013). For instance, Geert Wilders's Dutch Party of Freedom (PVV) has long championed the interests of iconic "Henk and Ingrid" (very popular old-fashioned Dutch names), who are "hard-working Dutchman or Dutchwoman" agrieved by both ends of the class spectrum, not just elites but also welfare cheats (welfare kings and queens often cast as having non-native backgrounds).

Taken together, these nuances suggest that upper- and lower-register positional deprivation may play out in distinct ways for support for the radical left and the radical right. And the nuances suggest that support for radical-left and radical-right parties can be differently sensitive to upper- and lower-register positional deprivation. Our second hypothesis focuses on what we anticipate to be the most important difference in how particular manifestations of positional deprivation play out for particular radicalisms:

Hypothesis 2:
Individuals experiencing upper-register positional deprivation (lower income growth than experienced by the richest on the income distribution) should be more likely to support radical-left than -right parties, while individuals experiencing lower-register positional deprivation (lower income growth than experienced by the poorest on the distribution) should be more likely to support radical-right than -left parties.

4. MEASUREMENT AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

We hope to test these hypotheses about how individuals are more likely to support radical right or radical left populist parties if they have seen their own household income increase less (decrease more) than others in the same society. To test such claims, we would ideally have data for a large number of countries on: (1) attitudes towards radical right and radical left populist parties; (2) data on significant individual-level covariates of such political behaviour; and (3) individual-level data on the percentage change in disposable household income in the preceding period (say 5 years).

In practice, however, we face an important obstacle, because there is no data available that systematically contains (1), (2) and (3). True income panel datasets, such as the German Socio-Economic Panel (1984-), the British Household Panel Survey (1991-), the Swiss Household Panel (1999-), and the American Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1968-), provide very little data on essential political behavioural variables, and in any case do not allow for large cross-country comparisons. On the other hand, data that does contain cross-country comparable data on political attitudes and party identification, such as the European Social Survey, measures a respondent's current (as opposed to past) income, and only measures income on the decile (rather than interval/ratio) level.

Preferring a well-specified individual-level model gauging party-political support for a significant cross-national of polities, we focus on the second option and use data from the European Social Survey (ESS waves 1-7, 2002-2014). We match this data to a larger dataset on real household income, from the Luxemboug Income Study (LIS), that is a basis for constructing measures of positional deprivation for all 20 ESS countries for which data is available.[3] The combined dataset yields substantial leverage to explore our Hypotheses on how various measures of positional deprivation relate to support for radical left and radical right parties and programmes.

4.1. Measuring Positional Deprivation

Relying on LIS data matched to the ESS public opinion data means that our study develops "anonymous" measures of income change on the country-year-decile level to measure the income change of individuals in the recent period. This means that we substitute a hypothetical measure of how much a respondents' income has changed in the past several years with how much the income has changed within the decile that this individual respondent belonged to at the end of the preceding period (as coded in a given wave of ESS).[4]

LIS provides data from a large number of representative (cross-sectional) household income surveys held in more than 50 countries from the 1970s onwards. These data have gaps between particular years but can be used to calculate annual or longer-term change in income (in PPP terms) for a given country-decile-year (LIS 2016).[5] To compare varying time-spans, we interpolate linearly the missing values between the roughly five-year intervals of country-specific LIS values.

Note that using the repeated cross-section data of LIS is preferable to using true panel data for generating measures of change in income on the decile-country level. With true panel data one would follow the same individual *i* over a particular time period *t*. In each year one would establish in which decile of the country-year income distribution *i* is by dividing the panel in 10 groups of 10% of the country-year observations. Based on the average year-to-year change of people that were in a particular decile at *t*-1 one would estimate the yearly

[3] The countries included in our sample are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom.
[4] We discuss the implications of this measurement strategy for the validity of our estimates in section 4.4.
[5] The basis for the present analysis is discussed by Leonhardt and Quealy (2014a, 2014b).

average decile change in household income per country-year. A problem with this is that it is not obvious what to do with people that moved up or down deciles from *t*-0 to *t*; should they be considered as representative for the decile that they came from, or representative for the decile that they moved to? Measuring decile-country-year income growth with repeated cross-section data, as we do, can provide the same estimate while avoiding that last problem. In this approach one simply takes two representative (cross-sectional) samples at *t* and *t*-1 divides these up into 10 deciles and calculates the percentage change for each decile between these two time points. In addition the (cross-sectional) household surveys included in LIS have much larger sample sizes than available income panel datasets and are at any point in time derived from a fully random sample. This means that the LIS income data is likely to be more reliable than true panel datasets and less sensitive to validity issues arising from (non-random) sample attrition.

To illustrate the data behind our measures of positional deprivation, Figure 1 estimates a crude 'growth incidence curve' for Europe. Figure 1 is depicts the (un-weighted) average increase in decile-level income pooled across sample European countries over the period between 1995 and 2005.[6] Over this period, averaged across the sample, the richest ten percent of the income distribution experienced the largest real household-income growth, 35 percent, while the poorest ten percent also experienced substantial (the second-highest) gain of almost 26 percent. The fourth decile, representing, as it were, the lower middle class, fared on average the worst, with a more modest 21 percent growth in disposable household income over the same period. Positional deprivation involves a given decile's change in income *relative to* the change experienced by other deciles. This may entail different time-spans to gauge changes, and also different comparisons of a given decile to another. Deprivation for a particular decile or inequalities across a spectrum can be observed in any given growth incidence curve, including the one reported in Figure 1. By Figure 1's standard of averages, the fourth decile experienced the most positional deprivation, and the highest decile the least positional deprivation, relative to any other growth benchmark.

[[Figure 1 about here]]

[6] The countries included in this illustration are those for which data is available for the full 1995 to 2005 period: Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

From such growth incidence curves, we can distil systematic measures of *positional deprivation*. These measures focus on the level of growth (gains or losses) of a given voter's own decile relative to the growth of the average, the highest, the lowest, or the median decile. Since growth can entail losses as well as gains for a given period, we are interested in the average-decile change (or the richest, tenth, fifth, or other decile change) *minus* a respondent's own decile change. Here, higher values constitute relatively less gain or greater loss for oneself as compared to others in the same society – *positional deprivation,* hence. In principle, positional deprivation can be measured by comparing the income growth of any individual decile with any other (group of) income decile(s).

To explore our two Hypotheses, however, four specifications of positional deprivation are most important. The most general measure is *Mean positional deprivation: Mean decile growth minus respondent's decile growth,* taking the average country-year growth for the ten deciles, minus the growth for a respondent's "own" decile. This captures the most encompassing measure most relevant to our general Hypothesis 1. The remaining three measures focus on positional deprivation relative to a particular point on the country's income distribution. *5th-decile positional deprivation* is a country-year's 5th decile's real household income group minus a respondent's decile's growth, and captures middle-register positional deprivation. *10th-decile positional deprivation* is a measure of upper-register positional deprivation: the growth in real household income in the 10th-decile minus a respondent's own decile growth. Lastly, *1st-decile positional deprivation* measures lower-register positional deprivation: the 1st-decile's growth minus a respondent's own decile growth. By any of these four measures, Figure 1's distribution shows Europe-wide positional deprivation for the 1995-2005 period to be, indeed, highest for the fourth decile and lowest for the highest decile. But for voters in that fourth decile, *5th-decile positional deprivation* is substantially lower than is either *1st-decile positional deprivation* or, especially, *10th-decile positional deprivation.*

Such measures of positional deprivation can be expected to vary substantially across deciles, countries and years. Figure 2 gives a sense of that variation by showing the growth incidence curves for a few of the countries underlying Figure 1's aggregate illustration. Germany (upper-left panel of Figure 2) is a more extreme version of Figure 1's Europe-wide pattern. Germans in the 5th decile experienced the highest positional deprivation by any of our four positional deprivation measures for this period, while the wealthiest 10th decile experienced the lowest positional deprivation by any measure (and the poorest 1st decile the second-lowest). Plenty of countries share this U-shaped pattern for any given period, but

some show very different patterns. The UK is a clear example of a country in which, for this period, the richest got relatively richer than did the poorest (with positional deprivation being highest for the poorest decile and lowest positional deprivation for the richest decile). Ireland and France are examples of the opposite, where the income distribution's poorest and lower-middle class saw higher relative gains over this ten-year period than did the richest decile.

[[Figure 2 about here]]

For the purposes of the analysis below, our measures of *mean positional deprivation, 5th-decile-based positional deprivation, 10-decile positional deprivation,* and *1st-decile positional deprivation* are all calculated for five-year periods or windows between 1997-2014 (to match the ESS data from 2002-2014. This is preferable to shorter periods that are less likely to be felt or registered in any meaningful way by people, and it is close to the average election cycle across our sample countries. Recall, for instance, Ronald Reagan's election-cycle question to voters, "are you better off than you were four years ago?" It is important to note that any given *positional deprivation* measure evolves from one year or period to another as a trend, such that small changes from one year to the next in a window of observed changes does not significantly alter the patterns (see robustness checks below). In any event, in the twenty-country sample and period under review, individual exposure to all the measures of *positional deprivation* were highly dispersed. For instance, *mean positional deprivation* ranges from -35.5 to 15.6 (mean 0.41, standard deviation 4.4).[7]

4.2. Measuring support for radical left and radical right parties

The ESS dataset allows us to measure our outcomes of interest (i.e. support for radical right and radical left populism) in various ways. The most important involve coding of answers to the question of which political party a respondent "feels closest to" at the time of the survey interview. This is preferable to using the related ESS question about which party a respondent "last voted for," since it is often the case that elections took place years earlier than the date of the survey interview and since we are interested in the present effects of

[7] See Appendix Table 1 for Summary Statistics of all our positional deprivation and other variables.

positional deprivation as an economic position that can change over time.[8] Answers to the question to which a respondent feels closest include a long menu of political parties and open-ended respondent answers, but can also include not feeling close to any party. We construe "feeling closest to" a given party as support for a party, and we focus on categorization of radical left and radical right populist parties in our analysis of such support. The categorization of radical left and radical right parties is based on widely-used coding, including that by March and Mudde (2005), Mudde (2007), March (2011), and Rooduijn and Burgoon (2018). Table 1 provides an overview of that categorization. All countries in our sample have one or more radical left or radical right party, and thirteen countries have both.

[[Table 1 about here]]

Based on such categorization of radical populist parties, we focus on several ways of conceptualizing support for radical right and radical left parties. In all cases we want to judge such support relative to support for non-radical parties, but also consider the possibility that respondents do not support any party at all – that is, "do not feel closest to any party." Our baseline measures of party support, hence, consider both radicalisms and the alternatives together. Our most encompassing version, the key baseline reported below, is *Party support (re: all parties),* where answers are coded as: 1=support any non-radical party; 2= support a radical left party; 3=support a radical right party; 4=support no party. We also report a second measure *Party support (re: mainstream),* where we focus on the choices between radical right and radical left versus mainstream parties: 1=support for any mainstream party (including only larger social democratic, conservative, liberal, and christian democratic parties, but excluding green, regional and fringe parties); 2=support radical left party; 3=support radical right party; 4=support no party. This second measure focuses on how radicalism may be particularly a rejection of mainstream parties, not partisan orientation generally. Beyond these two baseline specifications, robustness tests consider different conceptions of radicalism and their alternatives, including different categorizations of parties in the radical-right and of radical-left families.

Figure 3 provides a snapshot of the national variation in our baseline measure of support for the radical right and radical left. It shows the 2002-2014 mean for each of the

[8] The ESS measures of 'feeling closest to' and 'having voted for' parties are strongly correlated with one another. The only other party-choice measure in the ESS dataset involves a question about party membership, which captures a much smaller sample of respondents than party affinity or voting.

sample 20 countries the share of support for radical left and radical right parties, among respondents who supported some party in each of the sample 20 countries. By this measure, Switzerland is the country whose respondents express the highest level of support for radical right parties (24 percent averaged over the 2002-14 period); and Denmark is the country with the most support for radical-left parties (16 percent over the period). Combining radical right and radical left support, Denmark is the country with the most radical left (16.4 percent) and radical right (10.3 percent) support. And the United Kingdom is the country with the smallest share of radical right and left respondents, with only 3 percent of respondents feeling closest to UKIP or the British National Party averaged over the 2002 to 2014 period. Important for the validity of such coding in the ESS data is that the proportions of the respondents expressing support or having voted for radical-right parties correlates strongly with actual voting for such parties.[9]

[[Figure 3 about here]]

Finally, to further clarify support for radical right and radical left ideas, we also consider the ESS measures of voter support for parties in terms of the substantive platforms of these parties on issues of anti-globalization nationalism and authoritarianism. We do so by matching the ESS coding of support for parties to data party platforms from the Manifesto Project Dataset (MPD) (Budge et.al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Laver and Garry, 2000). The MPD measures positive and negative statements about party positions on particular issues by the number of sentences (or quasi-sentences) as a percentage of the total number of sentences in a manifesto. This makes it possible to gauge priorities of support or opposition to particular policy ideas (cf. Klingemann et al. 2006; Mikhaylov *et al.*, 2012), including issues related to nationalism and anti-globalization (Zurn et al. 2012; Chaudoin et al. 2015; Milner and Judkins 2004). We focus on a composite of support for and opposition to features of party platforms that gauge anti-globalization nationalism and authoritarianism (net of opposition to these principles) associated with radical populist backlash (Burgoon 2009, 2013; Colantone and Stanig 2017). Called *Net nationalist autarchy,* this composite includes the following components from MPD[10]: (1) *Protectionism*; (2) *Anti-Internationalism*; (3)

[9] For instance, the share of respondents supporting radical-right parties in the ESS sample period correlates with the actual vote share (*ParlGov* database, Döring and Manow 2016) in that same period, with an R-square of .88. See Appendix Table Two.

[10] See also Appendix Two for further details.

Anti-European Union; (4) *Anti-Multiculturalism*; (5) *Pro-National way of life*; (6) *Traditional morality*; (7) *Anti-Constitutionalism*; and (8) *Anti-Democracy and freedom/human rights*. Based on these platforms, we focus on the composite *Net nationalist autarchy,* where positive values represent net support for nationalist autarchy and negative values represent net opposition.[11] Most importantly, the party platforms provide some leverage to judge whether support for radical right or radical left parties is connected to such nationalist autarchy in the substance of the party platforms. And using the manifesto-based coding of party support in the ESS data, we can gauge whether positional deprivation directly influences party choice in terms of such platform orientations.

4.3 Empirical strategy

For our tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2, we consider a range of specifications, focusing particularly on those that allow direct comparison of the probability of supporting radical-right, radical-left or no support, relative to supporting non-radical parties. We model the process of choosing to support a (particular type of) political party, or not, as a discrete choice problem with four alternatives: (1) support a mainstream party; (2) support a radical left populist party; (3) support a radical right populist party; and (4) support no party. We choose this more complex structure over a simple dichotomous model (support for radical populist party, or not) for three reasons. First, Hypothesis 2 can only be tested by separately categorizing radical right and left parties, and comparing the effects of positional deprivation relative to a base category (that in itself implies some kind of multinominal rather than binomial model). Second, positional deprivation can plausibly affect the probability to withdraw from politics all together (i.e. not feeling close to any party). If so, excluding or lumping-together this category together with supporting a non-radical party would underestimate the true effect of positional deprivation on radical party support. Third, dropping cases that do not feel closest to any party would introduce selection bias as it is unlikely that respondents self-select into not supporting any party in a random fashion. And this could distort the true effect of positional deprivation on radical party support.

[11] In robustness checks we consider other specifications, such as excluding components that some scholars have found to have uneven traction among contemporary radical-right and -left parties, such as opposition to democracy.

To address support for radical right and radical left relative to key alternatives, we estimate multinominal logit models of the following form:

$$(1) \quad p_{ict} = \frac{\exp\left(\beta_{0,j} + \beta_{1,j} * x_{ict} + \beta_{2,j} * \delta_{ict} + \beta_{3,j} * C_{it} + \beta_{4,j} * T_{ic}\right)}{\sum_{l=1}^{k} \exp\left(\beta_{0,l} + \beta_{1,l} * x_{ict} + \beta_{2,l} * \delta_{ict} + \beta_{3,l} * C_{it} + \beta_{4,l} * T_{ic}\right)}, \qquad j = 1, \ldots, k$$

Where p_{ict} is the probability that individual respondent *i* in country *c* and ESS wave *t* feels closest to a radical left, radical right, or no party, *relative* to the baseline category of feeling closest to a non-radical party (the reference category that is set to zero in equation (1)). x is one of our measures of *positional deprivation* related to respondent *i* in country *c* and ESS wave *t*. In our baseline models we measure positional deprivation as the growth in real household income across all deciles (or the 5th, 10th, or 1st decile) of a respondents' country minus the income decile change of the respondent him/herself over the previous 5-year period. δ_i is a set of individual-level control variables. C and T are country and time (i.e. ESS wave) fixed effects. To account for the autocorrelation introduced by proxying individual-level income dynamics by income changes in a respondents' income decile we cluster the standard errors on the country-decile level.[12] We report all results as log odds, where we expect β_1 for all measures of *positional deprivation* to be substantially and statistically significantly positive, suggesting that individuals that have seen their own household income increase less rapidly (or decrease more) than other deciles in their own society are more likely to support a radical right or radical left populist party.

As controls, we consider a range of socio-demographic, economic, and attitudinal variables. We control for a respondent's highest level of completed *education* (1 = less than lower secondary education, 2 = lower secondary education, 3 = upper secondary education, 4 = post-secondary non-tertiary education, 5 = tertiary education). We also control for whether respondents are *unemployed* (1 = unemployed); their *age*; their sex (1 = *female*); their subjective *religiosity* (11-point scale; 0 = not at all religious, 10 = very religious); whether they or their parents are born in a different country (1=*foreign born*); whether they live in a rural or *urban* surrounding (1 = urban); and their general *left-right* self-identification (0 = left, 1 = right).

[12] Our results are robust to other type of clustering, such as on the country-year-decile level.

We foresee three potential sources of bias in our estimates of the effect of *positional deprivation*. First, as is well understood in the discrete choice literature, the identification of multinominal logit models is contingent upon the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption.[13] In our case the IIA assumption entails that, conditional on the covariates included in equation (1), the odds of any individual respondent choosing any of the four alternatives does not depend upon whether a radical right and/or left party is present or absent in a particular country-year.[14] To test this assumption we run Hausman and McFadden (1984) tests for all categories included in all regressions reported in the main text. In none of the 48 cases do we reject the null-hypothesis that the odds are independent of other alternatives (results are available on request).[15]

Second, our estimates in equation (1) could be biased due to the fact that we are forced to proxy individual-level income dynamics with the income dynamic of the respondents' decile group which we assume (s)he was in during the previous 5-year period (based on the decile the ESS has coded him/her in at the end of the 5-year period). This means that our measures of positional deprivation introduce significant measurement error because: (i) there may be significant within-decile differences in income dynamics relevant to political preferences, but which we average out by design; and (ii) we may miscode individuals that have moved into another decile over the previous 5-year period. To the extent that this measurement error is not random, which should bias regression coefficients downwards due to attenuation bias, this could affect the validity of our estimates. We address this issue by a robustness check whereby we include the dynamics of the decile above and below (separately) together with the income decile that a respondent is coded in, and find the results unchanged (results available on request).[16] To adjust for the autocorrelation generated by (i) we cluster the standard errors on the country-decile level in all our estimates.

Lastly, as is typical for observational data, our multinomial logit estimates may be biased due to confounding (i.e. unobserved variables that cause both positional deprivation

[13] Note that this assumption is necessary as positional deprivation is a feature of the case (i.e. the individual) rather than the alternative (i.e. the party), such that models able to circumvent the IIA assumption (such as nested logit and multinominal probit models) are not useful to our task (Long and Freese 2014).
[14] In other words, the estimates are valid to the extent that if any or several of the four alternatives is not available in a particular country-year that the relative odds across the remaining categories are the same, as compared to the counterfactual case that all alternatives were available in that same country-year.
[15] Note further that if the IIA assumption is violated in some of our regressions, this is likely to bias against our expectations, since radical right/left supporters are plausibly more likely to choose to support no party at all, as opposed to a mainstream party, when no radical right/left party is available (Long and Freese 2014).
[16] Individuals are unlikely to move up or down more than one decile within 5 years.

and party support).[17] This, of course, is the most important motivation for using country and time fixed effects in all our baseline models. These fixed effects control by design for all omitted variables that vary across countries and for all omitted variables that affect all respondents at the same time (i.e. common shocks). In addition to this we always include a large set of individual-level control variables (see above). Nonetheless we would like to make clear that given the important caveats discussed above we consider our results to reflect robust correlations rather than causation.

We expect our empirical approach to yield substantial leverage to test our hypotheses and explore links between positional deprivation and radicalism. Nonetheless, we consider a range of alternative specifications, a number of which address these main threats to inference. We also extend our main analysis of support for radical right and radical left parties, to analysis of how such party orientations and positional deprivation relate to substantive party platforms.

5. FINDINGS

We present the results of such analysis by first laying out the findings from the baseline specifications of the multinomial logit analysis. We then present and discuss key extensions to the baselines, including the party-platform results, before turning to discussion of robustness and sensitivity tests. On balance, the findings yield substantial and statistically significant support for both Hypothesis 1 that positional deprivation should spur radicalism, and for Hypothesis 2 that upper-register positional deprivation and lower-register positional deprivation play out differently for radical right and left.

5.1. Support for Radical Left and Radical Right Parties

Table 2 summarizes the results for how our broadest measure of positional deprivation, *Mean positional deprivation,* influences both support for radical right and radical left populist parties – providing a direct test of Hypothesis 1. The Table shows results for two multinomial logit models. The first model (M1) is summarized in the first three columns, focused on our baseline measure of *Party Support (re: all parties),* and shows how *mean positional*

[17] Note that reverse causality is unlikely to be a source of endogeneity in our estimations, since a respondent's party support can hardly be expected to cause 5-year relative income dynamics across income deciles.

deprivation and the other right-hand side paramesters correlate with the probability that a voter will support a radical left party (column 1), a radical right party (column 2) or no party (column 3), relative to the baseline category of supporting any other party. The second model (M2), summarized in the last three columns of Table 2, focuses on results for the alternative measure of *Party Support (re: mainstream parties),* showing how positional deprivation and the other parameters shape the probability of supporting radical-left (column 4), radical right (column 5) and no party (column 6), this time relative to support for mainstream parties as the baseline category.

[[Table 2 about here]]

Across both specifications, the controls perform in line with earlier estimates of radical right and radical left populism. For instance, supporters of radical right and radical left parties are more likely to be younger, subjectively less well-off, and secular than those supporting non-radical parties. And radical right respondents, more than their radical left counterparts, are more likely to be male, less educated, and self-report as ideologically right-oriented. The fixed-effect dummies for countries and survey rounds (not shown) are also often highly significant,[18] with both radical left and radical right support tending to increase in more recent waves of the survey, including a substantial up-tick in the 2014 wave.

As for the main results, both models (M1 and M2) show that *Mean positional deprivation* significantly correlates with support for radical left and radical right parties. Respondents in deciles whose five-year gains in real household income are more outpaced by the average gains across all deciles in the income spectrum are statistically significantly more likely to support radical left and radical right parties. This pattern should be seen as a spurring of radical party support relative to how *mean positional deprivation's* propensity to spur support for other parties generally (M1) or support for mainstream parties (M2). Importantly, this broad measure of positional deprivation more strongly positively correlates with support for radical left parties than with radical right parties. And interestingly, *mean positional deprivation* also significantly correlates with a higher propensity to support no party (columns 3 and 5) – comporting with the idea that the combination of over-time and positional misfortune might translate into political withdrawal as well as radicalism. With

[18] Due to highly singular matrix for calculation of dummies' standard errors, a few of the country dummies drop out. But alternative mixes of country fixed effects does not appreciably alter the main results.

respect to Hypothesis 1, hence, we see across both broad specifications and net of this possibility of no support (a kind of political retreat), our most encompassing measure of positional deprivation appears to significantly increase the likelihood of respondents supporting radical left and radical right parties.

Figure 4 provides a snapshot of the substantive size of these effects, based on M1. On the vertical axis, the left-hand panel captures the predicted probability of supporting radical-right or radical-left parties across the full (sub-)sample distribution of *Mean Positional Deprivation*, holding all other parameters at their means or medians. We report the schedules for support for radical-left and for radical-right in the same panel, clarifying their relative sensitivity to this broad measure of positional deprivation. The latter's effects are clearly stronger for radical left than radical right support. But as graphically captured by the positively-sloped confidence intervals, radical right support is also significantly spurred by *mean positional deprivation*. Both results are substantively quite large, with the full range of *mean positional deprivation* predicting, counterfactually, a tripling of the chance of supporting radical right and more than quadrupling the chance of supporting radical left parties. This reflects, of course, the relative rarity of supporting radical parties in European party systems, and with the average chance of supporting radical parties (among all respondents, not just those supporting a party) being a mere 3 percent in the ESS sample. Across the kind of variation in *mean positional deprivation* a given individual is likely to experience over the period, the substantive effects are more modest: about one-tenth of the full predicted range. Nonetheless, the substantive effect of *mean positional deprivation* is comparable to that of subjective income/wellbeing, though substantially smaller than the effect of education in our models. We interpret Table 1's findings as substantively, not just statistically significantly, supporting Hypothesis 1.

[[Figure 4 about here]]

Figure 4's right-hand panel also shows that *mean positional deprivation* predicts a substantively meaningful increase in the probability of respondents supporting 'no party'. In absolute terms this predicted increase – from about 42 percent to about 51 percent chance of supporting no party across the full range of *mean positional deprivation* – appears much larger than the effects for radical right and radical left. However, that predicted increase is much more modest if one considers that not feeling close to any particular party is much more

common (above 40 percent of ESS respondents) than embracing a radical party. Still, the results broaden our sense that positional deprivation yields political backlash not just in the form of radicalism but perhaps also in terms of retreat or non-participation.

Table 3 considers whether the broad patterns apply to alternative measures of positional deprivation, including those that gauge a respondent's decile's growth relative to a particular decile. The six models summarized in the Table focus on the same baseline dependent variables as in Table 1: *Party support (re: all other parties)* and *Party support (re: mainstream parties)*. The six specifications are also identical to Table 2 with respect to controls, standard errors and estimator. The difference, here, is that Table 3 estimates the effects of three key decile-focused measures of positional deprivation: *5th-decile positional deprivation* (M3 and M4) to capture middle-register deprivation*; 10th-decile positional deprivation* (M5 and M6) to capture upper-register deprivation*; and 1st-decile positional deprivation* (M7 and M8) to capture lower-register deprivation. To save space, Table 3 only shows results for these main parameters (controls perform virtually identically as in Table 2). Modeling the effects of these three measures provides, in part, a robustness test of Hypothesis 1, in that we expect significant spurring of left and right radicalism across the measures. Modeling the decile-based measures' effects is mainly, however, a test of Hypothesis 2, where we expect upper-register positional deprivation and lower-register positional deprivation to play out in divergent ways for radical right and left.

Indeed, the results are interesting for our arguments, providing mixed support for Hypothesis 1 but strong support for Hypothesis 2. The results in M3 and M4 show that *5th-decile positional deprivation* tends to significantly spur the likeliihood of supporting both radical left and radical right parties (columns 1, 2, 4 and 5) and also of supporting no party (columns 3 and 6). The results are stable across the specification of such positions relative to supporting any other party (M3) or relative to supporting mainstream parties (M4). These results basically echo those in Table 2.

[[Table 3 about here]]

The remaining models in Table 3, however, show important variation in how upper-register positional deprivation and lower-register positional deprivation play out for radicalism. M5 and M6 show the results for upper-register positional deprivation, focused on *10th-decile positional deprivation.* This measure significantly increases the likelihood of

supporting radical left parties, and also increases the likelihood that respondents support no party. However, *10th-decile positional deprivation* does *NOT* significantly correlate with higher probability of supporting radical right parties (column 2 for M5 and column 5 for M6). Here the coefficients are positive but under standard levels of statistical significance. This pattern narrows the empirical support for Hypothesis 1, in that we see that at least upper-register positional deprivation may not spur support for radical right parties, only for radical left parties. On the other hand, the pattern is very much consistent with Hypothesis 2, where we expected upper-register positional deprivation to more strongly spur radical left than radical right support.

Table 3's results for lower-register positional deprivation (M7 and M8) are similarly interesting. Here we see that *1st-decile positional deprivation* significantly spurs support for radical-right parties – as or more strongly than did any other measures of positional deprivation. But such lower-register positional deprivation does NOT significantly spur the likelihood of supporting radical left parties, or for that matter of supporting no party. This pattern is again a narrowing or weakening of our support for Hypothesis 1, this time revealing that lower-register positional deprivation might spur radical right but not radical left partisanship. This pattern strongly and clearly supports our Hypothesis 2, this time showing that lower-register positional deprivation is certainly stronger in its spurring of support for radical right than for radical left.

Figures 5 and 6 below graphically clarifiy and summarize the substantive size of these results, focusing on the results with respect to *Party support (re: all parties)* (M3, M5, M7). Figure 5's panel (a) summarizes how the full range of *5th-decile positional deprivation* predicts significant increase in support for both radical-right and radical-left parties, on a scale of increase comparable to the results for *mean positional deprivation* shown in Figure 4. Figure 5 panel (b), however, shows how *10th-decile positional deprivation* more strongly predicts higher probabiility of supporting radical left, while predicting only a very modest (and statistically insignificant) increase in radical right. And Figure 5 panel (c) shows the partner result, where 1st-decile positional deprivation more strongly predicts higher probabiilty of supporting radical right while predicting no significant increase in radical left support. Figure 6 summarizes the results for the "no support" outcome, show that *5th-decile positional deprivation* spurs probability of supporting no party at a pace comparable to the results for *mean positional deprivation*. But *10th-decile positional deprivation* has

substantively more modest such effects and 1st-decile positional deprivation has no such significant effect.

[[Figure 5 about here]]

[[Figure 6 about here]]

5.2. Extensions and Robustness

Table 4 checks the above baseline results but focuses on measures of *Party support* that take some account of the possibility that voters might respond to positional deprivation by shifting their past political participation and embrace of non-radical parties. We focus on such possibilities with respect to both all parties (the left-hand trio of columns) and with respect to mainstream parties (the right-hand columns), comparable to the baseline analysis. Here, however, the left-hand columns in Table 4 (M9, M11, M13, M15) focus on *Support party (re: having voted)* is coded as*:* 1=support any non-radical party and voted in last election for any non-radical party; 2=support radical left party and voted in the last election; 3=support radical right party and voted in the last election; 4=no party now but voted for a non-radical party in the last election. The right-hand columns (results for M10, M12, M14, M16) summarize similar models but where the focus is on having voted for mainstream parties, *Support party (re: having voted mainstream)*: 1=support any mainstream party and voted in last election for mainstream; 2=support radical left and voted in last election; 3=support radical right and voted in last election; and 4=support no party but voted mainstream in last election. These models are in all other respects the same as in Tables 2 and 3. But they provide some leverage to gauge the possibility that voters may have shifted their stance from participating in the most recent electoral process, a shift that may express discontent with a past political affiliation or orientation.

[[Table 4 about here]]

The results of this analysis corroborate the patterns captured in our baseline models from Tables 2 and 3. The most general measures of positional deprivation, *mean positional deprivation* and *5th-decile positional deprivation,* tend to spur support for both the radical left, the radical right and also support for no party. On the other hand, upper-register positional

deprivation (*10th-decile positional deprivation)* tends to spur support for the radical left but not right, while lower-register positional deprivation (*1st-decile positional deprivation*) tends to spur support for the radical right but not left. We have, hence, moderate support for the general claim in Hypothesis 1 that positional deprivation on the whole tends to spur radicalism of the left and right. And we have strong and consistent support for a strong version of Hypothesis 2, that upper-register positional deprivation spurs mainly/only radical left party support, while lower-register positional deprivation spurs mainly/only radical right party support. These alternative specifications also corroborate the added result – consistent with the above argumentation – that positional deprivation may not only to spur radicalism, but also political retreat or withdrawal from the electoral process.

To further explore support for radical left and radical right parties, we can also consider the coding of party choices with respect to how much a given party embraces *Net nationalist autarchy* in its most recent party platform or manifesto. Figure 7 provides a box-plot overview of *net nationalist autarchy* for the 20 ESS countries between 2002 and 2014. The boxes demarcate the lower-25th percentile to upper 75th-percentile, show the country-period median, as well as the adjacent values and outliers. As can be seen, the party systems have, on average, negative *net nationalist autarchy* scores, suggesting that parties tend to eschew rather than embrace such a programme.[19] But variation within the party systems is substantial, and interesting: in most countries, the parties with the highest *net nationalist autarchy* are radical right populist parties, as listed in Table 1. On the other extreme, it's clear that mainstream left parties, as well as green and liberal parties, tend to be most hostile to this nationalist and populist programme. Importantly, Radical-left parties do not appear to be as extreme in either direction, but are certainly less focused on *net nationalist autarchy* than their radical-right counterparts.

[[Figure 7 about here]]

Based on a party's *net nationalist autarchy* in a given year, we can consider the possibility that a respondent's support for that party in a given ESS survey round partly expresses support for the *net nationalist autarchy* in the party's platform. We do so by fitting OLS models (with fixed country and survey-round effects) where the dependent variable is

[19] The broader sample's summary statistics (see Appendix One) show that *net nationalist autarchy* among the parties for whom ESS respondents in our 20-country sample voted for averages –6.6 (the average party platform thus eschewing *net nationalist autarchy*), with the average level increasing appreciably between 2002 and 2014.

the *net nationalist autarchy* of the party that a respondent supports.[20] Of course, a respondent's support for a party may have little to do with any details of a party's platform, not to mention the features captured by *net nationalist autarchy.* To partly address this issue, we include left-right self placement by respondents as a control on general orientation, and we can control for the same individual-level factors addressed in the multinomial logit models above (as well as fixed effects and country-decile clustering of standard errors).

Table 5 shows the results of this extension to our main analysis. M17 explores whether respondent support for radical-right and radical-left parties (as opposed to supporting any other party, the excluded category) is more likely to be a party with a platform emphasizing *net nationalist autarchy*. The model yields econometric support for Figure 7's descriptive pattern. Support for radical-right parties is positively and highly-significantly more likely to entail a party platform embracing *net nationalist autarchy.* Radical-left parties, in contrast, are *not* significantly more likely to be parties embracing *net nationalist autarchy.* Supporting such patterns as causal inferences is very dicey, not least because feeling close to a party may have to do with conditions other than the party's platform, even after controlling for more general partisan differences. Nonetheless, the substantive *net nationalist autarchy* orientation is at least strongly relevant to a major face of radicalism: radical-right party orientation.

[[Table 5 about here]]

The remaining models (M18-M21), hence, consider whether the measures of positional deprivation explored above have a significant association with a respondent's "supported" *net nationalist autarchy.* The results suggest that only *1st-decile positional deprivation* – the upper-register positional deprivation in M21 – is significantly associated with a voter's revealed support for *net nationalist autarchy* based on the party to which a respondent feels closest. The other measures of positional deprivation, both the general and broadest measures like *mean positional deprivation* but also the *10th-decile* and *5th-decile positional deprivation* measures, tend to have no significant association with a respondent's chosen party's platform with respect to *net nationalist autarchy*. This suggests that direct support for Hypothesis 1 may not extend to this particular measure of the substantive

[20] To address skew in the raw manifesto measures, the estimates focus on the difference of logged measures of pro- and anti-net nationalist autarchy (Mikhaylov et.al. 2012).

orientation of the parties. On the other hand, the significant results for lower-register positional deprivation comport with our main findings where lower-register positional deprivation is particularly strong in spurring radical-right party support. Such aspects of Hypothesis 2, hence, find support in our (admittedly rough) measure of platform substance.

We interpret the results in Tables 2 through 5 as suggesting that positional deprivation likely fosters voter support for radical right and radical left populism. The main qualification is that decile-based measures of positional deprivation significantly alter support for radical left *or* right, not always both, and that we haven't found consistent evidence based on the substantive platforms of party choices. With respect to Hypothesis 1, we believe that the balance of evidence suggests that positional deprivation spurs radicalism, but not necessarily of both the radical left and radical right. Which radicalism it is, or both, depends on the manifestation of positional deprivation. Our Hypothesis 2 articulates such nuance, and finds strong support in Tables 3 through 5 – where upper-register positional deprivation particularly spurs radical left support, while lower-register positional deprivation particularly spurs radical right support. Also consistent with the tenor of our arguments is the inductive result summarized in Tables 2 through 4, that positional deprivation not only spurs radicalism but also rough measures of political retreat or nonparticipation. In short, the empirical exploration is consistent with the political resentment and relative deprivation that qualitative and journalistic accounts have found to loom large in radical right and radical left ferment.

Testing these issues of resentment more directly, however, is beyond the ESS dataset, which lacks survey questions and parameters to allow a focused exploration of whether economic resentments play a mediating role linking radical-right populist support to positional deprivation. Such tests would require questions about actual subjective economic position *relative* to others and/or about possible dissatisfaction or disgruntlement with their own and others' treatment by the government. The closest the ESS comes to such parameters are questions about satisfaction generally with the government or economy. For what it's worth, our positional measures significantly spur disatisfaction and distrust, which in turn significantly spur radical-right and radical-left voting. And taking these as extra control variables modestly lowers the explanatory power of both *Positional deprivation* in shaping radical popoulism (as in Tables 2-5). More meaningful mediation analysis, however, must be left to better measures and further study.

Within the possibilities afforded by the ESS dataset, it is worth pointing out that the effects summarized in Tables 2-5 do not get significantly or consistently altered by those individual parameters on which we focus as controls. For instance, the tendency of positional deprivation to spur support for radical right or radical left parties does not get significantly altered by gender, age, subjective income, urban residence, religiosity or right self-identification. An exception involves being foreign born or having parents who are foreign born: Positional deprivation spurs support for radical-right parties mainly among natives and those whose parents are also natives. While this may have a variety of explanations, an obvious one is that the economic anxieties associated with positional deprivation might be trumped by the more cultural considerations that might preoccuppy foreign-born voters in their political thinking about political party choices.

Further, the main results in Table 2 through 5 are robust to many alternative specifications.[21] First, alternative specifications of our left-hand-side and right-hand-side measures do not significantly alter our results. The results hold across specifications of positional deprivation, for instance to taking other benchmark deciles or decile combinations. Relevant to the high-dispersal of the positional measures, the results also hold to removing extreme-low and extreme-high (e.g. $<1^{st}$ and $>99^{th}$ percentile) outliers in positional deprivation or inequality from the sample. [22] The significance and direction of the baseline results hold for alternative measures of 'radical right' and 'radical left' party families and to net-nationalist-autarchy in party platforms. With respect to the party-family specification, this includes removing any particular 'radical' party from the coding. And it includes coding as 'radical right' those parties that have quite recently turned to radical populism, such as Poland's Law and Justice Party.[23]

Second, the baseline patterns hold to additional, fewer or different combinations of controls. The results hold with inclusion of additional individual-economic controls, like working hours or past unemployment; or other demographic controls like regions or measures of family composition; or further attitudinal controls (e.g. attitudes towards immigration, attitude towards government redistribution, and work satisfaction).[24] While our baseline models use fixed effects for countries and time (survey rounds), random-intercept modelling

[21] The principal robustness and sensitivity tests discussed here are summarized in a Supplemental Appendix: Extra Results on Positional Deprivation and Support for Radical Right and Radical Left Parties, available at: http://www.uva.nl/profiel/b/u/b.m.burgoon/b.m.burgoon.html .
[22] See Supplemental Appendix Table One and Two for a summary of these results.
[23] See Supplemental Appendix Tables Three and Four.
[24] See Supplemental Appendix Tables Five through Eight.

allows more focused control and exploration of the role of possibly-confounding aggregate country-year factors. This is relevant to whether positional deprivation has implications for radical-right and radical-left parties net of economic conditions like levels or changes in aggregate unemployment rates, GDP per capita, or Gini-index inequality. Controlling explicitly for these aggregates reveals that our positional deprivation conditions tend to have the hypothesized effects in spurring support for radical right and left parties – net of these other aggregate economic conditions.[25] This highlights what we see as distinctive about positional deprivation – that it combines dynamic with positional features of economic misfortune plausibly relevant to radicalism and populism. Furthermore, in random intercept models the baseline results also hold to inclusion of other macro-level controls like electoral institutions (e.g. proportional representation, democracy, federalism, foreign born stocks).

Third and finally, the baseline patterns hold up to alternative estimators. The baseline results certainly hold to the existing multinomial logit estimator but with alternative standard errors calculations, such as alternative clustering (e.g. country-decile-year). More importantly, however, the results also hold for logit or probit estimators with the same controls, fixed effects and standard error calculations, but where we take support for radical left or for radical right as dichotomous dependent variables (e.g. *Support Radical Right,* where 1=support radical right party, 0=support any other or mainstream party; and *Support Radical Left* where 1=support radical left party, 0=support any other or mainstream party).[26] The patterns are similarly stable for logits with random intercept and random slope models.[27] Finally, the baseline patterns for Hypothesis 1 also hold for logit or probit models where we combine radical parties (1=radical left or radical right party, 0=any other or mainstream party).[28] Altogether, these robustness and sensitivity tests suggests that the results summarized in Tables 2 through 5 are more than a selective cut at the opinion data.

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6. CONCLUSION

In this study we have sought to clarify how support for radical-right and radical-left parties might be importantly influenced by various conceptions of 'positional deprivation', how much a person's growth in disposable household income is outpaced by that of others in his

[25] See Supplemental Appendix Tables Nine and Ten.
[26] See Supplemental Appendix Tables Eleven and Twelve.
[27] See Supplemental Appendix Tables Thirteen and Fourteen.
[28] See Supplemental Appendix Table Fifteen.

or her country. Such positional deprivation, we have argued, directly highlights the combination of over-time (dynamic) and between-group (positional) economic misfortune that qualitative reporting has suggested loom large in the politics of radical populism. We have argued that positional deprivation, indeed, spurs generally support for radical-left and radical-right parties. We have also explained that different manifestations of positional deprivation – particularly upper-register positional deprivation as opposed to lower-register positional deprivation – can be expected to play out quite differently for radical right and radical left support. Our empirical inquiry into patterns of individual-level support for radical right and radical left parties in 20 European countries between 2002 and 2014 provides support for these expectations. On the whole, particularly with respect to the broadest measures of positional deprivation, positional deprivation tends to spur support for radicalism of the left *or* right. However, positional deprivation relative to the wealthiest deciles (upper-register positional deprivation) tends to spur support for the radical left more than right, and positional deprivation relative to the poorest deciles (lower-register positional deprivation) spurs support for the radical right more than left.

Important qualifications apply to these claims. First, limits in the public-opinion data analyzed here have made it difficult to directly explore the mechansisms putatively at work in the patterns reported above. We don't know whether the positional deprivation measures really shape resentments, and we certainly don't know enough to disentangle the results from cultural resentments. A second qualification involves the cross-section-time series basis of the positional measures. While relevant, these are less evocative than 'non-anonymous', true-panel information that might capture more valid, if by necessity more short-term, measures of positional deprivation. Third, the analysis is based on available data for a cross-section of countries and years capturing broad differences in European political economic and electoral experience, but the conclusions may not extend to longer time periods or countries outside the European context. For all these reasons, we offer the paper's arguments and evidence as suggestive.

But what they suggest is important to understanding how economic experience shapes the political ferment of radical-right and radical-left parties and populist movements. Positional deprivation may well have implications that go above and beyond the role of well-known economic forces. Scholarly and popular commentary has often dismissed economic forces as less important than cultural experiences to shaping the palpable resentments at play in radical-populist politics. Making such judgment, however, is premature, not only awaiting

more nuanced research designs disentangling cultural from economic experiences, but also for the more basic reason that we need to measure the aspects of economic experience that capture the distinctive combination of dynamic and positional economic misfortune. Measures of positional deprivation may help capture such misfortune. And if the patterns discussed above hold, then we know better the economic conditions that are afoot and can better learn which economic interventions can hope to solve one of the most important challenges to contemporary Western political stability and democracy.

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Table 1.
Radical-Left and Radical-Right parties in Twenty European Countries

Country	Radical left party	Radical right party
Austria		Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)
Belgium		Flemish Interest (VB), National Front Belgium (FNb)
Czech Repub.	Commun. Party Boh.&Mor.(KSCM)	Dawn (Úsvit Tomia Okamury)
Denmark	Socialist People's Party (SF) Red-Green Alliance (EL)	Danish People's Party (DF)
Finland	Left Alliance (VAS)	Finns Party/True Fins (PS)
France	French Communist Party (PCF) Worker's Struggle (LO,) Revolut. Commun. League (LCR)	National Front (FN) National Republican Movement (MNR)
Germany	The Left (Die Linke) Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS)	The Republicans (REP) National Democratic Party (NPD)
Greece	Communist Party of Greece (KKE) Coalition of the Left (SYN/Syriza)	Popular Orthodox Party (LAOS) Gold.Dawn
Hungary	Workers Party (WP)	Jobbik (Movement for a Better Hungary)
Ireland	Sinn Fein (SF)	
Italy	Commun. Refoundation Party (PRC) Communists (Comunisti)	Northern League (LN) National Alliance (AN) Tricolor Flame (FT)
Netherlands	Socialist Party (SP)	List Pim Frotuyn (LPF) Party of Freedom (PVV)
Norway	Red Party (Rodt) Socialist Left Party (SV)	Progress Party (FrP)
Poland		League of Polish Families (LPR) Congress of the New Right (KNP)
Slovakia	Communist Party Slovakia (KSS)	Slovak National Party (SNS)
Slovenia	Združena levica (ZL)	Slovene National Party (SNS)
Spain	United Left (IU/Podemos)	
Sweden	Left (V)	Sweden Democrats (SD)
Switzerland		Swiss People's Party (SVP)/UDC) Freedom Party (FrP) Ticino League (LdT)
United Kingdom		British National Party (BNP) UK Independence Party (UKIP)

Source: Mudde 2007; March and Mudde 2005; March 2011; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018

Table 2:
Positional Deprivation and Support for Radical Left, Radical Right, or No Party

	M1			M2		
	Radical left	Radical right	No party	Radical left	Radical right	No party
Mean Positional Deprivation						
Mean decile growth minus respondent's decile's growth	0.046***	0.028**	0.012**	0.048***	0.030**	0.014**
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.005)
Subjective income/wellbeing	-0.300***	-0.216***	-0.194***	-0.335***	-0.252***	-0.229***
	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.017)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.020)
Education	0.008	-0.253***	-0.180***	0.057*	-0.233***	-0.155***
	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.012)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.011)
Unemployed	0.224**	0.084	0.157***	0.233**	0.094	0.162***
	(0.085)	(0.183)	(0.040)	(0.087)	(0.182)	(0.047)
Age	-0.003	-0.010***	-0.023***	-0.006**	-0.012***	-0.025***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)
Female	-0.023	-0.345***	0.323***	0.018	-0.338***	0.343***
	(0.044)	(0.052)	(0.019)	(0.045)	(0.051)	(0.021)
Foreign born	-0.029	-0.444***	0.171***	-0.029	-0.444***	0.166***
	(0.075)	(0.089)	(0.027)	(0.080)	(0.093)	(0.031)
Religiosity	-0.168***	-0.043*	-0.058***	-0.177***	-0.047**	-0.063***
	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.005)
Urban	0.110+	-0.048	-0.052*	0.085	-0.097+	-0.090***
	(0.060)	(0.054)	(0.021)	(0.060)	(0.052)	(0.025)
Right self-placement	-2.308***	1.498***	0.650***	-2.408***	1.405***	0.543***
	(0.077)	(0.139)	(0.028)	(0.077)	(0.140)	(0.045)
Constant	-0.153	-1.242***	2.077***	0.658**	-0.414	2.916***
	(0.241)	(0.287)	(0.119)	(0.240)	(0.272)	(0.157)
Country dummies		Yes			Yes	
ESS Survey-round dummies		Yes			Yes	
Pseudo R-squared		0.126			0.139	
N		152,587			137,523	

DV for models M1: *Support party (re: all other parties):* 1=support any other non-radical party (baseline category); 2=support radical left party; 3=support radical right party; 4=support no party.
DV for models M2: *Support party (re: mainstream parties): :* 1=support mainstream party (baseline category); 2=support radical left party; 3=support radical right party; 4=support no party.
All models multinomial logit coefficients with standard errors clustered by country-decile (in parentheses), with country and survey-round fixed effects.

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 3:
Middle-register, Upper-register and Lower-register Positional Deprivation and Support for Parties

	Support party (re: all other parties)			*Support party (re: mainstream parties)*		
	Radical left	Radical right	No party	Radical left	Radical right	No party
5th-decile Positional Deprivation		M3			M4	
5th decile growth minus respondent's	0.033**	0.025**	0.011*	0.034**	0.028**	0.014**
decile's growth	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.009)	(0.005)
Country dummies		Yes			Yes	
ESS Survey-round dummies		Yes			Yes	
Pseudo R-squared		0.126			0.139	
N		152,587			137,523	
10th-decile Positional Deprivation		M5			M6	
10th decile growth minus respondent's	0.024***	0.007	0.006**	0.029***	0.011+	0.009***
decile's growth	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)
Country dummies		Yes			Yes	
ESS Survey-round dummies		Yes			Yes	
Pseudo R-squared		0.126			0.140	
N		152,587			137,523	
1st-decile Positional Deprivation		M7			M8	
1st decile growth minus respondent's	0.009	0.030***	0.002	0.002	0.025**	-0.002
decile's growth	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.004)
Country dummies		Yes			Yes	
ESS Survey-round dummies		Yes			Yes	
Pseudo R-squared		0.126			0.139	
N		152,587			137,523	

DV for models M3, M5, M7: *Support party (re: all other parties):* 1=support any other non-radical party (baseline category); 2=support radical left party; 3=support radical right party; 4=support no party.
DV for models M4, M6, M8: *Support party (re: mainstream parties): :* 1=support mainstream party (baseline category); 2=support radical left party; 3=support radical right party; 4=support no party.
All models multinomial logit coefficients with standard errors clustered by country-decile (in parentheses), with country and survey-round fixed effects.

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 4:

Positional Deprivation and Alternative Measures of Support for Radical Left Parties, Radical Right Parties or No parties

	Support party (re: having voted)			*Support party (re: having voted mainstream*		
	Radical left	Radical right	No party	Radical left	Radical right	No party
Mean Positional Deprivation		M9			M10	
Mean decile growth minus respondent's	0.046***	0.026**	0.015**	0.051***	0.033*	0.019***
decile's growth	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.011)	(0.015)	(0.006)
Country dummies		Yes			Yes	
ESS Survey-round dummies		Yes			Yes	
Pseudo R-squared		0.124			0.139	
N		109,852			78,711	
5th-decile Positional Deprivation		M11			M12	
5th decile growth minus respondent's	0.033**	0.023*	0.014**	0.039**	0.029*	0.017**
decile's growth	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.006)
Country dummies		Yes			Yes	
ESS Survey-round dummies		Yes			Yes	
Pseudo R-squared		0.123			0.139	
N		109,852			78,711	
10th-decile Positional Deprivation		M13			M14	
10th decile growth minus respondent's	0.024***	0.003	0.007**	0.031***	0.006	0.013***
decile's growth	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.003)
Country dummies		Yes			Yes	
ESS Survey-round dummies		Yes			Yes	
Pseudo R-squared		0.124			0.140	
N		109,852			78,711	
1st-decile Positional Deprivation		M15			M16	
1st decile growth minus respondent's growth	0.010	0.036***	-0.000	-0.004	0.038***	-0.006
	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.012)	(0.005)
Country dummies		Yes			Yes	
ESS Survey-round dummies		Yes			Yes	
Pseudo R-squared		0.123			0.139	
N		109,852			78,711	

DV for models M9, M11, M13, M15: *Support party (re: having voted):* 1=support any other non-radical party and voted non-radical in last election (baseline category); 2=support RL party and voted in last election; 3=support RR party and voted in last election; 4=support no party and voted non-radical in last election.
DV for models M10, M12, M14, M16: *Support party (having voted mainstream): :* 1=support mainstream party and voted mainstream (baseline category); 2=support RL party and voted mainstream or RL in last election; 3=support RR and voted mainstream or RR in last election; 4=support no party and voted mainstream in last election.
All models multinomial logit coefficients with standard errors clustered by country-decile (in parentheses), with country and survey-round fixed effects.
+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 5:
Positional Deprivation and Net Nationalist Autarchy in Supported Parties' Platforms

	M17	M18	M19	M20	M21
(Reference categ.: Support other non-radical party)					
Support Radical Left	0.135				
	(0.115)				
Support Radical Right	1.703***				
	(0.121)				
Positional Deprivation					
Mean Positional Deprivation		0.002			
		(0.005)			
5th-decile Positional Deprivation			0.003		
			(0.005)		
10th-decile Positional Deprivation				-0.001	
				(0.004)	
1st-decile Positional Deprivation					0.014**
					(0.005)
Subjective income/wellbeing	0.014	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.006
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.014)
Education	0.001	-0.008	-0.008	-0.008	-0.009
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.009)
Unemployed	0.023	0.041	0.041	0.043	0.044
	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.042)
Age	0.002***	0.002**	0.002**	0.002**	0.002**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Female	-0.051***	-0.073***	-0.073***	-0.073***	-0.075***
	(0.012)	(0.015)	(0.015)	(0.014)	(0.015)
Foreign born	-0.092***	-0.086***	-0.086***	-0.086***	-0.085***
	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Religiosity	0.024***	0.020***	0.020***	0.021***	0.021***
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Urban	-0.034**	-0.030*	-0.030*	-0.030*	-0.033*
	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Right self-placement	0.911***	0.917***	0.917***	0.917***	0.918***
	(0.064)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.069)
Constant	-2.518***	-2.349***	-2.342***	-2.339***	-2.410***
	(0.071)	(0.080)	(0.079)	(0.083)	(0.080)
Country dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
ESS survey-round dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R-square	0.475	0.416	0.416	0.416	0.42
N	83,740	58,435	58,435	58,435	58,435

DV for models M17-M21: *Net Nationalist Autarchy* score of party to which respondent feels closest
All models are OLS with fixed effects for countries and survey waves, with OLS coefficients and standard errors clustered by country-decile (in parentheses).

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure 1:
Growth in Disposable Income by Decile, European-sample national means 1995-2005



Figure 2:
Growth in Disposable Income by Decile, selected countries 1995-2005



Figure 3:
Support for Radical Left and Radical Right Parties



* See Table One for list of radical left and radical right parties (0 means less than .5 percent or no party)

Figure 4:
Predicted Support for Radical Left, Radical Right, or for No Party as a function of Positional Deprivation



Figure 5:
Middlle-register, Upper-register, and Lower-register Positional Deprivation, and Predicted Support for Radical Left and Radical Right Parties

(a) Middle-register Pos.Dep.



(b) Upper-register Pos. Dep.



(c) Lower-register Pos.Dep.



Figure 6:
Middle-register, Upper-register, and Lower-register Positional Deprivation, and Predicted Support No Party

(a) Middle-register Pos.Dep.



(b) Upper-register Pos. Dep.



(c) Lower-register Pos.Dep.



Figure 7:
Net Nationalist Autarchy, 2002-2014 per-party means



Source: MPD data (Klingemann et al. 2006), own calculations (see Appendix Three).

Appendix One:
Summary statistics

	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Dependent variables					
Party support (1=any non-radical party)	154,278	2.581	1.460	1	4
Party support (changed from voted any party)	139,065	2.765	1.433	1	4
Party support (1=mainstream party)	110,887	2.325	1.445	1	4
Party support (changed from voted mainstream)	80,414	2.291	1.431	1	4
Net nationalist Autarchy	58,933	-1.159	1.373	-5.299	5.829
Positional deprivation					
Mean-based Positional deprivation	154,278	0.804	3.931	-35.841	15.587
5th-decile based positional deprivation	154,278	0.110	4.196	-44.761	17.186
10th-decile positional deprivation	154,278	2.388	7.971	-27.314	45.801
1st-decile positional deprivation	154,278	0.704	6.190	-36.613	28.023
Controls					
Subjective income/wellbeing	153,932	3.066	0.798	1	4
Education	154,041	3.158	1.338	1	5
Unemployed	154,278	0.052	0.223	0	1
Age	154,278	48.318	17.128	18	104
Gender	154,278	0.509	0.500	0	1
Foreign born	154,180	0.148	0.355	0	1
Religiosity	153,490	4.605	3.002	0	10
Urban	154,022	0.645	0.478	0	1
Right self-placement	154,278	0.678	0.467	0	1

Appendix Two:
Proportion support for Radical-right parties (based on ESS-based 'feel closest to…') versus actual votes for same parties (based on ParlGov in nearest subsequent election), 2002-2014.



Source: European Social Survey (1-7 combined file) and ParlGov datasets, own calculations

Appendix Three:
Measuring *net autarky* and *net nationalist autarky* in party platforms

Net nationalist autarchy is measured as a composite score for additive elements of a party platform (measured as relevant sentences or sentence fragments, as a % of total sentences in platform).
Net nationalist autarchy = (*per*109 + *per*110 + *per*406 + *per*601 + *per*608+ *per*603 + *per*204) − (*per*107 + *per*108 + *per*407 + *per*602 + *per*604 + *per*607 + *per*201 + *per*202 + *per*203)

The Comparative Manifesto Project codebook words the parameters as follows (preceded, in parentheses, with the sign of whether the element is counted in the above composite as support for or opposition to nationalist autarchy).

(–) per107. *Internationalism: Positive*
Need for international co-operation; co-operation with specific countries other than those coded in 101; need for aid to developing countries; need for world planning of resources; need for international courts; support for any international goal or world state; support for UN.

(+) per109. *Internationalism: Negative*
Favourable mentions of national independence and sovereignty as opposed to internationalism; otherwise as 107, but negative.

(–) per108. *European Community: Positive*
Favourable mentions of European Community/European Union in general; desirability of expanding the European Community/European Union and/or of increasing its competence; desirability of the manifesto country joining or remain- ing a member.

(+) per110. *European Community: Negative*
Hostile mentions of the European Community/European Union; opposition to specific European policies which are preferred by European authorities; otherwise as 108, but negative.

(+) per406. *Protectionism: Positive*
Favourable mentions of extension or maintenance of tariffs to protect internal markets; other domestic economic protectionism such as quota restrictions.

(–) per407. *Protectionism: Negative*
Support for the concept of free trade; otherwise as 406, but negative.

(+) per601. *National Way of Life: Positive*
Appeals to patriotism and/or nationalism; suspension of some freedoms in order to protect the state against subversion; support for established national ideas.

(–) per602. *National Way of Life: Negative*
Against patriotism and/or nationalism; opposition to the existing national state; otherwise as 601, but negative.

(–) per607. *Multiculturalism: Positive*

Cultural diversity, communalism, cultural plurality and pillarization; preserva- tion of autonomy of religious, linguistic heritages within the country including special educational provisions.

(+) per608. *Multiculturalism: Negative*
Enforcement or encouragement of cultural integration; otherwise as 607, but negative.

(+) per603. *Traditional Morality: Positive*
Favourable mentions of traditional moral values; prohibition, censorship and suppression of immorality and unseemly behaviour; maintenance and stability of family; religion.

(–) per604. *Traditional Morality: Negative*
Opposition to traditional moral values; support for divorce, abortion etc.; oth-
erwise as 603, but negative.

(–) per201. *Freedom and Human Rights*
Favourable mentions of importance of personal freedom and civil rights; free- dom from bureaucratic control; freedom of speech; freedom from coercion in the political and economic spheres; individualism in the manifesto country and in other countries.

(–) per202. *Democracy*
Favourable mentions of democracy as a method or goal in national and other organisations; involvement of all citizens in decision-making, as well as generalized support for the manifesto country's democracy.

(–) per203. *Constitutionalism: Positive*
Support for specific aspects of the constitution; use of constitutionalism as an argument for policy as well as general approval of the constitutional way of doing things.

(+) per204. *Constitutionalism: Negative*
Opposition to the constitution in general or to specific aspects; otherwise as 203, but negative.

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